TC09601 - [2025] UKFTT 00920 (TC)
First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)

TC09601 - [2025] UKFTT 00920 (TC)

Fecha: 22-Jul-2025

The issue before the Tribunal

The issue before the Tribunal

10.

Unsurprisingly, at the outset of the hearing, Ms Man said that she adopted the submissions in the Objection. Those submissions addressed Martland v HMRC [2018] UKUT 178 (TCC) (“Martland”) on the basis that, in summary, the appeal to the Tribunal dated 7 June 2024 was “nearly 11 months after the expiration of the statutory time limit”, no explanation of the delay had ever been offered and in the circumstances of this appeal the merits of a substantive appeal were very weak.

11.

Surprisingly, Mr Hackett argued that the decision in Martland was not relevant as the only issue before the Tribunal was whether or not a letter from the appellant to HMRC dated 27 June 2023 (“the June Letter”) was a valid appeal.

12.

That letter was described in the Bundle as a “Notice of Intention to Appeal” comprising the June Letter which was one page long and marked in handwriting as “Sent 27/6/23 1st Class Post” and a copy of a six page letter from HMRC dated 15 June 2023 and marked in handwriting “Received 18/6/23”.

13.

We had difficulty with that. We asked Mr Hackett to explain why Martland was not relevant. The points made included:

(a)

The appellant accepted that the June Letter may not have been received by HMRC but HMRC accepted that it had been sent. He was asked who had accepted that because the documentation in the Bundle and the Objection made it clear that HMRC did not accept that it was sent to them in 2023.

(b)

His response was that that was an assumption based on the fact that the June Letter was a valid appeal and he outlined the reasons why he thought that that was the case.

(c)

In those circumstances, based on HMRC’s guidance, which was not in the Bundle and has not been produced, HMRC should accept that the June Letter had been sent.

14.

We explained that

(a)

The Tribunal is completely independent of HMRC and an appeal to HMRC is not an appeal to the Tribunal.

(b)

It is trite law that HMRC’s guidance is merely HMRC’s view of the law and may or may not be accurate.

(c)

The Tribunal is a creature of statute and has only the jurisdiction and powers given to it by statute, for example section 49 Taxes Management Act 1970 (“TMA”).

(d)

We explained Martland and the three stage approach that the Tribunal must adopt when considering an application for a late appeal. In particular paragraph 44 of Martland summarises the approach thus:

“When the FTT is considering applications for permission to appeal out of time, therefore, it must be remembered that the starting point is that permission should not be granted unless the FTT is satisfied on balance that it should be. In considering that question, we consider the FTT can usefully follow the three-stage process set out in[Denton v TH White Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 906, [2014] 1 WLR 3926]:

(1)

Establish the length of the delay. If it was very short (which would, in the absence of unusual circumstances, equate to the breach being ‘neither serious nor significant’), then the FTT ‘is unlikely to need to spend much time on the second and third stages’ – though this should not be taken to mean that applications can be granted for very short delays without even moving on to a consideration of those stages.

(2)

The reason (or reasons) why the default occurred should be established.

(3)

The FTT can then move onto its evaluation of ‘all the circumstances of the case’. This will involve a balancing exercise which will essentially assess the merits of the reason(s) given for the delay and the prejudice which would be caused to both parties by granting or refusing permission.”

(e)

We made it clear that the only issue before the Tribunal was the application in the Notice of Appeal for a late appeal. Mr Hackett confirmed that the appeal related to the HMRC decision dated 15 June 2023.

15.

We granted an adjournment to enable Freeths to discuss with the appellant whether or not he wished to give evidence in order to explain the reasons for the delay which is the second stage in Martland. Before doing so, we asked Ms Man to summarise her submissions so that the appellant would have be fully aware of the issues that might arise. She did so.

16.

The appellant declined to give evidence.

17.

Mr Hackett intimated that he would make submissions on the appellant’s behalf, albeit we had earlier pointed out that the Upper Tribunal in Barry Edwards v HMRC [2019] UKUT 131 (TCC) (“Edwards”) at paragraph 52 had endorsed a finding made by the First-tier Tribunal to the effect that an “advocate’s assertions and/or submissions are not evidence…”.