Upper Tribunal Administrative Appeals Chamber

[2024] UKUT 166 (AAC)

Fecha: 08-May-2024

Upper Tribunal’s analysis

Upper Tribunal’s analysis

22.

On the face of it, the decision’s reason for recommending that S’s mother be given sole discretion over what social care activities S should access – despite the decision acknowledging, at [30], that the Appellant, as S’s father, wanted to be involved as well – was an absence of “relevant evidence” from the Appellant. What the decision seemed to have in mind in terms of “evidence” that the Appellant could have submitted, but did not, was evidence of the kinds of social care activities he would (positively) want S to take part in (as the Respondent pointed out, part of the Appellant’s suggested Section D wording consisted of complaints about Brent social services’ input to date). This reasoning seems to me problematic:

if the allegedly “missing” evidence (from the Appellant) was evidence specifying exactly what social care activities S should access, then this was entirely at odds with the social care provision that the decision ultimately decided was required, as that, too, was not “specific” in this respect, but rather gave S’s mother (alone) the right to choose social care activities;

the absence of such “evidence” cannot, therefore, be a rational, or fair, explanation for why the decision gave S’s mother that sole discretion;

if the true explanation was that the tribunal had reasoned that, given the Appellant’s strongly-worded complaints about Brent social services to date, it was likely that he would “block” any social care activities if he had any role in choosing them, then this is in turn problematic because

the decision had itself recorded (at [30]) that the Appellant had said that he wanted to be involved in social care provision for S (and the decision had not made any findings to the effect that, if involved, the Appellant would simply “block” any social care activities); and

ii.

the Appellant’s suggested wording at Section D did not, on the face of it, object to any social care activities, but rather required, in future, consultation with both parents and “professionals” supporting S at school.

23.

In essence, the decision’s reasons are in my view inadequate on this point because they do not engage with what the Appellant actually suggested in his proposed wording (as above: consultation with parents plus “professionals”) – and, it would appear from [30], at the tribunal hearing – and do not explain why the tribunal rejected this. The explanation cannot, logically, be (as it appears to be on the face of [51]) that the Appellant’s proposal was not specific enough, as the tribunal went on to recommend something of no greater specificity (that S’s mother choose the social care activities); and it cannot be inferred from the context (such as the evidence given and submissions made at the tribunal) that the tribunal had decided, on the basis of the Appellant’s complaints about Brent social services’ input so far, that he would block any social care activities (as this would be an important, and sensitive, finding for it to make – and it did not make it). Moreover, such a finding (about expected obstruction by the Appellant to any social care activity) would not fully explain why the tribunal gave S’s mother sole discretion over social activities, as the Appellant’s proposals also gave “professionals” from school a say in choosing such activities, and there is no explanation of why this aspect was rejected in the decision.

24.

The result is that the Appellant is left without fairly understanding why he lost on this point; and the appellate tribunal is unable to probe as to whether there was legal error in the tribunal’s thinking in arriving at its conclusion. It follows that there is material legal error in the decision on this point.