TC09601 - [2025] UKFTT 00920 (TC)

Mr Hackett argued that the appellant had assumed the June Letter “was being processed in the background” in the period before Freeths were instructed in March 2024 approximately eight months later. The appellant was a party litigant and had not necessarily understood the letters from HMRC until the recorded delivery letter was received.

Quite apart from the fact that we heard no evidence on that point, that is simply not credible. All of the letters from both officers were written in plain English and were very clear in their terms. The appellant was told explicitly and repeatedly that no appeal had been received by HMRC.

We were told that the appellant had written the June Letter. If he did, it is articulate and makes it clear that he had read and understood the letter of 15 June 2023. We do not accept that the appellant has established a good reason, effectively a reasonable excuse, for the delay until 6 March 2024.

We also do not accept that he should have been in any doubt about the severity of the matter since he had already been threatened with bankruptcy if he did not make arrangements to make payment. Officer Bancroft’s first letter could not have been more clear. Underlined and in bold the heading in the short letter read “Please pay now £241,765.79”.

Under a similar heading which read “If you don’t pay or contact us” there were four concise bullet points, namely “court action at the Magistrates or County Court, attachments of earnings, taking possession of your assets, and, making you bankrupt”. He should have been in no doubt of the need to contact HMRC but, as previously, he did not do so.

Lastly, there is the delay between the letter of 18 April 2024 and the application for a late appeal on 7 June 2024. It was argued that no application was made to the Tribunal “in the interests of expense and proportionality” as there was ongoing correspondence with HMRC; there was no need to apply to the Tribunal. Clearly that part of the delay, if we are considering an 11 month delay, was based on advice from Freeths. As HMRC repeatedly told Freeths that all appeal rights with HMRC had been exhausted. They were. The application to the Tribunal should have been made at an earlier stage.

Ms Man had referred the Tribunal to HMRC v Katib [2019] UKUT 189 (TCC) (“Katib”) at paragraph 17 in the context of the need to observe statutory time limits but Katib at paragraph 58 makes it very clear that reliance on poor advice of an adviser does not amount to a reasonable excuse.

In summary, we do not accept that the appellant has established a reasonable excuse for the very long delay whether it is eight or 11 months.