QB-2020-004171 - [2025] EWHC 2773 (KB)

It follows from the above that it is not necessary to make findings in respect of limitation. It suffices to say the following. The claim for malicious prosecution and malicious procurement of a warrant are clearly in time. The claims for misfeasance in public office had an essential part of the tort malice on the part of the public official. They are subject to analysis under section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980 which provides that where has been concealment, the limitation period does not start to run until the concealment could with reasonable diligence have been discovered. There is an argument with a real prospect of success that the concealment here was of the malice which could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence prior to the execution of warrant or the arrest. There is therefore a case to go to trial that these claims were not statute barred.

In respect of the claims in negligence, the claim was brought on 28 November 2020. It follows that any cause of action in negligence which accrued before 28 November 2014 is statute barred on the basis of a six-year limitation period, namely that “An action founded on tort shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued”: see the Limitation Act 1980 section 2. It is said that the claim in negligence which depended upon damage did not accrue before 28 November 2014 on the basis that whilst there might have been a contingent liability prior to that arising out of continuing trading with assurances, until the contingency occurred of the search warrant, arrest and prosecution, there was no damage for the purpose of the accrual of the cause of action in negligence: see Clerk & Lindsell on Torts 34^th Edition paras. 30-13 – 30-15. This is a difficult question upon which it is not necessary to express a view having regard to the other conclusions in this judgment.