KB-2025-003193 - [2025] EWHC 2642 (KB)
King's / Queen's Bench Division of the High Court

KB-2025-003193 - [2025] EWHC 2642 (KB)

Fecha: 16-Oct-2025

The Defendants’ response to the Claimant’s libel case

The Defendants’ response to the Claimant’s libel case

33.

The second defendant, speaking for herself and on behalf of her son, the first defendant, and in the defence statement signed by both of them, denies the spin put on some of the statements, but for the most part asserts that they are substantially true and, further or alternatively, that any of those which may prove not to be substantially true have not seriously harmed the claimant’s reputation in the light of those that are. She has in the defence statement produced a detailed response, sometimes exhibiting documents (totalling well over 100 pages), in support of this case. In addition to a defence of truth, she says she will put forward a case of honest opinion.

34.

The second defendant also filed a detailed “Defence Skeleton Argument”, which included submissions about the evidence as well as the law. It pointed to inconsistencies in the claimant’s case at the interim hearings, accused her of a failure to make full and frank disclosure, and attempted a detailed dismantling of the claimant’s case against the first and second defendants.

35.

On the central allegation that the claimant is indeed behind the content of the now-deleted Mr Fake Flex Instagram account, the second defendant puts forward a case based on a variety of circumstantial evidence, including:

i)

The claimant’s WhatsApp messages being visible on the Mr Fake Flex account.

ii)

The claimant’s emails being visible on the Mr Fake Flex account.

iii)

Accurate information about the second defendant’s clothing at the hearing before Hill J being included on the Mr Fake Flex account, which (she says) must have come from one of the relatively few people, including the claimant, who were there.

iv)

A striking and unusual screensaver being associated both with the claimant’s acknowledged mobile phone and with the Mr Fake Flex account holder.

v)

The language of the claimant’s phone being French, and evidence that this was also the case for a person involved with the Mr Fake Flex account.

vi)

Both the claimant and the Mr Fake Flex account being associated with hate, and hateful allegations, against the first defendant.

36.

She expounded on this case before me and, in response, the claimant’s Leading Counsel attempted to refute it. But neither side won a decisive victory before me in that respect. The second defendant’s case, which she is not, of course, obliged to have fully-formed before a trial, appeared to me to be on the whole reasonably arguable, notwithstanding the best efforts of the claimant’s Leading Counsel. It was also presented with an attention to detail and a lack of hyperbole which reflected well on the second defendant as a litigant in person, and suggests she might bring similar qualities to any evidence she may give at a trial (she tells me she expects to give evidence at any trial).

37.

The second defendant also argued that there were similarities between the claimant’s case against the defendants in this action and her dispute with Chanel in other litigation. She submits that:

i)

The claimant worked for both brands; Chanel and CYD’s clothing brand.

ii)

After leaving, the claimant posted defamatory information about both brands on social media.

iii)

During disputes with both brands, the claimant has been accused of fabricating her case.

iv)

In both disputes, the claimant is accused of evading detection by using a social media alias.

v)

In both cases, the claimant has said her defamatory comments are in the public interest but in neither case did she take any concerns to the authorities. Instead, she used social media to build her own profile.

38.

It is clear from the way that both the claimant and, through the second defendant, the first two defendants present the case to me that there is a fundamental dispute about whether the other side is credible and honest, or lying and dishonest. Both sides accuse the other in that respect. The claimant also accuses the first defendant of being a criminal, although he has not been convicted of any criminal offence. It likely that the question of credibility will play a major part at any trial, which will have the benefit of hearing from witnesses, examining evidence in detail, and evaluating both the documentary and social media evidence and any witnesses who do give evidence, for better or for worse. I have looked at both sides’ case on this. I am completely unable, on the material before me, and at this interim stage, to pronounce confidently on the outcome of that battle of credibility.

39.

I am further hampered in the evaluation of the claimant’s case by what does appear to have been a fairly comprehensive failure even to attempt full and frank disclosure when she made her original appearance, without notice, before Farbey J on 29 August 2025. The written evidence and written submissions which the claimant relied on were nakedly one-sided and partisan. They made no effort to identify possible weaknesses in her case, or what might prove to be strengths in the defendants’ case. She referred to a number of legal concepts and authorities in her skeleton argument before Farbey J, but the duty to make full and frank disclosure was not mentioned or addressed. The claimant’s own written note of her without notice hearing before Farbey J does include this:

“The Applicant referred to the duty of full and frank disclosure but submitted that the Respondents would be unable to produce evidence of ‘stalking,’ as alleged, because such conduct has not occurred.”

However, that was a self-serving statement on one aspect of the case (“such conduct has not occurred”) and did not disclose anything, for example, about the allegations which had been made against her by the first defendant in the context of the breakdown of their working relationship (she covered this in her first witness statement with only a passing reference “He became aggressive & violent and we parted on bad terms”), or about her dispute with Chanel and allegations against her by Chanel (which she did not mention at all). In this context, I am aware from the Court file (the C-E File) that there are proceedings between Chanel as claimant against AXB as defendant in the course of which Chanel obtained injunctions against AXB and, following a settlement, in which AXB was alleged by Chanel to have breached undertakings she had given to the court in those proceedings.

40.

There was no duty to make full and frank disclosure in subsequent hearings, given that they were on notice. However, in the absence of the third defendant from the hearings (although on notice), I am wary of assuming that everything is as it may appear to me now, in which no-one presented what might be his case in defence. The second defendant is not connected with the third defendant and told me she does not speak for him. The second defendant raised full and frank disclosure in the skeleton argument on behalf of herself and the first defendant. The claimant’s Leading Counsel did not deal with full and frank disclosure.