KB-2025-000497 - [2025] EWHC 2330 (KB)

Soole J referred to the evidence which had been before him, including the evidence on behalf of the University, in particular from Ms Rampton, and 8 witness statements served on behalf of ELSC: Soole Judgment, [9]. All this material has also been before me and I have considered it.

Soole J summarised previous incidents of Direct Action, as they emerged from the evidence: Soole Judgment, [14]-[28]. I have given my own summary of this, above. Soole J’s summary sets out a number of further features of the evidence.

Soole J summarised the applicable law, noting that there were three principal sources of instruction and guidance: first the general principles applicable to the grant of interim precautionary (or quia timet) injunctions; second the adaptations to those principles necessary if and when ECHR rights and/or s. 12 Human Rights Act 1998 were engaged; and thirdly the principles and guidance identified in respect of ‘newcomer’ cases by the Supreme Court in Wolverhampton City Council v London Gypsies and Travellers [2023] UKSC 47, [2024] AC 983 (‘Wolverhampton’).

Soole J summarised the submissions made on behalf of the University: Soole Judgment, [49]-[59]. One particular matter to which he referred was that the University had relied on the provisions of its Rules of Behaviour and Code of Practice of Freedom of Speech, to whose provisions all students sign up when enrolling at the University. Those Rules of Behaviour include that a student must not ‘damage, misappropriate or occupy without appropriate permission any University or College property or premises, or any property or premises accessed as a result of a College or University activity.’ The Code of Practice includes that ‘Permission is required for meetings and events to be held on University premises, whether indoors or outdoors’: Soole Judgment, [49]. Another matter to which reference was made was to steps taken by University officials to engage with demonstrators, including members of Cambridge for Palestine. This had led to an agreement that the University would review its approach to investments in and research funded by the defence industry; and that a working group would be established to make recommendations to the relevant University committees overseeing investments and research: Soole Judgment, [50].

Soole J summarised the submissions made on behalf of ELSC: Soole Judgment, [60]-[79]. These included: that the proposed injunction was a disproportionate infringement of the Defendants’ rights; that it was unnecessary, in that there was a framework under the criminal law which addresses such protests; that no sufficiently serious risk had been identified; that the proposed injunction affected the ability of the Defendants to exercise their Article 10 and 11 rights at the very heart of the University; that the proposed prohibition was not calibrated by the requirements of Articles 10 and 11; that the proposed condition to the effect that conduct was prohibited unless there was the consent of the University produced uncertainty for students and staff as to the nature of that consent; that there were less restrictive means of achieving the intended aim; that the injunction had not been the subject of appropriate scrutiny by the University’s decision-making bodies; and that the effect of the proposed injunction was discriminatory in respect of both race and of political and philosophical beliefs.

Soole J concluded that there was a compelling need for the grant of an injunction in the terms and for the period proposed: Soole Judgment, [80]-[101]. His reasoning included in particular the following: (1) he was satisfied that there was an imminent and real risk of the occurrence of the conduct which it was sought to restrain and consequent substantial harm; (2) he was satisfied that it was likely (‘(indeed very likely)’) that at a notional final trial or hearing the application would succeed, and specifically, assuming that the Defendants’ Article 10, 11 and 14 rights were engaged, that (i) as to Articles 10 and 11, he was quite satisfied that any interference was in pursuit of the legitimate aim of the University to secure its buildings and spaces and the activities carried out thereon, that the interference was necessary to achieve that end, that there was a rational connexion between the means and the end, that there were no adequate alternative means available to the University, and that the proposed injunction provided a fair balance between the rights of the parties, and (ii) as to Article 14, he was doubtful that the proposed order had any discriminatory effect, but in any event was quite satisfied that the proposed restraint left ample opportunity for the protesters to campaign and express their opinions and beliefs in Cambridge and its city centre; (3) he did not accept that the application had not been subject to appropriate scrutiny by the University and its decision-making bodies; (4) he did not accept that there was a lack of clarity in the proposed reference in the terms of the injunction to the prohibited acts being carried out ‘without consent’; (5) damages would not be an adequate remedy; and (6) that, even on the assumption that the Wolverhampton principles applied in full measure, each of the requirements was fully met.