The Present Proceedings
The Present Proceedings
These proceedings have come about as a result of a false citation placed by Mr Rahman in the grounds of appeal in the appellant’s case which he drafted on 14th March 2025. In the grounds it was said as follows at paragraph 14: “The Tribunal or decision maker placed undue weight on delay in isolation, contrary to Y (China) [2010] EWCA Civ 116, which requires consideration of personal circumstances, mental health, and overall context.” The case Y (China) does not exist. However permission was granted to appeal on limited grounds by the First-tier Tribunal including on the ground that undue weight had been placed on delay.
The matter therefore proceeded to the Upper Tribunal, and Mr Rahman of Lexminders’ Chambers Limited was recorded as the representative, with all correspondence being sent to [email protected] from that point onwards. Mr Rahman claims that this is an error by the Upper Tribunal and that whilst the email is operational that he was in fact instructed as counsel by Lextel Solicitors. Mr Rahman maintained that evidence of Lextel Solicitors being on the record had been sent to the Upper Tribunal and we gave him 7 days to provide this evidence. The fact is however that Lextel Solicitors were not on the record with the Upper Tribunal, and the additional material Mr Rahman provided at the most showed that the appellant had instructed these solicitors on 9th June 2025 but that they had used the wrong court and case type on CE file so the bundle containing this letter of instruction was not received by the Upper Tribunal until Mr Rahman provided it on 23rd June 2025.
Mr Rahman explained that Lexminders’ Chambers was a company that had only existed between February 2023 and June 2024 when it was dissolved. His evidence is that since this time he has been a self-employed barrister. We note however that the decision against which the appeal lay was sent on 27th March 2024 to the appellant at Lexminders Ltd, to Mr Rahman’s address, and was not sent to the address for Lextel Solicitors. We also note that before the First-tier Tribunal, on 25th February 2025, Mr Rahman completed the s.84 notice stating that he appeared as direct access counsel, and so was not instructed by Lextel Solicitors and his letter of acting appears in the bundle of documents before the First-tier Tribunal with the appellant instructing him as a direct access barrister.
The appeal proceeded to an error of law hearing before the Upper Tribunal Panel on 20th June 2025. In this hearing Mr Rahman was asked by Upper Tribunal Judge Blundell to take him to the relevant paragraph of Y (China) as it was noted that the citation was actually for YH (Iraq), a judgment of the Court of Appeal which is about s.94 certificates and paragraph 353 fresh claims and not delay. Mr Rahman responded to the Upper Tribunal Panel stating that he did not wish to rely upon YH (Iraq). He then said he meant to cite Beatson J’s judgment in R (WJ) v SSHD [2010] EWHC 776 (Admin), although he was again unable to take the Panel to anything in that case which bore on credibility assessments or section 8 of the 2004 Act. He then suggested that what he should have cited was Bensaid v UK [2001] ECHR 82, although he accepted that the ECtHR was unlikely to have said anything about a 2004 UK statutory provision in a decision which was made in 2001. The Panel then decided to take a break and provided by Mr Rahman with a copy of Ayinde and asked him to consider his position over lunch. After lunch Mr Rahman said he had undertaken ChatGPT research during the lunch break and the citation for Y (China) was correct, and it was a decision made by Pill and Sullivan LJJ and Sir Paul Kennedy. The Panel then directed Mr Rahman to provide them with a copy of Y (China) by 4pm on 24th June, or, alternatively if that was not possible, to explain what had happened. The Panel then started the next case and while this was happening Mr Rahman provided the Tribunal clerk with nine stapled pages which were not a judgment of the Court of Appeal but an internet print out with misleading statements including references to the fictitious Y (China) case with the citation for YH (Iraq). The notes contained no mention of the key case on delay JT (Cameroon) v SSHD [2008] EWCA Civ 878.
Mr Rahman then wrote to the Upper Tribunal on 24th June 2025 in accordance with the direction of the Panel stating that he had in fact meant to cite YH (Iraq) (and in particular paragraph 24 of that decision which he cites as saying all factors in an applicant’s favour must be taken into account) and apologising for his failure to cite the full and correct name of the case. He blamed this on having suffered from “acute illness” before drafting the grounds; and on having been on a visit to Bangladesh between 10th and 18th June 2025, and the fact that he had been hospitalised in Bangladesh due to diabetes, cholesterol problems and high blood pressure. He also argued that we should not penalise him for this error as he has five family members (wife and four children) depending on him.
At the hearing before us Mr Rahman provided a further letter dated 23rd July 2025, which has his address as Lexminders Chambers (formerly) and the lexminderschambers email at the top. In the letter he provides an analysis of Ayinde in which he acknowledges that it is a breach of professional duties to rely upon citations produced using AI tools without checking their veracity using reputable legal search engines such as West Law, EIN or Bailii. In this document and in his answers to questions from us Mr Rahman accepted that he had used ChatGPT to draft the grounds of appeal and to create the document he handed up via the clerk to the Upper Tribunal Panel on 20th June 2025. In his letter of 23rd July 2025 and in oral submissions he explains his behaviour on 20th June 2025 by saying he had returned from Bangladesh on 18th June 2025 unwell, and that he had felt under time pressure in the lunch break on 20th June 2025 as he needed to eat lunch due to his diabetes and so he thought ChatGPT would be a quick way to find the judgment in Y (China). He argues that he was misled by the search engine and is thus also a victim. He accepts in his letter of 23rd July that paragraph 24 of YH (Iraq) is not to do with delay but relates to the principle of anxious scrutiny, and so was not relevant. He says however that he has now undertaken some further professional training on immigration law which includes a presentation on AI and the Ayinde case. He offers an apology for his conduct and says that he should not be referred to the BSB as he now has a proper understanding, he has been honest, he will act with integrity in the future and is unwell and concerned as to how he will support his family.
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