[2025] UKUT 299 (AAC)

I set out below the parties’ arguments and submissions as set out at the oral hearing. I have not set out in detail the contents of their written (skeleton) arguments. The legal arguments being put forward developed and evolved at the hearing. It is more relevant to address the arguments as put at the hearing, since these represent the final positions taken by the parties.

CPAG’s arguments on behalf of MJ and observations about SC

Mr Williams confirmed that his organisation (CPAG) and the SSWP agreed the structure of Chapter 2 of the SS Act 1998 and Schedule 7 to the CSPSS Act 2000 create separate decision-making structures for UC and HB producing materially identical results (meaning they act more or less in the same way). Mr Williams therefore focused his submissions on the provisions in Chapter 2 of the SS Act 1998 because there was more case law addressing it.

Mr Williams confirmed MJ accepted she was not entitled to HB from the Monday after she left the UK (20 March 2023), and no issue was being taken about the meaning of regulation 7(13D) of the HB regulations 2006.

Mr Williams submitted that section 8(1) of the SS Act 1998 places a duty on the SSWP to decide a claim for benefit. He argued the equivalent duty for HB is in regulation 89 of the HB Regulations 2006.

Mr Williams submitted that where a benefit claim is made and determined, there are two broad possible outcomes:

Mr Williams submitted that the indefinite nature of a UC award described in paragraph 51(b) above is confirmed by regulation 36(1) of the Universal Credit, Personal Independence Payment, Jobseeker's Allowance and Employment and Support Allowance (Claims and Payments) Regulations 2013 (“the UC etc. (C&P) Regulations 2013"). He argued the position is similar for HB. Mr Williams argued that given benefit weeks for HB had been revoked in 2004, periodic renewals were no longer required, indicating HB awards were now indefinite in nature.

Mr Williams submitted that for both situations described in paragraph 51 above, section 8(2)(a) of the SS Act 1998 provides that the benefit claim ceases to exist. Mr Williams submitted that section 8(2) of the SS Act 1998 was enacted to reverse the effect of the down to the hearing date rule applied by a Tribunal of Commissioners decision in R(S)2/98. This rule treated a claim as continuing to exist once a decision had been made about it, including where the decision awarded benefit. Where a review decision changed an indefinite benefit award into a time limited one (by ending entitlement), it became a mixed decision, within which the benefit claim continued to run.

R(S)2/98 decided that appeals against a decision refusing a benefit claim and appeals against a review decision ending a benefit award would each run up until the date of the tribunal hearing. Mr Williams submitted that section 8(2) of the SS Act 1998 was introduced to make clear that a claim dies at the point it is decided, and to overturn the decision in R(S)2/98 (whose analysis relied on a claim continuing to exist after it had been determined).

Mr Williams argued that section 8(2) of the SS Act 1998:

Mr Williams agreed with the SSWP that where a claim is disallowed under section 8 of the SS Act 1998 (or the equivalent legislation for HB), it cannot be superseded for a later change of circumstances. He did not, however, agree with the SSWP that a closed period supersession decision could not itself be superseded.

Mr Williams confirmed he accepted the general principle that a supersession decision cannot itself be superseded for a change of circumstances. He argued, however, that this is not because of section 8(2). Instead, it is better stated as a principle established by (then) Mr Commissioner Mesher in paragraphs 12 and 13 of CIS/767/94. Mr Commissioner Mesher decided that a decision disallowing benefit cannot be superseded where the change of circumstances being relied on is not relevant to the circumstances at the time when the supersession decision was made (because it arises afterwards).

Mr Williams submitted that given a decision awarding benefit is indefinite and runs into the future, if the SSWP supersedes that indefinite award, the supersession decision modifies and closes the period of the award. Mr Williams submitted that after the effective date of the supersession decision, a later change of circumstances cannot be relevant, because it covers a period which the supersession decision does not now deal with. Mr Williams submitted this is the key principle that generally prevents a supersession decision being capable of being superseded for a change of circumstances.

Mr Williams submitted that section 8(2) of the SS Act 1998 does not have any application to what the SSWP is doing in a closed period supersession decision, because section 8(2) applies to claims, not ongoing awards. He argued that none of the case law suggests otherwise.

