[2025] UKUT 069 (AAC)

DBS’s decision made a mistake in a finding of fact on which it was based, in that it found that, as at the time of the decision, DGW was “of the belief” that children under 16 could consent to sex (see for example page 293 of the Upper Tribunal bundle), and had “an attitude that” he could do what he wanted irrespective of the safety or concern of others (example at page 294). DBS made these findings based on evidence about DGW’s beliefs and attitudes in 2001. It is realistically arguable that DGW, through his own evidence, could persuade a panel of the Upper Tribunal that, 23 years later, when DBS’s decision was made, he did not hold such beliefs or have such attitudes (either because he never had, or because he had changed in that period of time);

DBS’s decision made a mistake in a finding of fact on which it was based, in that it found (see page 293) that, over a period of months in 2001, DGW developed an inappropriate and sexual relationship with the 14 year old. It is realistically arguable that DGW, through his own evidence (which would include the fact, which is significant if not determinative, that he was acquitted of two charges involving sex with an underage person, a fact seemingly not considered by DBS) could persuade a panel of the Upper Tribunal that he did not in fact have a sexual relationship with the 14 year old;

DBS’s decision made a mistake in a finding of fact on which it was based, in that it found (see page 293) that DGW had received warnings from the police prior to his taking the 14 year old away from the residential unit in his car, prior to May 2001; and that DGW had bought alcohol and cannabis for the 14 year old in 2001. It is realistically arguable that DGW, through his own evidence, could persuade a panel of the Upper Tribunal that he did not know, at the time, that he needed the unit’s permission to take the 14 year old in his car; and that he did not buy alcohol or cannabis for her;

DBS’s decision made a mistake on a point of law by not taking relevant material into account, namely DGW’s life story in the 23 years between the occurrence of the facts on which the decision was based, and the making of the decision. It is reasonably arguable that such material included the fact that (per DGW’s evidence) DGW’s life story since then had not given rise to any cause for concerns about safeguarding children or vulnerable adults, that DGW had been in a relationship with the same partner since 2006 and had six children with her, now aged between 8 and 18, that DGW had been diagnosed with PTSD, and that DGW had been prescribed an antidepressant, mirtazapine, at a high dose (45 mg). In the alternative, the error of law was that DBS’s decision was disproportionate, for the same reasons.