Case No. UKUT-00129-(IAC)

e 46. Mr Lindsay submitted that the appellant and her partner had sought to obscure and minimise their connection to Pakistan . He argued that the evidence pointed to the appellant having an uncle in Pakistan who is sufficiently close to her that she was able to use his address for her identification document. He maintained that the appellant and her partner gave contradictory evidence about the uncle: the appellant stated that he is deceased whereas the evidence of her partner was that the appellant speaks to him on the telephone. 47. Mr Lindsay argued that it is not possible to conclude, based on the oral and other evidence , that the appellan t and her partner would face difficult ies meeting the financial eligibility requirement for entry clearance. He noted that in the 2018 application form the after tax income of the appellant’s partner was recorded as £1 , 600 per month ( a sum which is sufficient to meet the financial eligibility requirements) and that on his daughter’s birth certificate he is described as a proprietor of a carpet shop. He submitted that there was no plausible explanation for the discrepancy between the income stated in the 2018 application form (£1 , 600 per month) and that stated in oral evidence (£250 – £300 a week). 48. Mr Sarwar argued that the evidence of the appellant and her partner about the appellant ’s uncle was not inconsistent as the appellant could have more than one uncle and her partner was not asked if any of the appellant’s relatives had died. Mr Sarwar noted that the appellant’s Pakistani ID card was issued whilst her mother was still alive, which is consistent with her claim that her only contact with extended family in Pakistan was via her mother. 49. He argued that the evidence of the appellant and her partner show s that neither have family ties in Pakistan and that there is no one in Pakistan who would be in a position to provide the appellant with support or accommodation. He highlighted that the appellant has lived her whole life in Dubai and has no experience of life in Pakistan. 50. With respect to the prospect of the appellant succeeding in an application for entry clearance, Mr Sarwar noted that the appellant’s partner would need evidence , such as wage slips and self-assessment returns, to prove his income which would not be possible given that he works “cash in hand”. He noted that the reference to the appellant’s partner being a shop proprietor was 3.5 years earlier, and the evidence was that the shop had not been successful. Mr Sarwar submitted that the evidence shows that if t he appellant is removed from the UK she will not be able to return. 51. Mr Sarwar also submitted that the evidence shows that the appellant has not used deception and has “done everything through the front door” . He argued that she had intended to return to Dubai to apply for settlement but because of her child’s health issues was forced to change her plans. He also contended that because of the delay by the respondent the appellant has established ro ots in the UK and now has a close relationship with her partner’s two sons. 52. We agree with Mr Linds a y’s assessment of the evidence . It is apparent that rather tha n state matters in a straightforward way the appellant and her partner have sought to present their evidence in a w ay t hat they believe will assist them. An example of this is the evidence given about the appellant ’s partner’s income . I n the 2018 application form the appellant stated that her partner earned approximately £1,600 a month after income tax and other deductions. This corresponds to £19,200 before tax a year and would be sufficient to meet the financial eligibility requirements under Appendix FM. The appellant stated in oral evidence that th is f o rm was completed by a solicitor on her behalf . S he would have been aware (through her solicitor) of the importance of providing accurate information . We note that at the time this form was completed the appellant is likely to have believed that it was in her interests for her partner to have an income that met the requirements under Appendix FM. In contrast, at the hearing before us, where we were told in oral evidence that the appellant’s partner earns £250-£300 per week (corresponding to £13,000 - £15,600 per year) , the appellant was seeking to convey the opposite - that her partner’s income did not meet the threshold under Appendix FM . 53. We f ound several aspects of the oral evidence problematic . In particular: a. The appellant stated that she had never spoken to her partner about whether he has any family in Pakistan (even though he is of Pakistani heritage ). We find it wholly unbelievable that, faced with the possibility of being returned to Pakistan with their daughter, the appellant and her partner would not have discussed whether the appellant ’s partner has any family or friends in Pakistan who might be able to provide assistance . b. The appellant stated that she had no idea when her father moved to the UK . We do not find it credible that she did not even know whether her father was already in the UK when she came to the UK , given her claim to be entirely dependent upon him for her right to reside in the United Arab Emirates. c. The appellant stated that she does not know whether her uncle had any children. Even if she only heard about her family through her mother and is not in contact with them herself , it is not p lausible that she would not know if she ha s any cousins . d. The appellant claimed that when her family visited Pakistan from Dubai they would stay in hotels and not visit family ; and that she has never met any extended family . However, this does not stand with the appellant’s acknowledgment that her mother’s brother lived in Pakistan , the evidence of her partner that she speaks to h er uncle on the tele phone, and the documentary evidence – in the form of her Pakistani identity document – which gives an address that she accepted was probably his as her “permanent address” . e. It is not credible that the appellant , if she genuinely intended to return to Dubai after her child was born (as she stated in oral evidence) , would not have taken steps to ensure she remained entitled to reside in Dubai before her United Arab Emirates’ visa expired at the end of 2016. Similarly, g iven that she had no basis for believing she would be able to remain in the UK , it is not plausible that , if moving to Pakistan would be as challenging as she claims, she would not have taken steps to ensure that she would be able to return to Dubai in order to avoid the risk of having to relocate to Pakistan. 54. We also found th at there was a n inconsistency between the appellant’s claim that she has never had contact with any family in Pakistan and the evidence of her partner that she speaks on the telephone to her uncle who recently moved to the UK from Pakistan. We were left with the clear impression , following Mr Lindsay’s cross-examination of the appellant, that she failed to mention her uncle – and then stated that he was deceased – as part of an attempt to minimise and downplay the extent of her ties to Pakistan. We do not accept Mr Sarwar’s attempt to suggest the appellant and her partner might have been talking about different people. 55. In addition, w e found the evidence about the income of the appellant’s partner to be unreliable not only because of the substantial discrepancy between the income stated on the 2018 application form and the oral evidence but also because the appellant’s partner contradicted himself by stating in answer to one question from Mr Lindsay that he could earn £1,600 in a good month and in response to another question that it would be impossible to earn that much as a carpet fitter . 56. We also noted that the appellant’s evidence about her daughter’s health difficulties was not corroborated by the letter from the child’s nursery, which describes her as healthy; or the letter from the appellant’s GP practice , which includes no reference to there ever having been any health concerns. Likewise, there was no medical or other evidence to corroborate the appellant’s claim that she was warned not to travel when pregnant because of a miscarriage risk. 57. For these reasons, we approach the witness evidence of the appellant and her partner with a high degree of caution . Moreover, we are unable to rely on their oral evidence about the presence of family in Pakistan and the earnings of the appellant’s partner as it is apparent to us that the y have sought to portray these matters in a way that they believe would be favourable to the appellant’s claim. D.