QB-2018-004997 - [2025] EWHC 2301 (KB)

The Claimant was a gunner in the Royal Horse Artillery, a regiment she had joined in October 2014. She was assigned to the King’s Troop, first at Wellington Barracks, London but then in July 2015 she was sent to Woolwich. Her assessment, once she had arrived at Woolwich, identified the need for riding lessons which she took under the instruction of, amongst others, Lance Bombardier (L/Bdr) Hilary Oldfield.

On 4 September 2015 the Claimant was one of three recruits having a riding lesson with L/Bdr Oldfield. The other two were Gunner Smith and Gunner Collins. The lesson took place at the Defendant’s outside riding arena. The Claimant had started the lesson on one mare, Narlia, but was finding her difficult to control. She was swapped onto another mare, Electra Jazz (‘Jazz’). She had not ridden Jazz before. There came a point in the lesson when the recruits were ordered by L/Bdr Oldfield to cross the arena and turn right. Gunners Smith and Collins crossed the arena and mistakenly turned left. The Claimant turned right but assumed that she had done so incorrectly. She therefore turned Jazz in order to go in the opposite direction. This affected her balance. Jazz bucked and the Claimant was thrown off her. She fell to the ground and sustained a serious injury to her left shoulder, which ultimately deprived her of her army career.

The Claimant blames the Defendant for her accident. She puts her case both in negligence and under the Animals Act 1971. She maintains that she was not provided with appropriate equipment, in particular properly fitting riding boots, that Jazz was an unsuitable horse for her and that L/Bdr Oldfield did not pay any or any sufficient heed to an earlier incident in the lesson where Jazz had bucked and unseated her.

It is the Claimant’s case that, pursuant to section 2(2) Animals Act 1971, the Defendant is strictly liable for what happened to her because (i) her injury was caused by Jazz (ii) her injury was of a kind that, if caused, was likely to be severe and (iii) that that likelihood was due to characteristics of Jazz which are not normally found in horses or not normally so found except at particular times and in particular circumstances. These characteristics she maintains were known to the Defendant.

The Defendant denies liability in negligence. Its case is that Jazz was a suitable horse for the Claimant, that her boots were suitable and that she was properly trained and instructed, both by L/Bdr Oldfield and generally. The occurrence of an earlier incident of bucking in the lesson is denied.

The Defendant denies liability under the Animals Act 1971. It denies that the damage was of a kind that was likely to be severe. Its further case is that bucking is something that all horses do and the Claimant has failed to establish the particular circumstances that caused Jazz to buck and so cannot establish that the damage was caused by a characteristic only found in horses at particular times or in particular circumstances. Finally it argues that, if Jazz had the requisite characteristics it did not know about them.

The Defendant also made allegations of contributory negligence in relation to the Claimant’s technique and control but these were not pursued at trial.

The Claimant sustained a comminuted fracture to her left clavicle as a result of the accident. She underwent open reduction and internal fixation surgery shortly thereafter. Unfortunately, she continued to experience pain and, in 2016, she was referred first to a local pain clinic and then to the Defendant’s rehabilitation facility at Headley Court. The hoped for improvement in her condition did not occur and she was recommended for medical discharge in late December 2016. Her date of discharge was in August 2017. She left with an exemplary service record.

The army was more than a job to the Claimant and the consequences of the accident took their toll on her mental health.

Around the same time as she was recommended for discharge the Claimant had further surgery. Under general anaesthetic, a neuroma was excised and metal work removed. In late April 2017 she had a nerve block injection. It is at this point that the parties’ cases as to the Claimant’s recovery materially diverge.

The Claimant’s case is that she has recovered orthopaedically but been left with neuropathic pain, weakness, restriction of movement and hypersensitivity.

The Defendant’s case is that the Claimant has recovered to the extent that she can use her arm normally or near normally. That recovery occurred around May 2017, alternatively by no later than mid-2019 when she saw Dr McDowell, the Part 35 pain expert reporting to the court on behalf of the Defendant. (I shall refer to such experts hereafter in this judgment simply by reference to the party who instructed them.) Her representations as to the extent of her disability since then have been dishonest. That dishonesty is ‘fundamental’ engaging the provisions of s.57 Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 and/or CPR 44.16. It requires me to dismiss her claim even if I find the Defendant in breach of duty. In the event that I do not find for her, I am asked by the Defendant to use my power under CPR 44.16 to permit the enforcement of an award of costs, removing the Claimant’s QOCS protection. Reliance is placed on surveillance evidence, on inconsistencies in what she has said, in particular about having horses to look after and on issues concerning her vehicle, which came to prominence during the course of the trial itself.

The Claimant’s case is that she is honestly presenting her claim. She has engaged with all the evidence on which the Defendant relies and there is no inconsistency, alternatively no more than would be expected of a genuine Claimant over the course of lengthy and stressful litigation. The Claimant points to her continued engagement with clinicians and the fact that she has obtained work and competed as a disabled athlete since her accident. She had a local brachial plexus nerve block procedure in June 2018 and she has had a spinal cord stimulator fitted. She found work at a funeral director’s after leaving the army. She has been a successful competitor at the Invictus Games and has been in contention for paralympic selection.

Finally, there are issues as to the quantum of the Claimant’s claim if she is successful in particular as to past and future loss of earnings and support.

Proceedings in this case were issued shortly before the expiry of the primary limitation period. The first directions made set a timetable ending in a trial in July 2021. That turned out to be some four years before the actual date of trial which therefore took place nearly 10 years after the Claimant’s accident. The evidence, particularly that in relation to liability would, of course, have been more coherent had it been earlier.

On the Claimant’s behalf I heard evidence from her, from her grandmother, Maureen O’Connell, her Army Reserve superior officer Captain Karl Stone and her friend, Shireen Timmis. On behalf of the Defendant I heard from four of her fellow soldiers in the King’s Troop, L/Bdr Hillary Oldfield, Sgt Shaun Kershaw, Gunner Rebecca Collins and Bdr Kristian Dawson. (I have used their ranks at the time of the events with which the case is concerned). I heard expert evidence in the fields of equestrianism (Ms Taylor for the Claimant, Ms Ham for the Defendant), psychiatry (Dr Collinge, Dr Eldred), Pain medicine (Professor Lalkhen, Dr McDowell), Care evidence (Ms Gouldstone, Mr Major-Preece) and employment evidence (Mr Stafford OBE, Mr Cameron). I did not hear evidence from the orthopaedic experts (Mr Lourie and Mr Gilham for the Claimant and Mr Smith for the Defendant) but their reports and joint reports were in the trial bundle.

During the course of the trial I was greatly assisted by counsel, Mr Lewers and Ms Mawdesley-Thomas for the Claimant and Mr Fetto KC and Ms Fenelon for the Defendant.