Mr Williams argued a closed period supersession is also not caught by the principle in CIS/767/94. This is because in a closed period supersession, the decision being superseded (decision A) is one that a claimant has an ongoing entitlement to benefit. The supersession decision (decision B) therefore does not trespass on a period not governed by decision A, because decision A applies indefinitely until changed by a new decision.

Mr Williams’ skeleton argument had argued that closed period supersessions involved a pair of supersession decisions (decision B and decision C), taken and given at the same time. Decision B would supersede the decision awarding benefit (decision A) and would bring benefit entitlement to an end. Decision C would supersede decision B and restore benefit entitlement. Because decisions B and C would be given at the same time, the claim would never be completely extinguished. This would avoid triggering the difficulty in section 8(2) of the SS Act 1998 that meant a claimant had to submit a new claim.

At the hearing, Mr Williams confirmed he was no longer pursuing the pair of supersessions argument because:

Mr Williams argued his new analysis still meant the decision-maker was not trespassing on a period not governed by the benefit award being superseded. This was because the decision being superseded (decision A) was one making an indefinite award. Decision A therefore affected present and future entitlement, a period of time that would be affected by the supersession decision (decision B).

Mr Williams argued that the SSWP had incorrectly analysed the change of circumstances as SC or MJ leaving the UK for a period that would, from the outset, exceed the temporary absence provisions. Mr Williams submitted that for SC and for MJ, the relevant change of circumstances was that she was leaving Great Britain for a known fixed period. Mr Williams argued that if the relevant change of circumstances is analysed as leaving Great Britain for a known fixed period, the outcome of removing entitlement for that fixed period flows from the supersession ground. He argued this did not breach the principle in Wood that supersession grounds are outcome grounds, and the decision must flow from them.

Mr Williams said the cases of SSWP v NC [2023] UKUT124 (AAC) (“NC”) and AK & DA v SSWP (UA-2024-000227-ULCW) did not undermine his arguments. He submitted Upper Tribunal Judge Rowland was not given submissions about closed period supersessions in NC, and they did not need to be argued before him, given the facts of that particular case. In relation to AK & DA, Mr Williams argued that the crucial difference between that case and MJ and SC, was that when AK contacted DWP, she did not know how long she and her partner would remain abroad. It would not have been possible to make a prospective closed period supersession in SK’s appeal, because at the time the SSWP superseded AK’s award, she did not know when AK planned to return to Great Britain.

Mr Williams argued the SSWP could not find a convincing alternative analysis to explain how closed period supersessions operate. This was why Mr Howell was forced to resort to arguing they exist through necessary implication. Mr Williams submitted that in terms of the SS Act 1998 and its equivalent for HB, the SSWP had not met the stringent test explained in paragraph 45 of R v Special Commissioner and another, ex parte Morgan Grenfell and Co [2002] UKHL 21. Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough explained a necessary implication is one which necessarily follows from the express provisions of the statute as construed in their context and is a matter of express language and logic not interpretation.

Mr Williams argued the SSWP was relying on the detailed (and restrictive) provisions for making an advance award of benefit, to dispute that prospective closed supersessions were possible (since there were no equivalent restrictions). He argued the comparison was misconceived; a claimant with a benefit award has an indefinite entitlement to that benefit and is in a fundamentally different position to a benefit claimant asserting entitlement that has not yet been established. He contrasted the restrictive circumstances in which an advance award can be made, compared with the unrestricted power to supersede a benefit award for an anticipated change of circumstances (see regulation 7(2)(a)(ii) of the HB & CTB (D&A) Regulations 2001 and regulation 23(1)(b) of the UC etc. (D&A) regulations 2013).

Mr Williams confirmed he was not arguing that prospective closed period supersessions are made under regulation 7(2)(a)(ii) (or the UC equivalent). However, the SSWP had relied on that regulation to try to undermine the analysis that prospective closed period supersessions are not available. Mr Williams argued the SSWP’s reliance on that provision was flawed, and so was the argument that such supersessions decisions would cause uncertainty. Mr Williams submitted that prospective closed period supersessions would only apply in a narrow category of cases, where the end date of the disallowance period was known (in advance) and a proper end date could be determined. Mr Williams argued that at the time the decision-makers had made their decisions about MJ and SC, their absence from Great Britain for a known fixed period.

