Price in the short-term contracts
Price in the short-term contracts
The 2012 contract included provisions for the prices to be indexed. Those provisions did not carry over into the extensions in the real world; instead, prices under the extensions and the following short-term contracts were significantly higher than they would have been under the 2012 contract formula. The claimant had to maintain profitability in a very uncertain period and the higher prices enabled it to do so; we imagine that for NR a short period of high prices was acceptable if it meant that the supply was secure – particularly in view of the need to build up a stockpile.
In the no scheme world that latter motivation was absent, so NR was in a stronger position. Moreover, NR was buying only its requirement for track because it was not stockpiling, so overall sales would have been considerably lower (by 820,000 sleepers or so, see paragraph 79 above) than it was in the real world. In those circumstances the claimant had to bear in mind the competition from TWM, which in the no scheme world could in fact have provided most of NR’s requirement – an outcome the claimant would have been keen to avoid. Accordingly we find that the prices in the short-term contracts in the no scheme world would not have been the inflated prices charged in the real world. Nor would they have been as low as they were in the claimant’s P2 bids for supply from WWH, because the claimant was not in competition with a range of international bidders as it was in the P2 procurement exercise.
Pricing was complicated because there were so many different types of sleeper and we have insufficient information to construct a set of prices higher than the P2 bid price and lower than the prices in the short-term contracts in the real world. But in between those two sets of prices lie the prices the claimant was charging under the 2012 contract at the end of its fixed term in March 2017. They could be further updated by means of the formula set out in the contract, which depended upon the price of raw materials as well as inflation. We find that that is what would have been done; the 2016 prices would have been further updated in each contract until the P3 contract began. We expect the accountants to be able to agree the updating in order to produce the necessary range of prices for their calculations.
- Heading
- Introduction
- The legal background
- The factual background
- The supply and demand for sleepers in Great Britain
- The Washwood Heath factory
- Local Distribution Centres and the rail network
- Contracts and tenders
- The P3 procurement exercise and contract
- The issues in the appeal
- Issue 1(1): the volume of sleepers required by NR to date in the real world and the no scheme world
- The authority’s case about NR’s requirement to date
- The claimant’s position about NR’s requirement to date
- Discussion and conclusions on NR’s requirement to date
- Issue 1(2): NR’s future requirement for sleepers in the real world and the NSW
- The background to future demand
- The claimant’s case about future requirement
- The authority’s case about future requirement
- Discussion and conclusion about future requirement
- Issue 2: the duration of the claimant’s business in the real world and the no scheme world
- Conclusions about the real world
- Issue 3: the terms of the extension contracts from April 2017 to April 2020
- Market share and MGV
- Price in the short-term contracts
- Market share
- Issue 4: the terms of the P3 contract in the no scheme world
- Price in the P3 contract in the no scheme world
- Would there have been an MGV in the P3 contract in the no scheme
- Market share during the P3 contract in the no scheme world
- The Area B problem
- Conclusions
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