Case No. EWHC-1023-(IPEC)

38.For the reasons set out above, in my judgment it is not necessary to take any further action as regards the matters referred to above. 39.Having said that, it is worth reiterating the points made by Carr LJ in the Banque Pictet case at [18], namely that where there is an embargo on publicising either the content or substance of a draft judgment, all recipients of that draft judgment need to understand clearly:“i) The importance and breadth of such embargoes. They are orders of the court which prohibit communication for any purpose other than the legitimate exercise of making suggestions for the correction of errors, preparing submissions, agreeing orders on consequential matters and preparation for the publication of the judgment. Informing other lawyers within the same organisation who are not involved in the conduct of the litigation and whose input is not necessary for the purpose of carrying out these legitimate exercises will be a breach of the court's order;ii) The need for utmost care in communicating the content or substance of a draft judgment in the digital age. The use of electronic messaging requires greater, not lesser, attention to detail so as to ensure that errors of the type that occurred in this instance are not repeated;iii) Any breach of an embargo must be drawn to the court's attention as soon as it is identified.” 40.To those points, I would add that the courts are likely to look with a very critical eye at any case where a party’s wish to manage the publicity surrounding litigation has led that party to breach the embargo imposed by CPR PD40E.41.Match submits that this is a case where it is appropriate for the court to make an order that the Defendants pay Match’s costs of and associated with the issues addressed in this judgment to be summarily assessed on an indemnity basis. It also raises the issue of a publicity order. It seems to me that these are both matters that can be addressed at the form of order hearing which has been set down for 25th May. On the issue of those costs, I would say that, whilst I am prepared to accept that Mr Younas made a mistake, given what I have said in paragraph 34 above, my preliminary view is that it may well be appropriate to make the order sought by Match on the basis that Mr Younas’ conduct amounted to an abuse of the court’s process and/or was objectively unreasonable within the meaning of CPR 45.30(2)(a), CPR 45.32 and CPR 63.26(2). 42.Finally, I agree with Ms Bowhill that this is not a case where it is necessary for the court to seek to lay down any guidance with regard to the approach to be taken by the press in relation to draft judgments. 1 HM Attorney General v Crosland [2021] UKSC 15