Mr Williams argued his analysis also avoided the unfair outcomes that MJ and SC were worse off than a claimant who only notified their absence after they returned to Great Britain, or who notified the absence before they left but where a decision-maker failed to act on it until they returned to Great Britain. In MJ’s case, it would have held open the opportunity to continue claiming HB that was no longer open to her when she returned to Great Britain, because any new claim would have to be for UC. Mr Williams argued the scope for a decision-maker to change the outcome by failing to make a timely decision was the very definition of arbitrary and capricious as described by the Court of Appeal in SB v SSWP [2007] EWCA Civ 89 (R(DLA)2/07).

Mr Williams submitted that if the Upper Tribunal decided against his argument that a prospective closed period supersession decision could be made, he had a secondary argument. This was that it was an abuse of power for LB Bromley and the SSWP to make the supersession decisions ending MJ and SC’s benefit awards. The FTTs had not made clear findings of fact but each claimant’s evidence was that they discussed with the decision-maker or DWP and were told that they would face a short period of not being entitled to the benefit followed by becoming re-entitled to it.

Mr Williams submitted that the ability to supersede is a power, not a duty, and the SSWP could decide not to exercise it. In CIS/6249/1999, Mr Commissioner Mesher had indicated it was open to DWP not to supersede on the basis that it would be an abuse of power to do so. Mr Williams confirmed, however, that this was his secondary argument, and he placed greater reliance on his submissions that there could, and should, be a prospective closed period supersession.

The SSWP’s arguments in relation to both appeals

Mr Howell confirmed CPAG and the SSWP were largely agreed about the relevant statutory framework. He submitted, however, that section 134 of the Administration Act 1992, not regulation 89 of the HB regulations 2006, obliges a local authority to decide HB claims.

Mr Howell submitted that the Court of Appeal’s decision in Wood explains what a change of circumstances means in the context of the new decision-making regime provided by the SS Act 1998. In Wood, the majority of the Court of Appeal agreed that: (a) supersession involves altering and replacing an existing decision, (b) the ground for supersession specified in the regulations must be satisfied before the power can be exercised and (c) the decision can only be altered in a way that follows from what has been established.

Mr Howell confirmed the SSWP agreed the wording of section 8(2) of the SS Act 1998 means it does not apply to supersession decisions. He argued that section 8(2) is relevant because it confirms that once a claim is decided, the claim itself is extinguished. Read together with section 1 of the Administration Act 1992, a person whose claim is refused must make a new benefit claim.

Mr Howell agreed that UC and HB awards run indefinitely, until they are validly changed. He did not agree this applied to all social security benefits. See, for example, personal independence payment, which is generally made as a time limited award.

Mr Howell argued that while a decision to award UC or HB is a running decision, a disallowance decision is not. After it is made, a claimant’s circumstances might change, in which case they can make a new claim. Mr Howell explained there are exceptions to this principle, but argued they are limited. One exception applied for industrial injuries disablement benefit (“IIDB”). Mr Howell also referred to the regulation-making power in section 5(1)(f) of the Administration Act 1992 allowing a disallowance of a claim to be treated as operating for a longer period. Mr Howell argued that if disallowance decisions generally operated indefinitely, it would not be necessary to have a regulation-making power to provide for this to happen.

Mr Howell confirmed the SSWP agreed Mr Commissioner Mesher’s decision in CIS/767/94 is relevant and important to making closed period supersession decisions. Although the decision was made under the pre-1998 legislation, Mr Howell confirmed the SSWP considers it reflects the correct position under the SS Act 1998 as well.

Mr Howell explained the SSWP’s position reflects paragraph 16 of R(I) 5/02; namely that a decision to award benefit is generally a running decision, but a decision refusing a claim is not. This principle extends to where a decision awarding benefit is later superseded and disallowed. Mr Howell argued it would create unworkable consequences to treat a supersession decision disallowing an award as a running decision. It would also undermine the requirement in section 1 of the Administration Act 1992 to make a claim.

A claim can be treated as having been made but this requires regulations to be made under section 1(2) of the Administration Act 1992. This was the mechanism used to make regulation 32A of the UC etc. (C&P) regulations 2013. However, this applied to a limited group of UC claimants (whose income is too high for UC entitlement in a given assessment period). Mr Howell argued that unless there are specific regulations allowing a benefit claim to be treated as having been made, the SSWP cannot dispense with the requirement under section 1 of the Administration Act 1992 that a claimant must make a benefit claim to be entitled to it.

