Case No. UKUT-00227-(IAC)

of a teacher who has formed part of M’s life during almost two years: “ He was devastated when he received the news that the initial application had been rejected and actually had to take time off school to pull himself together. His foster parents are very caring, but I know that his real mother has a special place in his heart and he does not feel the same sense of belonging to his foster parents. ” This evidence has the supreme virtues that it is manifestly objective, independent and measured. In passing, the teacher concerned deserves commendation for taking the trouble to provide her detailed and balanced witness statement. 9. The mother and younger son plainly live in deprived and dangerous circumstances. They are destitute. The second Appellant has been unwell for a long time. This is a fractured family. Neither son has had the benefit of a father, or father figure, for several years. The mother struggles on, battling against the odds, deprived of the immense assistance and support which the sponsor would be capable of providing. Meanwhile, M has become increasingly stressed and preoccupied. He appears to be under-achieving academically and his social activities have become limited. Having reached his 18 th birthday, the sponsor is no longer in foster care. Some three years have elapsed since he last saw his mother and younger brother. His status is that of a former looked after child. He cuts an isolated and unsupported figure, a teenager living in an unfamiliar foreign country without any family support whatsoever. I am satisfied that his need for reunification with his mother and younger brother has not diminished since his advent and is, if anything, greater than ever. Family Reunification: the Secretary of State’s Policy 10. The Secretary of State’s policy in the realm of family reunification, as expressed in the Immigration Rules, dates from the year 2000. Its most important feature, for the purposes of these appeals, is that no provision has ever been made for family reunification in the case of a child who has gained refugee status in the United Kingdom. This discrete regime is currently contained in Part 8 of Appendix FM to the Rules, at paragraphs 352A – 352G and 819L – 819U. In short, spouses and minor children of a “sponsor” can, subject to satisfying the governing conditions, secure family reunification in the United Kingdom by the grant of leave to enter. However, this possibility does not exist where the sponsor is a child. 11. Thus a blanket prohibition is in operation. Historically, there was a short lived exception to this prohibition relating to the parents of unaccompanied children who had fled Kosovo and secured asylum in the United Kingdom. This concession was confined to the short time frame of July to September 1999. With effect from 02 October 2000, the family reunification regime enshrined in the Immigration Rules contained the aforementioned blanket prohibition. From then to 2006 the Secretary of State operated a policy of permitting the parents or siblings of unaccompanied minor refugees to enter the United Kingdom for the purpose of reunification only where compelling and compassionate circumstances were demonstrated. Since 2006 the Secretary of State’s policy has extinguished this possibility. While these appeals have generated much documentary evidence pertaining to this discrete issue, it is striking that there is no evidence bearing directly on the policy aims and justification underpinning this exclusion. I shall revisit this discrete issue infra . Legal Framework 12. As appears from the above, the refusal decisions of the ECO were made solely by reference to the Immigration Rules. The appeal to the FtT was based on Article 8 ECHR. One of the salient features of the legal framework is that the Immigration Rules contain no provision for family reunification in the case of a child refugee. Nor does the Secretary of State operate any policy to this effect. There is (very properly) no dispute about the existence of family life and the interference with Article 8(1) wrought by the decisions of the ECO. Thus the fundamental question for this Tribunal is whether such interference is necessary in a democratic society viz is a proportionate means of securing the legitimate aim in play, namely immigration control. The statement of Lord Bingham of Cornhill in Huang v SSHD [2007] 2 AC 167, at [18], applies fully to these appeals: “ The Strasbourg Court has repeatedly recognised the general right of States to control the entry and residence of non-nationals and repeatedly acknowledged that the Convention confers no right on individuals or f