[2025] UKUT 00305 (IAC)

We have concerns that Mr Rahman is conducting litigation in this matter when he has no licence from the BSB to do so, and that he does not act simply as direct access counsel or as counsel instructed by Lextel Solicitors. This is due to the fact that he appears to have been acting as the representative for the appellant in that he received the decision from the respondent and appears to have taken steps in the litigation. We are also concerned that he is holding himself out to be from a set of chambers, namely Lexminders Chambers when in fact he is simply a self-employed barrister. We note that we have in fact already referred Mr Rahman to the Bar Standards Board in January 2025 in relation to concerns that he was conducting litigation without being authorised to do so in another appeal (UI-2024-004654), and also on the basis that there were concerns that he lacked basic professional competence.

Mr Rahman has accepted that he used ChatGPT on two occasions: when he drafted the original grounds of appeal and when he appeared before the Upper Tribunal Panel. He accepts that on neither occasion did he conduct any checks from a reputable source of legal information, such as Bailii, West Law, EIN or Lexis Nexis, to discover if the case Y (China) was genuine. It would appear that the authority may have swayed the Judge of the First-tier Tribunal to grant permission on the delay ground. When challenged by Upper Tribunal Judge Blundell on 20th June 2025, who strongly suspected that the case of Y (China) was not a genuine authority, Mr Rahman was very fairly given time over lunch and a copy of Ayinde, so that he ought to have been aware of the gravity of his situation. However Mr Rahman did not immediately admit to his unprofessional use of ChatGPT but astonishingly maintained that the case was genuine because of it having been evidenced by this AI large language model. Mr Rahman’s attempt to explain his behaviour by reference to his state of health and tiredness is not, we find, a valid excuse. If unwell counsel must refuse work and where they are due to appear before the Upper Tribunal they must inform the Tribunal at the earliest possible time, and if there is sufficient time the appellant must instruct alternative counsel. Taking unprofessional short-cuts which will very likely mislead the Tribunal is never excusable for these or any other reasons. Further in his written response to the Upper Tribunal Panel drafted on 24th June 2025 Mr Rahman inconsistently and dishonestly pretended that he had intended to rely upon the genuine case of YH (Iraq) which he now accepts was not the case, and indeed that the passage he identified in this previous letter was to do with anxious scrutiny and not delay.

Mr Rahman therefore has moved from an acceptance of the use of ChatGPT but with a defence of the research and a defence of the fake case of Y (China) on the day of the Panel error of law hearing; to a claim that it was a regrettable oversight and he did in fact want to rely upon an irrelevant but genuine case in his letter of 24th June 2025; to an acceptance before us that he used ChatGPT to assist in formulating the original grounds and in production of the document he handed to the Panel on 20th June 2024, and that the case of Y (China) is fake. We find therefore that Mr Rahman has directly attempted to mislead the Tribunal through reliance on Y (China), and has only made a full admission of this fact in his third explanation to the Upper Tribunal. He has not therefore acted with integrity and honesty in dealing with this issue, as well as having attempted to mislead the Tribunal in the grounds through the use of an AI generated fake authority.

We find that it is likely that Mr Rahman did not understand the limitations of large language models such as ChatGPT until he read Ayinde and attended his recent professional training on the issue but this is clearly not an excuse. The BSB issued guidance on AI and ChatGPT in October 2023 which identified the danger that it could produce misinformation including fabricated judgments complete with false citations, as is set out at paragraph 14 of Ayinde.

We therefore find that Mr Rahman has misused artificial intelligence and attempted to mislead the Tribunal contrary to the obligations as set out in the BSB regulatory framework which require him to observe his duty to the Court, to act with honesty and integrity, not to behave in a way which diminishes trust and confidence in the profession, and to provide a competent standard of work to clients.