QB-2020-004171 - [2025] EWHC 2773 (KB)

It is necessary to refer to the RRAmPoC in order to understand how the claim is made. It refers to the successful procurement of a search warrant before District Judge Inyundo at Croydon Magistrates Court on 28 November 2014 (para. 66). An absence of a subjective and/or objective RPC to pursue the search warrant application since (para. 67):

“a.

Mr Muldoon and/or Ms Chipperton did not honestly believe that there was RPC to pursue the application for a search warrant.

b.

The evidence available to the defendant, and specifically Mr Muldoon and/or Ms Chipperton, did not provide the defendant with reasonable grounds for any belief that there was RPC to pursue the search warrant application.”

The statutory framework was referred to in that the District Judge had to be satisfied (para. 68) that either:

In satisfaction of the statutory criteria, the search warrant application contended that if C1 or one of his associates or employees was able to deny immediate access to such material, then it would afford the opportunity either to remove or destroy evidence. It was said that the use of a search warrant would allow officers to secure that evidence before that could take place (para. 72).

The application for the search warrant stated that C1 had continually made excuses to the court in relation to non-payment of the VAT and non-completion of business records, blaming bad financial advice and regular changes of accountant and business advisors. He had repeated those reasons for not paying his current liabilities to HMRC in relation to his tax affairs at later meetings with HMRC officers.

It was also stated that London Fields Brewery does not hold a licence to brew beer on its premises nor had it since it began to produce beer in January 2012. It was discovered that sales of beer were being made. In July 2014 C1 confirmed that he was aware that Beer Duty was payable on the beer being produced and that he had not paid it to HMRC. Subsequent applications to register had been submitted but on each occasion they had been refused by HMRC (para. 73).

The application mentioned the conviction of C1 in respect of drugs offences and the confiscation order, but this was only “incidental to this current application [for the warrant]”. There was also reference to excise duty and the production of beer without a licence and to a possible debt of £500,000 in respect of Beer Duty. It was said that it was intended to deal with this matter by way of a civil action, and that the premises would be visited the same day after the execution of the search warrant to address the non-compliant beer production. It was said that that civil action would be dealt with concurrently with the criminal intervention, and that officers would attend the brewery remove the undiluted beer and would seal the brewery to prevent its access and use.

The District Judge made an observation that he needed to be satisfied that this was deliberate cheating and not cash flow difficulties, to which the response of Mr Muldoon was that it was believed to be deliberate because the business was believed to be profitable (para.74).

The application was made ex parte: there was an obligation to make full and frank disclosure and it was alleged that HMRC was in breach of that obligation (para. 75). This included in failing in the following respects, namely:

It was therefore pleaded that Mr Muldoon and/or Ms Chipperton did not honestly believe that there was RPC because “had [they] believed that there was RPC, [they] would not have relied upon materially inaccurate and/or incomplete evidence to support that application” and that, for the same reasons their actions were malicious: see RRAmPoC paras. 77, 79.

In the light of this, there were no reasonable grounds for considering that access to the premises would not be granted without a warrant and/or that entry to the premises might be frustrated or seriously prejudiced unless immediate entry to the premises could be secured (para. 78).

There was malice in the pursuit of the search warrant in that there is no other credible explanation for the breaches of the duty of full and frank disclosure. There were three pages of pleaded particulars of malice which can be summarised as follows:

The case of the Claimants in connection with the tort of misfeasance in public office is that HMRC (i) had no reasonable grounds for believing that there was RPC to pursue the warrant application, (ii) lacked an honest belief that there was RPC, and (iii) acted with malice: see RRAmPoC paras. 82-84. The Claimants rely on an alleged failure by Mr Muldoon to provide the Magistrate determining the warrant application with the information set out in the RRAmPoC paras. 73-75, of which it is said that Ms Chipperton was aware. It is pleaded that the damage resulting from the execution of the warrant was the destruction of the business: see RRAmPoC para. 113.

HMRC say that (i) immunity attaches to matters raised in the course of the application before the Magistrate, and (ii) that any challenge must be by public law and not private law proceedings. It is not necessary to make a ruling on these points, because, even if HMRC is wrong, the claim can be dealt with on its merits.

HMRC submits that it does not follow that if there were any material inaccuracies or omissions on the part of Mr Muldoon and Ms Chipperton that there would be no RPC in the warrant application or that they were malicious. They were concerned only with the criminal investigation into the fraudulent evasion of VAT. Whilst background information was provided about Beer Duty and about the confiscation order, there was no reason to believe that they had knowledge that it was false or incomplete (if that was the case).

The criminal investigation into fraudulent evasion of VAT only began in August 2014 and there was nothing to suggest that Mr Muldoon and/or Ms Chipperton had knowledge themselves about the matters relating to Beer Duty or to the confiscation order. These matters were in the domain of others and were ongoing over a period of about two years prior to their involvement.

The pointing to a number of errors in the context an otherwise detailed warrant application does not provide a basis for considering that Mr Muldoon or Ms Chipperton were motivated by malice in preparing the application. The mere reference to errors and omissions, even if established, did not provide any grounds for inferring that they were deliberate and with a view to causing harm to the claimants.