TC09572 - [2025] UKFTT 00850 (TC)

In reaching our Decision, we have followed the three-stage test set out in Martland.

The length of the delay was just over 4 months. We bear in mind the importance of compliance with statutory time limits, and we agree that the delay is both serious and significant.

However, the length of the delay, which weighs against granting the application is not, in itself, determinative and we must consider the remaining guidance laid down in Martland.

We accepted the evidence, which was not challenged, that the Appellant struggles with reading and writing. It was clear from the correspondence within the bundle that the Appellant had informed the Respondents of his difficulties, and we were satisfied that this was also clear from the content of that correspondence. In such circumstances, we accepted that Mr Stoney had not understood the contents of the (often lengthy) letters sent to him which set out his appeal rights.

We noted that the Appellant was provided with Officer Bromley’s contact details and could have made contact to enquire about appeal rights. However, in circumstances where Mr Stoney believed the Respondent’s decision to be final, we were satisfied that he had no reason to do so. Our conclusion was reinforced by the evidence of Mr Stoney, which was supported by the records of telephone calls contained within the bundle, that his conversations with the Respondents were directed towards repayment and payment plans and not his appeal rights.

We did not accept the Respondent’s submission that Mr Stoney had in some way waited for other appeals to “show that the way is clear” as we found that there was no evidence to support the proposition that Mr Stoney’s motive for appealing was based on other cases. Rather, we formed the view that Mr Stoney had been made aware of other similar cases which predated his Notice of Appeal and which he was fully entitled to cite in support of his application.

We were satisfied that it was only when Mr Stoney sought help from Mr Bentley that action was taken to make the application to admit a late appeal. The fact that an SAR was made prior to the application, in our view, supports Mr Stoney’s evidence that he was unaware and had no understanding of the case against him. We accepted, for the reasons set out at [60] above, that Mr Stoney did not know how to commence or structure an appeal and that this was done on his behalf by Mr Bentley.

We were satisfied that Mr Stoney had acted reasonably, seeking assistance with time to pay believing that repayment was his only option. We also accepted that the appeal was only made due to the involvement and assistance of Mr Bentley. In those circumstances, we were satisfied that there was a good reason for the delay, which weighs in favour of allowing the application.

We turn now to consider “all the circumstances of the case". There is limited information before us and we were careful not to conduct a detailed analysis of the underlying merits of the case (Martland at [46]).

Mr Stoney submits that he is a victim of fraud. The Respondents did not seek to challenge this. The prejudice to Mr Stoney is the loss of the ability to challenge the Assessments and Closure Notices which total a substantial amount for Mr Stoney.

The Respondents are entitled to finality and treated this matter as settled. It will have to divert time and resources into the litigation.

We cannot, on the information before us, reach any view as to the strength of the Appellant’s substantive case. However, we have concluded that the prejudice to the Appellant in refusing the application outweighs that to the Respondents and, taking into account all of our findings following the approach set out in Martland, we have concluded that the interests of justice and fairness weigh in favour of the Appellant.

The application is therefore allowed and permission is granted to bring a late appeal.

This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.