[2025] EWHC 1844 (KB)

Before I set out the witnesses evidence it will assist understanding if I set out a summary of the relevant documents. I start with documents before the accident. The manufacturer of the Lynx Xtrim 900 SM produced a manual for its operation. It is described as a sport/deep snow cross over. It is the most powerful SM they list in this manual. The others are 600 or 800 cc. The throttle has intelligent electronic control, so there is no cable. In ECO mode, vehicle torque and speed “are limited”. It is a reduced power mode (D504). In Standard mode, acceleration is reduced when starting off from stationary and at “low vehicle speed”, otherwise it is a “full power” mode (D504). If the Learning Key is used, the torque is limited and the speed is limited. The initial Learning Key programme limits the speed to 40 kph but it can be set to 70 kph. A warning is given: “The ability of a novice to operate the SM can be exceeded even when a learning key is used”. For turns, the advice was to lean in. The left handlebar has a brake on the forward side operated by the driver’s fingers. The right handlebar has a throttle on the rearward side operated by the driver’s thumb and palm. A tether, which attaches to the engine cut off, is on the dashboard and the SM can only operate if it is attached. The other end is to be attached to the eyelet on the rider’s clothing. If the rider falls off, the curled cord pulls the tether cap off the base and the engine stops. Also, there is an emergency cut off button on the right side of the handlebars. There is a speedometer.

Luxury Action were the Defendant’s suppliers of the SM experience. Arto Pitkanen (AP) and Jouni Satta, the guides, were signed off as having had training on SM operation and guiding. Powerpoint slides from that training were produced, which were provided in association with a company called SML. I extract some relevant parts here. The main guide should be at the front and should set the route, the pace and decide upon the breaks. The safety distances depend on the conditions. A safety demonstration is required. This should demonstrate the driving position; emergency stop function, the tether and its attachment to clothing; the controls: the brake, the accelerator, starting and stopping. Safety distances of 5 metres minimum should be advised. Those increase with speed and weather conditions. The demonstration should cover turning the handlebars, weight transfer and advice should be given about left hand turns. Guides were instructed that:

“Tell me about turning left, DO NOT push the accelerator when turning to avoid attacking a tree. Similarly, "tourist panics" MUST NOT clench their fists, the throttle goes to the floor. Prior knowledge helps to avoid such reactions.”

Thus, guides were taught to brief customers not to push with the right arm when turning left and not to clench the throttle. After accidents the guides were taught to make a report and take photos, if possible. No guidance was given in that presentation on the mode to be used on the SM and no guidance was given on post-accident evidence gathering, expert examination of the track or the crashed SM or asking the rider what happened and writing that down for posterity.

LA produced documents for their guides. Their Snowmobile Safety and Operation Briefing document (SSOB) required guides to brief customers. The briefing required the guides to cover: no alcohol, no drugs, no strong medication, compulsory insurance, the insurance excess of 1,000 euros and the maximum speed limit of 60 kph in forests and 80 kph on lakes. The minimum safe distance is stated as 5 metres. Driving should always by on the right-hand side of the track, if not advised differently. The briefing should cover: no overtaking, hand signals, the emergency stop button, the throttle and the thumb activation of it, the use of it to accelerate and to slow down, the start button, the engine stop switch, the brake lever, the tether cord, the engine cut off cap and the attachment of the cord to the rider’s clothing. The briefing was also required to cover: riding position, leaning into turns, advising riders to slow down or stop if they feel uncomfortable or insecure. Finally, the track and possible risks of the track and duration should be mentioned and riders asked if they have any questions. The SSOB did not carry over the Powerpoint words about left hand turns.

LA also had a safety document (30.10.2019). This stressed the maximum speed of 60 kph, off road and 80 kph on lakes. It expressed that LA designed their routes to be suitable for all levels of riders. It advised that for inexperienced customers a thorough briefing was required because the risks were higher. The document required guides to use the SSOB for briefings. The guide was to start the briefing sitting on the SM and after that take the riders for a few hundred metres then stop and ask if everything is alright. After that, the guide was required to look out for yo-yoing (gaps increasing and decreasing between riders). During “long straights” the guide was to watch behind and at corners the guide was to slow down, so everyone was in sight of each other going around the bend. No guidance was provided on the mode to be used on the SM.

LA also produced a document called “Guide 2019-2020” to compliment the safety document. This gave guidance on treating customers well. It summarised that the briefing was split into three parts: (1) Finnish law and insurance, (2) security and (3) technical. Under security it advised that the safe separation distance was 20 metres (in contrast to the minimum of 5 metres in the SSOB). Guides were reminded to tell riders not to use the brake at the same time as the throttle. The first stop was to be “after a few kilometres”.

