KB-2025-000497 - [2025] EWHC 2330 (KB)

The judge recounted the facts of the two lawn occupations, referring to the fact that the evidence relating to Trinity College had concentrated on the disruptive impact of loud noise on students taking examinations within the College or revising for examinations, while the evidence relating to St John’s College, though focusing on the disruption caused to examinations by loud noise, had in addition mentioned an atmosphere of intimidation, and the disruption of Evensong which is held in St John’s College chapel on six evenings a week.

The judge set out that each College sought two orders: first, each sought an order for possession on a summary basis pursuant to CPR r. 55.8(1)(a); and second each sought to make the existing injunctions final on their current terms until the end of June 2026. It is to be noted that, while no order for possession is sought in the action with which I am concerned, Mr Twigger KC’s consideration of the claim for possession in the cases before him is of significance because he relies on part of his reasoning in relation to that claim in his consideration of the claims for injunctions.

The judge set out the legal principles applicable to summary orders for possession: Twigger Judgment, [16]-[34]. He referred to the decision of Johnson J in University of Birmingham v Persons Unknown [2024] EWHC 1770 and its treatment of whether a decision by a land owner to terminate a licence or of the court to make an order for possession might be unlawful if breaching a person’s rights to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly.

The judge then stated his decision as to whether there should be possession orders. He found that the Colleges were the owners of the land in question; that the protesters had not had any right to occupy the land, and were trespassers, and that they had no private law defence to the claims for possession. The only question was whether there was an arguable defence on the grounds that the Colleges’ decisions to terminate any licence and bring possession proceedings or the making of the order itself might be unlawful because of Articles 10 and/or 11 of ECHR. For these purposes he assumed without deciding that the Colleges were public authorities, and assumed that the Colleges’ decisions or an order for possession would interfere with the protesters’ Convention rights. He considered that orders for possession would not be unlawful. His reasoning was as follows: (i) the making of summary possession orders was prescribed by law; (ii) the interference with protesters’ rights was in pursuit of a legitimate aim, namely the Colleges’ private law rights to their property and their protection of the rights of those lawfully using their land; (iii) that the Colleges’ decisions and the making of a possession order were proportionate, in that (a) the objective of the Colleges’ decisions, and of the making of an order, namely the Colleges’ possessing their own land, was sufficiently important to justify any interference with the protesters’ Convention rights, (b) a possession order was directly and rationally connected to the objective of obtaining possession, (c) there was no measure less intrusive on the protesters’ Convention rights that could achieve the legitimate aim of giving the Colleges possession of their land, and (d) the severity of the measure’s effect on the protesters’ rights did not outweigh the importance of the objective. As the judge said (at [48]):

‘Taking all these matters into account, I have no doubt that the importance of the objective of the possession orders, both in returning the possession of the land to the Colleges, and in protecting the rights of the College communities, substantially outweighs the severity of the effect the order will have on the protestors’ Convention rights. … I consider this to be a conclusion which can comfortably and confidently be reached on a summary application, so that any defence based on Convention rights has no real prospect of success.’

The judge then referred to the legal principles applicable to the grant of precautionary injunctions against persons who cannot be identified in advance. He referred to [235] of the judgment in Wolverhampton, with its reference to the judge needing to be satisfied that there is ‘a compelling need for the order’. He referred to a number of cases in which the principles discussed in Wolverhampton have been applied to protesters trespassing on private land including the decision of Ritchie J in Valero Energy Ltd v Persons Unknown [2024] EWHC 134 (KB), the decisions in MBR Acres v Curtin [2025] EWHC 331 (KB) and University of London v Harvie-Clark [2024] EWHC 2895 (Ch), and the decisions of Fordham J and of Soole J in the present action.

Considering the fifteen guidelines mentioned by Ritchie J in Valero Energy the judge was satisfied that there was a compelling need for the grant of injunctions and that it was just and convenient to make such orders, to run until the end of June 2026: Twigger Judgment, [62]-[131]. In particular: (i) the judge found that there was an ‘imminent and real risk’ that, without injunctions in place, the protesters would continue to trespass on the Colleges’ land and set up another encampment, which would cause real harm; (ii) there was no realistic defence, either a private law defence, or based on Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR; (iii) damages were not an adequate remedy; and (iv) an injunction was necessary ‘whilst there remains an imminent and real risk of further disruptive protests, and I have seen nothing which encourages me to think that this risk will recede in the course of the next year.’