However he also explained that
However he also explained that:
“It's more a case of the true care and treatment that is given to the patient. The Clinicians don't think about, the individual nurses, support workers and unit managers don't think ah this person is extra care, I need to give them extra care. They’re there treating those particular things with that patient. It's then someone like Simon, predominantly it was Mark or Andrew, that's a right, having discussed these patients and having read the report that is all about these patients, clearly this person is absorbing a lot more of our resources that we've already put in...”
And
“It's not all, it's not totally tangible, no elements of it would be tangible, but because we're not trying to attribute a body to a patient it does become that little bit more intangible.”
When asked how the figure for the charge had been arrived at Mr Wilson said that he knew what the charge for specialing was; usually £600-700 per day and that they halved that figure to come up with the price for extra care.
In his second Interview Mr Wilson stated that the extra care charge system was not the same system as in place at Kelling (which runs contrary to the argument/evidence that it was effectively the same system) and that:
“Extra care is a charge levied on the more difficult, challenging risky patients on the basis that they do pose more of a risk and are likely to be using more resources than less challenging, risky, difficult patients.”
Again it might reasonably be thought, this is a reference to a risk premium in advance of actual need for extra staff input (so payable whether or not the patient was actually more difficult or demanding) as distinct from an ex post facto assessment of the actual use of additional staff resources. The difficulty with having two different bases for the charge (in the absence of a clear explanation of either any audit trail) is that PCTs may not be aware what they are paying for and on what basis.
- Heading
- Evidence 14 - 16
- Defendant’s witnesses 124 - 169
- Law 201 - 203
- Analysis 215 - 216
- Introduction
- Facts; an overview
- The Parties’ Cases
- PARTICULARS OF MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
- PARTICULARS OF MISFEASANCE IN PUBLIC OFFICE
- Evidence
- Defendant’s witnesses
- Mr Deveney’s disclosure and associated evidence
- Lisa Vescio and Paul Vincent
- Case Summary and MG6
- To summarise At this juncture in the inquiry it is evident that
- MG6
- The drugs investigation
- Claimants witnesses
- Mr Breeze
- Mr Wilson
- However he also explained that
- The following points are noteworthy
- Mr Ward
- Mr Chancellor
- He continued
- Anthony Bull
- Mr Drewery
- Charles Bott KC
- Margaretha Gaisford
- Mr Cooper
- There was then a diversion into small talk and it was later stated by DS Brownsell that
- City Club Evidence
- Victor Miller
- Mr Pointer
- The restraint proceedings and the evidence of Mrs Breeze and DC Wilcox
- Other witnesses
- David Prior
- David Graham
- Mr Graham continued
- Susan Smith
- Raymond Adcock
- Sandra Grunwald
- James Braithwaite
- Richard Innes
- Sir Norman Lamb
- Corinne Scicluna
- Dr John Olive
- Defendant’s witnesses
- Closed mind
- Conduct of officers
- Pressure to achieve a result
- Health Care Commission
- Mr Cooper
- Ms Gaisford
- Deveney’s computer
- 14 th November 2006
- Linda Todd
- Mr Prior
- Dr Barker
- Missing Rough Book
- Dr Badcock
- Charges levied
- Kelling Park
- PwC
- Questionnaire
- Mr Bull
- Mr Drewery
- Exclusion from court
- Mr Breeze’s interviews
- Weight attached to other evidence
- DLA Piper letter
- Mr Ward
- DS Brownsell’s mindset
- Pleaded case
- DC Baker
- SIOs
- Mr Cooper
- 14 th November, Ms Gaisford and arrests
- City Club
- Mr Bull
- Mr Chancellor
- Mr Ward
- DC Deacon
- DC Wilcox
- DC Flynn
- Willan and Woodhead
- Mr Bull
- Mr Ward
- Judith Cass
- Draft, unsigned statement of Mr Tarrant
- Other Statements/Interviews
- Dr Barker
- And
- Linda Todd
- And in respect of the meeting to agree terms
- Documentary Evidence
- The Hird Report
- The trial and the failure of the prosecution
- After Mr Brook gave evidence Counsel took stock. As they stated
- Post Prosecution
- IPCC
- Reasonable and probable cause
- Honest belief
- Objective analysis
- Malice
- Misfeasance in public office
- Conduct in the exercise of public power
- Acting dishonestly/in bad faith
- Limitation for misfeasance in Public office
- Analysis
- The investigation and prosecution; a critique
- Interviews
- Witness tampering
- The honest belief of officers
- Other pleaded issues
- PwC
- Healthcare Commission
- Was the case summary deliberately “slanted”
- Was there reasonable and probable cause?
- Malice
- The prosecutor?
- Conclusion
- and
- Sept – Oct ’03 Cawston Park site purchased
- 25 May ’05 Management buy-out of Chancellor Care Ltd
- 15 Aug ’05 Mr Cooper commenced employment at Cawston Park as Operations Manager
- Dec 2005 (per Particulars of Claim)
- 27 Jan ’06 Allegation made by Mr Deveney to NHS CFS
- 4 July ’06 Report prepared by DS Kirkham re Operation Genus addressed to Det Supt Julian Blazeby
- 1 Aug ’06 Meeting between NHS CFS and the Major Investigation team
- 19 Sept ’06 Unannounced inspection of Cawston Park by HCC
- 29 March ’07 Statement signed by Mr Brook
- 23 Aug ’10 Outcome of Operation Meridian Review communicated to Claimants
- Letter of Response
- Amended Reply to Defence
- Conclusions
![[2025] EWHC 2684 (KB)](https://backend.juristeca.com/files/emisores/logo_AJKZXmE.png)