Mr Howell relied on the decisions of CIS/5170/1999 and CSIS/745/2002 to establish the principles underpinning, and supporting, closed period supersessions. In CSIS/745/02, Mrs Commissioner Parker decided that where it was later decided that a claimant was not entitled to benefit during a period, but had been paid it under an award, entitlement must be considered for each week within the period as if a claim for benefit still existed. Mrs Commissioner Parker stated that had the non-entitlement been identified earlier, the SSWP would have made a disallowance decision, and the claimant would have had to make a new claim (or claims) for benefit. Mr Howell argued this undermined Mr Williams’ argument that there is no difference in principle between being able to make a retrospective closed period supersession decision and a prospective closed period supersession.

Mr Howell argued that at the conceptual heart of a closed period supersession decision, is a difference between making a closed period supersession where a past period of non-entitlement has been identified and the mechanism for changing a benefit award where, at the time the decision is made, the person is not entitled to benefit.

Mr Howell argued that applying Wood, Mr Williams’ argument could not succeed that the relevant change of circumstances was not meeting the entitlement conditions for a fixed period. A relevant change of circumstances identifies what is different to the earlier set of circumstances that gave the person benefit entitlement. Mr Howell argued the fact a period of non-entitlement is (or is likely to be) for a fixed period, is not a relevant change of circumstances. Once a person receiving benefit is absent from Great Britain for longer than permitted, it does not matter how long their absence will be after that time, because it is not relevant to the decision being superseded.

Mr Howell also argued that because UC and HB awards are running decisions applying for indefinite periods, Mr Williams’ approach could lead to a series of complex and unworkable decisions, where a claimant moved in and out of meeting entitlement conditions, requiring a range of decisions to be made. Mr Howell argued the more straightforward and logical approach would be for a decision-maker to consider the position at the date they were making their decision. If the claimant did not meet the conditions of entitlement at that time, the decision-maker could, and should, make a supersession decision ending the award. In these circumstances, a person could reclaim benefit when they next met the entitlement conditions.

Mr Howell submitted that the mechanism for a closed period supersession cannot readily be found in express legislative provisions. He submitted that once Mr Williams’ arguments were rejected (as they should be), the only possible explanation is that a closed period supersession is produced by necessary implication. Mr Howell acknowledged the test sets a high bar. He submitted this is for a very good reason, otherwise a tribunal or court is drawn away from its proper function and into legislating, which is reserved to Parliament and Ministers.

Mr Howell argued the two factors driving necessary implication as the reason for having closed period supersessions are:

Mr Howell argued the basis for the necessary implication is that the non-entitlement is for a temporary period in the past. A closed period supersession avoids generating artificial overpayments that would be caused by the past period of non-entitlement to the benefit affecting the subsequent period when the person met the entitlement conditions again. It escapes the difficulty of requiring a claimant to make a fresh claim.

Mr Howell argued that where an existing benefit award is looked at again, and a claimant does not meet the entitlement conditions at that time, there is no reason not to supersede the entitlement decision. Supersession would give effect to the statutory requirement of considering all the circumstances down to the date of the SSWP’s decision. Recognising that the person no longer meets the conditions of entitlement does not create any artificial overpayment. A claimant whose benefit ends in this way, would then make a fresh benefit claim once they satisfy the conditions of entitlement again.

Mr Howell submitted that in most of these cases, a claimant who reclaims benefit promptly and reasonably, will be able to restore their benefit entitlement. He acknowledged that for MJ, this was not possible as a result of living in an area that had become a UC area during the period of her HB award.

Mr Howell accepted that disallowing SC’s UC award had “restarted the clock” in assessing whether she had limited capability for work. This was relevant to the effective date of awarding SC any LCWRA element. Mr Howell acknowledged that in a situation like SC’s the clock might start again, potentially affecting when the LCWRA element could be awarded. Mr Howell submitted Parliament made this choice when legislating regulation 28 of the UC regulations 2013 and regulation 35(9) of the UC etc. (D&A) regulations 2013. These regulations collectively create the effective date for supersession decisions that a person has limited capability for work / work-related activity.

Mr Howell argued that a claimant who does not meet the entitlement conditions at the date of the supersession decision is in an objectively different position to a claimant who is entitled to benefit at the decision date but has a past period of time during which they were not entitled. He submitted the two situations are plainly distinguishable.

