TC09514 - [2025] UKFTT 00524 (TC)

At the first stage of the Martland analysis, we need to establish the length of the delay. We agree with Mr Abernethy that the tribunal has adopted a benevolent interpretation towards the date on which it has deemed a valid appeal to have been made by the appellant. But even taking this as 2 July 2024, it was 164 days late. That is serious and significant and requires us to identify the reasons for that delay.

These appear to be that: it was unsurprising that the wrong document was uploaded in the first place given that Mr Cardey is not a lawyer; having paid the safeguarding duty on 17 January 2024, he failed to give appropriate attention to the appeal, and this was why he did not respond immediately to the tribunal’s letter of 26 January 2024 when first notified on that date, nor when subsequently notified in April 2024; his personal circumstances meant that he was extremely tired and this contributed to his failure to pay full attention to the conduct of the appeal.

We now need to consider the third stage of the Martland analysis which is an evaluation all of the circumstances of the case. This involves a balancing exercise, assessing the merits of the reasons given for the delay and the prejudice which will be caused to both parties by granting or refusing permission. In undertaking this balancing exercise, we need to take into account the particular importance of the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost, and for statutory time limits to be respected. We should not apportion much weight to the fact that the appellant is a litigant in person, but we can have regard to any obvious strengths or weaknesses of its case.

Mr Cardey submits that it is understandable that he did not upload the correct document as he is a man of business rather than a lawyer. However, he is clearly a bright and intelligent man who runs a successful business. The instructions on the tribunal’s website regarding the decision which needs to be uploaded when submitting an appeal, are clear. They are not written in technical language, but in plain English, and should have been readily understandable by Mr Cardey. It seems likely that he read them since he attempted to upload a document. His failing was that it was the wrong document. If it had been left like that, then we would have had some sympathy.

However, he was notified by the tribunal’s letter of 26 January 2024, that he had uploaded the wrong document and that need to be rectified. He was also told that if that was not done within the original 30 day period, a revised notice of appeal would not be valid unless it contained reasons for that at late appeal.

It was Mr Cardey’s evidence that the reason he did not submit a revised notice of appeal following the tribunal’s letter was that having paid the safeguarding duty on 17 January 2024, he then failed to pay sufficient attention to the tribunal process. And furthermore, he was suffering from sleep deprivation as a result of caring for his son. Both are understandable reasons for failing to respond to the tribunal’s letter, but their weight at this final evaluation stage is diminished by the fact that the tribunal then sent a further copy of that letter to Mr Cardey on 23 April 2024. This should have alerted him to the fact that he needed to put in a new notice of appeal, yet he did not do that for a further two plus months.

We have also considered the obvious strengths and weaknesses of the appellant’s case. We agree with Mr Abernethy that there are obvious weaknesses. The jurisdiction of the tribunal is limited to a consideration of whether the decision and the review conclusion were correct. The appellant’s contentions that the CHIEF system was malfunctioning and that its agent was advised to use the override code, is wholly irrelevant to the correctness of the decision, and whilst it is something which might conceivably be a matter for a public law challenge by way of judicial review, it is not something within the jurisdiction of the tribunal. The same is true of the grounds of appeal dealing with the purpose of the safeguarding measure to safeguard the British Steel industry, and that it was unfair and unreasonable, given the pronouncements made by the UK and the EU regarding a trade deal, that quotas were retained and relevant to the period under appeal. Finally, the way in which quotas are allocated between periods, which comprises the appellant’s second ground of appeal is not something which is relevant to the correctness of the relevant decisions.

In light of the foregoing the balance of prejudice weighs in favour of rejecting the application. The seriousness and significance of the delay and the reasons given for it do not outweigh: The principle that time limits imposed by Parliament should be respected; the prejudice which will be caused to HMRC by the diversion of resources and additional cost; the obvious weakness of the appellant’s case.