Case No. UKUT-00162-(IAC)

5. The Appellant is aged 30 years. He was born in the United Kingdom on 18 March 1986. The impugned decision recites that between 2004 and 2012 he was convicted of a series of criminal offences, mainly offences against the person and breaches of community orders. It suffices to focus on his two most recent convictions. On 01 March 2011 he was sentenced to two years imprisonment having been convicted of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, criminal damage and harassment. The index conviction – of rape – was made on 29 February 2012 generating a punishment of 6 ½ years’ imprisonment and a three year licence period. 6. The decision maker, in giving consideration to the question of how the 2006 Regulations applied to the Appellant, stated: “ It is not accepted that you have been resident in the United Kingdom in accordance with the 2006 Regulations for a continuous period of five years. ” The reason proffered for this conclusion was the absence of documentary evidence demonstrating that at the time of the Appellant’s birth, his parents were settled and exercising Treaty rights in the United Kingdom. The decision continues: “ It is understood at aged 2 or 3, in 1989, you and your family relocated to Germany for approximately 7 years, not returning until September 1997. Although evidence submitted in the form of school and medical documents indicates your presence in the United Kingdom from 1997 to 1999, there follows a gap of approximately 12 years until your employment time sheet dated August 2009 and weekly pay slip dated 24 June 2010 …. It is asserted [that] during this period you were in the United Kingdom in constant employment but no evidence has been submitted or received to substantiate these claims … Furthermore, prior to your indicated conviction of 29 February 2012, you were convicted on 01 March 2011 and received a custodial sentence of 2 years … thus breaking any continuous residence accrued from August 2009 and 24 June 2010. ” 7. The decision maker next posed the question of whether the deportation of the Appellant would be justified on the grounds of public policy or public security. In the lengthy recitation of the evidence of risk of reoffending and commentary which follow, one finds these salient passages: “ In completing your OASYS assessment the Offender Manager found that you pose a medium risk of harm … to the community, but high risk of harm to non - adults, any partners due to the pattern of serious domestic abuse …. In assessing you as high risk, it has been considered that there are identifiable indicators of a risk of serious harm which could happen at any time and cause a serious impact …. The Offender Manager has assessed [that] your risk of harm is greatest when you are in a relationship with a partner (given your history of domestic abuse) failure to address your offending behaviour, increased use of alcohol, the perception of being disrespected or humiliated and failure to comply with the indefinite Restraining Order with regards to your current victim…. There is no evidence that you have addressed the issues which caused you to behave in this appalling manner … you pose a significant and unacceptable risk of harm to women in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, there is clearly an escalation in seriousness of the offences you have committed. ” This assessment culminates in the omnibus conclusion: “ All the available evidence indicates that you have a propensity to reoffend and that you represent a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to the public to justify your deportation on the grounds of public policy. ” The decision continues: “ Given the nature of the offence you have committed and the threat that you pose to society, it is considered that, even if you had permanent residence as a result of 5 years continuous residence in the United Kingdom or for a continuous period of at least 10 years, the requirement for serious grounds of security or imperative grounds of public security respectively would be satisfied. ” Finally, the decision maker pronounced himself satisfied about the proportionality of deportation and concluded that this would not infringe Article 8 ECHR.