[2025] EWHC 2621 (KB)

Ms Gumbel indicated that her central concern was to avoid the PI claimants having to give evidence on more than one occasion about the events concerning the alleged sexual assaults. She submitted it would be very distressing, unfair and oppressive for the PI claimants to have to give evidence twice about these events. Her Skeleton Argument was prepared on the basis that if a trial on liability in the Libel Claim went first, it would be unnecessary for the claimants to also give evidence about the events themselves and the PI claim (as opposed to giving evidence in respect of limitation, causation and quantum), as the findings made in the libel trial would be determinative of those matters. She emphasised her clients were willing to accept the findings made in a trial of liability in the Libel Claim, so that if the accounts of the five PI claimants were not accepted by the court at that stage, they would not continue with the PI litigation. She said if the PI claims were tried first, as The FT is not a party to those proceedings, the findings would not bind a court hearing a subsequent libel trial, and not only the five PI claimants, but potentially all 15 women would have to give their evidence twice. That is if the other 10 complainants were also permitted to give similar fact evidence in the trial of the PI claims.

However, Ms Gumbel accepted that it was open to Mr Odey to indicate, as he had now done, that for the purposes of the PI claims, he did not agree to be bound by findings made in a liability trial if the Libel Claim was heard first.

Ms Gumbel said that in these circumstances, her clients preferred the Joint Trial Proposal, as this was the only way of ensuring they only had to give their accounts of the disputed sexual assaults on one occasion. In addition, she said this was the most effective way of saving time and costs. Like Mr Millar, she proposed that the joint trial should address the section 2 truth defence, and not the section 4 public interest defence, as this would enable the trial to be heard as soon as possible. She considered a joint trial was entirely possible, and could be managed to ensure fairness to all parties involved. She accepted limitation should be heard at the same time, but considered that quantum should be the subject of a separate hearing at a later stage (if it arose). She considered the quantum hearing would only last two to three days.

Ms Gumbel did not abandon the stay application, but indicated this was now her second preference. She did not accept that granting of the stay would cause unfairness to Mr Odey: the judge at the libel liability trial and a judge at any subsequent trial of the PI claims would be astute to ensure that fairness was achieved. She agreed with Mr Millar as to the broad scope of questioning on the credibility of the women's accounts that would likely be admitted in a libel liability trial if that went first.

Ms Gumbel did not accept Mr Kent's proposition that section 33 limitation issues should necessarily be dealt with at the same time as the court made findings as to the material events. However, she was content for limitation to be included within the proposed trial, as I have indicated.

Ms Gumbel suggested it had been reasonable to delay providing the claimants' witness statements in the PI claims, until the outcome of this hearing was known. Firstly, because the cost of finalising the witness evidence could prove unnecessary if the PI claims were stayed; and secondly, because the decisions made on the two applications could affect whether the non-claimant women would be willing to provide statements in support of the PI claims.