Case No. UKUT-00129-(IAC)

8. Mr Lindsay, in his skeleton argument, accepted that: a. t here are insurmountable obstacles to the appellant’s family life continuing outside of the UK ; and b. i t would not be reasonable or proportionate for the family unit to be indefinitely separated . 9. He stated that , on the facts of the case , the appellant is expected to leave the UK for only a limited period of time in order to apply for entry clearance to join her partner and that the “narrow issue” in the appeal is whether her temporary removal from the UK is proportionate. In his submissions, Mr Lindsay clarified that it is the respondent’s case that the appellant will be able to travel to Pakistan in order to apply for entry clearance and that it is not contended that she would be able to return to the United Arab Emirates. 10. The appellant ’s primary case is that respondent’s assumption that she would be able to re-enter the UK from Pakistan is mistaken as she would be unable to satisfy the financial eligibility requirements for entry as a partner . Accordingly , she contends that her appeal should be allowed because the consequence of her removal will be permanent, or at least long-term, exclusion from the UK which the respondent has conceded is not reasonable or proportionate. 11. In the alternative, the appellant argues that if (which she does not accept ) she would be able to re-enter the UK after only a limited period of time , her removal wound be disproportionate under article 8 ECHR for three reasons . 12. First, s he argues that her removal would be disproportionate because she meets the requirements of the Immigration Rules ( both under para. 276ADE( 1)(vi) and Appendix FM ) and satisfying the Rules is determinative of an article 8 appeal, as explained by the Senior President of Tribunals (Sir Ernest Ryder) in TZ (Pakistan) and PG (India) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 1109 at paragraph 34: [W] here a person satisfies the Rules, whether or not by reference to an article 8 informed requirement, then this will be positively determinative of that person's article 8 appeal, provided their case engages article 8(1), for the very reason that it would then be disproportionate for that person to be removed. 13. Second, she submits that there is a principle, derived from the House of Lords ’ judgment in Chikwamba v SSHD [2008] UKHL 40 , that there is no public interest in removing a person from the UK in order to make an entry clearance from abroad that would be certain to succeed ( referred to by Mr S arwar as the “ Chikwamba principle”) . The appellant’s case is that as she would succeed in her application from outside the UK it follows that she falls squarely within the Chikwamba principle and her appeal should be allowed on that basis . 14. Third, she argues that it would not be reasonable to expect her daughter to leave the UK (even for a temporary period , whilst her application for entry clearance is pending ) and therefore, in accordance with s117B(6) of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”) , the public interest does not require her removal . 15. The appellant has advanced a further argument as to why it would be unlawful to remove her from the UK . This contention is that she is entitled to a right of residence in order to avoid her daughter being deprived of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of her European Union Citizenship rights in accordance with Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (Case C-34/09) and Patel v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] UKSC 59 . C.