KB-2025-003193 - [2025] EWHC 2642 (KB)

Finally, in relation to a claim for harassment, the claimant seeks the following interim injunctive relief:

“(c)

Further, the Defendants must not pursue a course of conduct which amounts to harassment of the Claimant contrary to the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and in particular must not do or procure, incite, abet or encourage any other person to:

(i)

Publish the allegations prohibited by paragraph 7(a) of this Order.

(ii)

Post threatening or abusive comments on social media sites;

(iii)

Issue death threats against the Claimant;

(iv)

Make phone calls to the Claimant, including silent calls;

(v)

Approach the Claimant in the street in connection with the allegations references in paragraph 6(a) of this Order.”

The section 12 Human Rights Act test applies, but not the rule in Bonnard v Perryman.

The order should be limited to specific acts, in order to avoid arguments about what, in the abstract, might amount to unlawful harassment.

I will not grant relief in the terms of paragraph 7(c)(i) of the draft order, for the reasons I have already given when assessing the evidence in the context of the libel claims.

In relation to (iii), (iv) and (v), there is no real evidence that any of the three defendants issued death threats against AXB, or made phone calls to her including silent calls, or approached her in the street in connection with any allegations. I will not make any orders in those terms. I also note that the second defendant, on her own behalf and on behalf of the first defendant, offered undertakings in the terms of paragraphs 7(c)(ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) of the draft order, which in itself shows that there is no threat as far as they are concerned.

In relation to (ii), there is some evidence of threatening and abusive comments posted in response to the videos, but they are not attributed to any defendant and I am concerned about the breadth of the expression “threatening or abusive”. It would include, for example, a threat of legal proceedings (albeit that the ambit of the order is limited to threats on social media). It would also include specific criticism, as well as general abuse. Abuse is itself a vague term, encompassing real harassment but also the sort of disrespectful language on social media which ought to be acceptable, even if unwelcome, in ordinary discourse. There is also the point that I have already decided to refuse relief in relation to the specific allegations which the first and second defendants intend to prove as substantially true, although they are defamatory.

I am not satisfied that there is a threat of any action from any defendant by way of harassment between now and trial which ought in my discretion to be the subject of interim injunctive relief. I will therefore make no order in the terms proposed by paragraph 7(c) of the draft order. I will however accept the undertakings which have been offered, albeit not by the third defendant.

Hill J was satisfied that it was strictly necessary for the evidence not to be provided to any non-party without further order of the court; and that any non-party (other than a person notified or served with her order) seeking access to or copies of the evidence should make an application to the court on notice to the parties (para 4 of the order of Hill J; see also paras 8-11 of her order).

I am asked to make similar orders (paras 3 and 8-11 of the draft order).

I also realise that this judgment, if published without anonymisation, will amplify the allegations damaging to the claimant’s reputation, which she has brought these proceedings to stop. That has the potential of denying her substantial justice, even if she is ultimately successful in her claims.

I apply the test of strict necessity required to justify any derogation from the important and essential principle that justice is done in public: see Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417. The question is whether derogation is strictly necessary in order to achieve justice in the proceedings: see PMC v Cwm Taf Morgannwg University Health Board [2025] EWCA Civ 1126at para 28.

I am persuaded to make the orders sought, with liberty to apply, and also to anonymise the names of the parties in the published version of this judgment, with liberty to apply. This is in order to protect the subject matter of the action in the unusual circumstances that the claimant has filed evidence that she has received death threats and is in serious fear for herself and her child and has had to relocate because of a storm of online abuse of exceptional breadth which has followed the allegations already made public.

On the other hand, there should be no harm in the judgment being published without anonymisation when the facts of the case are being more definitively considered and decided later in the litigation, either in the claimant’s favour or against her. That is because there will be more context in which to place what I have said in this judgment.