In 2017 LA were audited by TUKES, the Finnish health and safety organisation. This mainly focused on the policies and documentation. The guidance in the SSOB was approved as following the industry practice.

On the day of the accident the Claimant signed the following forms:

On the day of the accident the Claimant took various photos just before ride 1 and during the stop. These showed the light and conditions and the precise timing of the events. The briefing was at around 2.58 pm and they did not set off until 3.03 pm or later. They were taking a photo at the first stop at 3.07 pm. Their jackets had tether eyelets. None of the photos show tethers attached but that does not mean that they were not attached.

After the accident the following documents were produced. Photos of the scene of the crash were taken some hours afterwards but on the same afternoon/evening, when the SM was recovered by LA staff (D98-104). Later the same evening, when it was dark, Janne Seurujarvi took a black and white photo of turn 2 (D110). The SM was still in situ. Here it is. The blue arrow marks the SM.

No plan was drawn up by LA, no measurements were taken, the Claimant’s tracks were not marked and the SM was not examined by an engineer (at least no such report was produced), so little effective post-accident fact gathering was carried out.

The Claimant was transported by SM to the ambulance in the car park nearby and there he had a conversation with AP. As a result, AP wrote his accident report form on 3.2.2020 stating this:

“We drove together with the customer and in the middle of the left side curve the customer had, while turning the steering wheel, squeezed the throttle inadvertently. The snowmobile drifted out of the route and crashed into a tree.”

AP drew this plan:

In the ambulance, the Claimant took photos which showed a bruise on his left forehead. The Claimant was taken firstly to the local hospital (Central Hospital of Lapland) where they recorded that he told them that he: “lost control of the vehicle and hit a tree. Wore helmet, head injury and loss of consciousness for 30 seconds, No amnesia regarding time after or before the incident. Left knee injured. Walked normally after the accident. Fully orientated.” … “Snowmobile accident. Speed 30 km/h …” … “30km/h speed, losing control of the vehicle collision with a tree, helmet unbroken, slight bruises.” Because he had a head injury he was then transported to another hospital with neurological facilities. At Oulu University Hospital they recorded the following of relevance: “Underwent initial treatment in the Central Hospital of Lapland, during which a leakage was found on the left side ventricle.” … “Patient has full recollection of everything before and after the incident.” … “Lost control of vehicle and hit a tree” … “The accident was caused by loss of control of the vehicle”… “The patient remembers the accident and has no pre- of post traumatic amnesia. The cause of the accident was mixing the gas and the brake handles.” The Claimant was advised to stay in for observations. Against that advice he self-discharged and went back to the resort, 500 km away. No witness statement was taken from him or from the guide by LA or the Defendant.

On 3.2.2020 Arto Pitkanen (AP), the guide, wrote a Whatsapp message at 11.06 am stating:

“We drove faster at straight parts and slower in corners. Maximum speed at straights maybe 60km/h and corners maybe 10-20km/h. After around 4km of driving I heard a crashing sound after a corner and stopped. I looked back wondering what was the sound and saw the misters snowmobile crashed a tree aprox. 30 meters behind me right after the corner. … Then the doctor came and researched him again and better and we decided that we can move him ourselves to ambulance that was coming to parking lot. Customer told us that his glove got stuck to throttle at mid way of the turn when he tried to go slower and so he accidently accelerated out from the track. We were driving tight with the customer and in the middle of the curve to the left the customer had inadvertently squeezed the gas while turning the wheel. The snowmobile drifted off the route and rushed into a tree.”

On 4.2.2020 Elliot Weir wrote the Defendant’s incident report containing the following:

“5.

Description of incident:

Following snowmobile instructor, came to a more "wooded" section, lost control of the vehicle and came into contact with a tree.

6.

Contributory factors:

Unaware of potential speed of vehicle, not knowing how fast it could go.

…

11.

What action was/ should be taken to prevent recurrence?

Snowmobile instructors to brief to be more careful approaching the wooded section of the course.”

On his journey home, on 4.2.2020, the Claimant wrote various texts to the Defendant’s staff including the following:

“No worries … shit happens … I asked Elliot if I owe you guys a snowmobile, or any other costs. Please let me know. It was my error and my responsibility...”

On 5.2.2020 the Claimant wrote:

“Hey guys, we are on our plane to Amsterdam. Thank you both so much for your help yesterday and thru my little self destructive snowmobile behavior. Please let me know anything I am responsible for.... transport.... a snowmobile..... etc. we had a great time and all is good!”