Mr Howell turned to SC’s argument that closed period supersession decisions may have arbitrary effects on people reporting changes of circumstances and discourage timely and honest reporting of them. SC had argued that claimants who don’t report going abroad until after they have returned are, effectively, rewarded for failing to report relevant changes. Mr Howell submitted this could be an argument not to have any form of closed period supersession decision at all. He also pointed to the consequences claimants face where they do not report relevant changes of circumstances, including facing recoverable overpayments, civil penalties, and even potential criminal prosecution.

Mr Howell acknowledged that unacceptable delay by a decision-maker in making a supersession decision may also operate to the advantage of some claimants compared with others where a timely decision is made. He submitted this would not, however, be the system operating in a capricious or arbitrary way, but a consequence of a public authority failing in its duty to make a decision.

Mr Howell argued that using the power to supersede an award for anticipated changes of circumstances would also not provide the outcome Mr Williams wanted to achieve. Mr Howell argued the power is designed to be used for anticipated changes that are straightforward, knowable, and largely administrative.

Mr Howell invited me to apply the decisions in NC, CIS/1305/2012 and in AK & DA. Mr Howell drew on paragraphs 24 to 26 of NC. He argued the decision confirmed that had NC been in prison when the SSWP made her supersession decision, he would have had to make a fresh claim, but that once NC was released from prison, the circumstances giving rise to his non-entitlement to ESA had ended, and a closed period supersession should be applied.

Mr Howell submitted that NC and AK & DA are very recent decisions of the Upper Tribunal and, while the judges deciding them had not heard as full and detailed arguments as in the appeals regarding SC and MJ, they should be followed applying principles of comity. The word “comity” means the Upper Tribunal gives respect to decisions of equal status to its own decisions. It applies because decisions by a single Upper Tribunal Judge generally all carry the same weight as each other. Mr Howell argued that NC and AK & DA can be applied to conclude that a closed period supersession decision can only apply retrospectively, and, where a person does not meet the benefit entitlement conditions at the date their entitlement is superseded, they must make a new claim for benefit.

Addressing Mr Williams’ secondary argument about abuse of power, Mr Howell submitted that supersession is not a discretion at large. It must be exercised applying the principle that claimants receive their correct benefit entitlement, neither more, nor less. He argued that subject to the detailed and restrictive advance award provisions, the SSWP has no statutory power to award benefit where the entitlement conditions are not met. Mr Howell argued the SSWP is administering scarce public funds, and it would be inappropriate to exercise her discretion and decide not to supersede an award, where this meant continuing to pay benefit to a person no longer entitled to receive it

Mr Howell submitted that in R(I)1/07, Mrs Commissioner Brown rejected the argument that it was a potential abuse of power to exercise the discretion to supersede. She considered the abuse of power argument previously set out by Mr Commissioner Mesher in CIS/6249/1999. Mrs Commissioner Brown was not, however, persuaded it meant DWP should not have used its power to supersede the award in the specific appeal she was dealing with. Mr Howell argued that R(I)1/07, as a reported decision, should be followed.

Mrs Commissioner Brown explained that erroneous advice by DWP does not mean a benefit award cannot be superseded. Nor does it give a claimant a benefit entitlement they would otherwise not have. Where DWP has made incorrect representations and a party has relied on them, the person can claim payments for maladministration or complain to the Independent Case Examiner. Mr Howell argued this position was also supported by the decision in PS v SSWP[2016] UKUT 437 (AAC) that a non-binding promise cannot prevent revision or supersession decisions being made.

Mr Howell submitted that for this reason, the issue of what DWP may or may not have told SC about her benefit entitlement was not relevant to what the FTT needed to decide. It would not change the statutory position, no matter how strongly SC felt about what she had been told.

In allowing SC’s appeal, FTT1 had decided that for a period of time while absent from Great Britain, SC had a nil award of UC. Mr Howell argued:

Mr Howell submitted that applying paragraphs 3 and 36 of the decision in IpswichBC v (1) TD and (2) SSWP[2024] UKUT 117 (AAC), there cannot be a nil award of UC. He argued that in UC, in particular, there is no basis for making nil awards.

