TC09572 - [2025] UKFTT 00850 (TC)

The Respondents’ submissions can be summarised as follows.

The Respondents cited Romasave (Property Services) Ltd v Revenue & Customs Commissioners [2015] UKUT 254 (TCC) (“Romasave”) in which the UT held that a delay of three months against a 30-day appeal window was serious and significant ( at [96]):

“In the context of an appeal right which must be exercised within 30 days from the date of the document notifying the decision, a delay of more than three months cannot be described as anything but serious and significant.”

On 18 July 2024, the Tribunal receipted the Appellant’ Notice of Appeal dated 9 July 2024. This is 4 months and 12 days after the expiration of the statutory time limit at s.49G TMA 1970. The Respondents submitted that the delay in this case is therefore serious and significant.

The Respondents submitted that each case must be taken on its own merits and the fact that the Tribunal has accepted other cases involving EIS fraud, specifically Huntly v HMRC [2022] UKFTT 00135 (TC), does not bind this Tribunal. In support of this proposition, the Respondents cited Mulvenna & anor v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2015] EWHC 3494 (Admin) (“Mulvenna”) in which it was held:

“This simply will not do. Anyone objecting to a decision of a public authority by way of judicial review must challenge it without delay, they cannot wait until others show that the way is clear…. But for reasons of good administration our system of public law cannot work on the basis of persons holding back from legal challenges until another claimant in a similar position has a success in court. Those unhappy with a public authority’s decision must take the initiative and promptly challenge it.”

In Moore and Anor ( T/A Moore Farms) v HMRC [2022] UKFTT 411 (TC), a late appeal application was made based on a decision in another similar case and this was refused by Tribunal, even though the substantive merits of the case were considered to be strong. Judge Cannan stated at [94]:

“In my view, the publication of a new authority which prompts an appeal out of time might have some weight in the balancing exercise at stage three. However, it is not in itself a good reason for not appealing in time. If it was, then it would nullify to a large extent the benefit of finality recognised in Data Select and Aberdeen City.”

The Respondents accepted that the Appellant’s mother’s medical conditions led to her disposing of his post and that he has dyslexia. However, the Respondents do not accept that the Appellant did not know how to structure his appeal or that he did not understand his appeal rights as, they submitted, he managed to appeal to the Respondents, and it does not require a sophisticated taxpayer to make an appeal. Furthermore, the Appellant was provided with Officer Bromley’s contact details but did not seek her assistance to discuss making an appeal.

The Respondents did not accept that the Appellants’ appeal rights were not explained to him; they were contained on the correspondence sent to him. The Respondents also did not accept that the Appellant took their decision as final.

The Respondents noted that the Appellant’s dyslexia did not prevent him from appealing the decision to the Respondents or submitting a SAR request to the Respondents, a process which the Respondents contend is just as complex as appealing to the Respondents or requesting a Statutory Review.

The Respondents contended that to allow the application would give the Appellant an advantage over other taxpayers who make a timely request for a Statutory Review or appeal to the Tribunal and that there is no good reason why the default occurred.

The Respondents submitted (as confirmed by the UT), that litigation must be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost and that statutory deadlines must be respected. Were the application allowed, the Respondents would be prejudiced in having to divert resources to defend an appeal which they were entitled to consider closed, especially given the significant length of the delay. The Appellant failed to comply with the relevant statutory time limit and the Respondents are entitled to finality in proceedings. To allow a late appeal in this instance is inconsistent with the principles of good administration of justice which require litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost.

In relation to the merits of the substantive matter, the basis of the Appellant’s appeal is that he was a victim of fraud. However, the Appellant accepts that he is not eligible for EIS relief. He was asked to provide documentary evidence to support the claim for EIS investment tax relief, but no response was received during the enquiry period. To the limited extent that the merits of the case should be considered, it is submitted that the Appellant’s case is weak.