R (Alighanbari) v SSHD
[2013] EWHC 1818 (Admin), noting that it was accepted by the respondent that the appellant had made a human rights claim: [50]-[55]. For reasons he gave at [56]-[80] the President concluded that the appellant’s human rights submissions had not been refused because they had not been considered, and therefore that there had been no refusal of a human rights claim which engaged s82 of the 2002 Act. In so concluding, Lane J said this at [67]: The respondent's ability, pursuant to section 50 of the 2006 Act, to require a specified procedure to be followed in making or pursuing an application or claim, and, in particular, in requiring the use of a specified form (along with the payment of a fee) has been endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Shrestha . Although that case was concerned with a section 120 Notice, paragraphs 29-33 of the judgment of Hickinbottom LJ acknowledged the power of the respondent to regulate the way in which applications and claims fall for consideration under the Immigration Acts. The way in which the respondent does so may, of course, be subject to public law challenge. However, there is no suggestion in Shrestha that the Court had difficulties with the respondent's stance (which differed from that in Ahsan ), whereby the respondent will, as a general matter, engage with an application or claim only if made in the specified manner, until the point at which the individual concerned is subject to removal directions, when no formality will be necessary. We reject Ms Mair's attempt to distinguish Shrestha ; although concerned with section 120, it contains an endorsement of the respondent's practice that has relevance to the present case. 112. The judicial headnote to the decision reflects the conclusions summarised at [81]. The headnote is as follows:
(1) The Secretary of State's assessment of whether a claim by C constitutes a human rights claim, as defined by section 113 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, is not legally determinative. The Secretary of State's Guidance is, however, broadly compatible with what the High Court in
- J U D G M E N T
- Judge Blundell:
- Factual Background
- Application for Fee Waiver
- Decision Under Challenge
- R (Carter) v SSHD
- Procedural Background
- R (Omar) v SSHD
- Ahsan
- Legislative Scheme
- Omar
- Sheikh
- It seems to me that if a person demonstrates upon proper proof that they cannot pay the fee, then a policy which does not provide for waiver in those circumstances is incompatible with a Convention right. [emphasis added]
- Version 3.0 of the Fee Waiver Policy
- Carter
- Although a fee waiver will not normally be granted where evidence of destitution is not provided, or where an applicant cannot show that they would be rendered destitute by paying the fee, there may be exceptional circumstances affecting the applicant’s expenditure which mean that a fee waiver should be granted.
- It is for the applicant to provide evidence that there is something exceptional about their financial circumstances and ability to pay that warrant granting the fee waiver request
- Witness Evidence for the Respondent
- Submissions
- Ahsan v SSHD
- Shrestha
- Balajigari
- R (Mujahid) v FtT & SSHD
- Shrestha
- Discussion
- R (Ellis) v SSHD
- MS & MBT v SSHD
- PK (Ghana) v SSHD
- Odelola
- Sherstha
- Ahsan & Others v SSHD
- Ahsan & Ors
- Ahsan
- Balajigari & Ors
- R (AT) v SSHD
- Baihinga
- R (Alighanbari) v SSHD
- [2013] EWHC 1818 (Admin)
- SSHD v JCWI
- Supplemental Judgment
- Postscript