In this context, Mr Howell submitted that the heading of regulation 32A of the UC regulations 2014, which states: “Reclaims of universal credit after nil award due to earnings” was unhelpful in describing of what regulation 32A does and also the position generally. This is because the SSWP’s position is that there cannot be a nil award of UC. Mr Howell argued that the clearer position is set out in 32A(1)(b), which refers to “entitlement to an award of universal credit ceases”.

Mr Howell acknowledged there is a power to suspend payment of benefit but argued this could not be used in situations like those SC and MJ faced. The power to suspend is used where there are questions whether a benefit award should be superseded but insufficient information to decide this. Mr Howell argued this would not apply where (as for SC and MJ), it was clear a claimant no longer met the entitlement conditions.

Mr Howell argued that delaying making entitlement decisions to allow claimants to benefit from closed period supersessions, conflicted with the duty to make decisions without delay. He pointed out there is no discretion for the SSWP to simply delay (or defer) making decisions. Mr Howell submitted that where there are many claims to decide and competing demands on its resources, a public authority such as the SSWP or a local authority, should be entitled to balance its case load and decide where to focus its capacity. This means giving a broad margin to decision-makers about deciding when to take decisions (see paragraph 24 of R(DLA) 4/05).

SC had argued the SSWP should not have taken the decision to supersede her entitlement to UC until she had exceeded the maximum period of temporary absence open to her. Mr Howell submitted this was not possible on the wording in regulation 11 of the UC regulations 2013. The requirements in regulation 11(1)(b)(i) were cumulative, meaning SC’s absence had to both be expected not to exceed one month and also not to exceed it. As soon SC’s absence was expected to exceed one month, she no longer met that requirement. Regulation 11(1)(b)(i) did not allow the SSWP to disregard her temporary absence for any period of time.

LP’s arguments in relation to the appeal against SC

LP explained there were some matters that SC asked her to raise on her behalf. These included that SC’s work coach had told SC that there would be no problem with her going abroad and her UC claim would not be closed. LP explained that SC’s UC journal had been wiped after her claim was closed and she could not obtain copies of what the work coach had told her.

LP highlighted that there are articles in the media where DWP had told the press that if a person went on holiday, their UC claim would not be closed, even if they went abroad for more than a month. LP also referred to the document in the House of Commons Library stating this. LP explained what when Mr Howell had said that the advice of a DWP employee is not a reason not to supersede an award, SC had said: “Who do I ask then?”.

LP explained SC was due to go on holiday in 2020, cancelled because of COVID-19. Her holiday had been discussed many times with DWP. The media, and SC’s UC work coach (and their supervisor) and all the other people SC and LP had spoken to, told them that SC would be paid for four weeks of her absence but probably not the other three. LP said she does not know where DWP expects claimants to get their information from.

LP explained SC had declared to DWP she had limited capability for work in September 2021. DWP’s guidelines were that the limited capability for work assessment would be carried out within 3 months, but it had still not been done by the date SC went on holiday in May 2022. Had SC been told that being abroad for seven weeks would mean her claim ended, she would not have planned a holiday abroad for seven weeks, or she could have flown home early. LP argued that SC’s mental health has been severely impacted by DWP’s decision making, as well as being financially impacted.

LP argued that DWP is required to make reasonable adjustments for people with disabilities, and closing their benefit claims is not making reasonable adjustments. When SC came back from Canada, she had to make a completely new claim, wait for her money, undergo a habitual residence test with her passport and documents to prove she had the right to reside in Great Britain and claim benefit. SC had lived in the UK since birth and had only gone abroad for 7 weeks. LP argued that DWP’s treatment of a young woman who had developed PTSD because she was at the Manchester Arena bombing, was appalling.

LP explained that when SC first claimed UC, she was on fit notes from her GP. After she claimed UC again, SC’s LCWRA element was only backdated to July 2022 (linked to the second claim). LP submitted she believes in principles, and it may not relate to the law, but that how DWP treated SC was wrong.

After LP made her submissions, SC also spoke. I am grateful that SC felt in a position to speak. I have no doubt it felt stressful to do so. It was very helpful to hear what SC wanted to say. She told me that she does not know all the laws but if she had not been living with her mother at the time, she would have been homeless when DWP closed her claim. LP had to cover all SC’s bills, and she ended up so badly affected, she was using a good bank. SC told me she would never have gone away for 7 weeks if she had known what would happen. In addition, DWP initially backdated the closure to April 2022, so she had no benefit for 3 or 4 months.