KB-2025-002908 - [2025] EWHC 2937 (KB)
Fecha: 11-Nov-2025
Discussion
Discussion
Preliminary observations
As is clear from the terms in which section 187B of the 1999 Act was enacted, it is for the local planning authority’s to decide whether it is necessary or expedient for an actual or apprehended breach of planning control to be restrained by injunction. In exercising the original jurisdiction conferred by section 187B of the 1990 Act and deciding whether or not to grant an injunction on the local planning authority’ application, the court must not re-assess for itself the local planning authority’s planning judgment which formed the basis for that authority’s decision to apply for the injunction.
However, the factors which, on the evidence before the court, weighed with the local planning authority in making their planning judgment may properly be considered by the court, in the context of reaching its own judgment as to whether the circumstances of the case are such as to justify the grant of an injunction. Moreover, where as in the present case, the Defendant questions the validity of the local planning authority’s decision to apply for an injunction on public law grounds, the court may properly consider the points raised in the exercise of its discretion whether or not to grant the injunction: see South Bucks at [27] and [71].
As Simon Brown LJ said at [39] in his judgment in the Court of Appeal in South Bucks, in judging the relevance and weight of the local planning authority’s decision that an injunction is necessary and expedient to restrain the breach of planning control, the court will consider the extent to which the authority can be shown on the evidence to have had regard to all material considerations. At [70] in his speech in South Bucks, Lord Clyde said that in deciding whether to take action in the event of a breach of planning control, a local planning authority will need to consider the seriousness of the breach and its effect in the particular case, in order to enable them to judge which of the various methods of enforcement provided by part 7 of the 1990 they should adopt. The fact that the local planning authority is empowered to apply for an injunction, whether or not they have exercised or are proposing to exercise one or more of the range of enforcement powers given by the 1990 Act, does not render the availability of those other powers irrelevant.
- Heading
- Introduction [1]
- Introduction
- The Claimant’s case
- The Bell hotel, its location and current use
- The proceedings
- The evidence
- Legal principles
- Factual background
- 2022-2024 – second period of use as accommodation for asylum seekers
- Resumption of use as contingency accommodation – early 2025 onwards
- Correspondence regarding the need for planning permission – April/May 2025
- Events since 8 July 2025
- The decision to apply for an injunction
- The launch of proceedings and subsequent events
- Discussion
- An actual or apprehended breach of planning control
- The Claimant’s decision to apply for an injunction
- Whether an injunction is an appropriate remedy – the correct approach
- Planning and enforcement history
- Environmental harm and urgency
- Countervailing factors
- Although initially procured by service providers as a short-term measure to deal with an exceptional increase in demand for accommodation during the pandemic, the pace and volatility at which the numb
- Striking the balance – is an injunction a commensurate remedy?
- My conclusion
- Declaratory relief
- Conclusions