AC-2024-LON-003241 - [2025] EWHC 3014 (Admin)

It is against that background that it is necessary to consider Ground 2. The Coroner did not leave issues of causation to the Jury because she had addressed the alleged acts or omissions of the Police which it was said were open on the evidence, and concluded that none passed the Galbraith test. Having made those findings, she stated ([57]):

“I do not in these circumstances consider it necessary or appropriate to make findings as to causation”.

That last sentence clearly meant a Galbraith determination in relation to issues of causation (as Mr Stanbury fairly accepted).

A causal issue for a coroner’s jury necessarily involves the identification of alleged acts or omissions which it has been suggested may be causative, and a finding as to whether they are by reference to the test in Tainton. Having concluded that there were no relevant acts or omissions, I am satisfied that the Coroner was right to conclude that there were no causation issues in respect of the actions of the Police which should be left to the jury. Causation is not an issue which, in this context, could fairly or sensibly be approached in the abstract, but only by reference to acts or omissions alleged to be causative. This point had been recognised by Mr Menon KC for the family at the Inquest, when noting that if the Coroner “were to find that Article 2 is no longer engaged in this case, after your examination of the evidence and applying the Galbraith test to it …. there may well be no possibly causative matters to leave”

While Ground 2 argues that the Coroner erred in law by not considering “that there were any acts or omissions by the police that were potentially causative of Sabina’s death and which could be safely left to the jury”, that is exactly the question the Coroner asked, finding that there were no such acts or omissions satisfying the Galbraith test. The submissions made on behalf of Mrs Rizvi do not identify what acts or omissions Ground 2 is referring to. If Ground 2 has in mind matters not identified as “acts or matters” by the family or CTI at the Inquest, there can be no criticism of the Coroner for addressing herself to the submissions she did receive from those who had participated in the Inquest and followed all of the evidence. Any suggestion that potential acts or omissions were raised but not considered by the Coroner would have offered an obvious means of public law challenge, but none has been brought, no doubt because there is no basis for such a challenge.

In these circumstances, I am satisfied that Ground 2 is not arguable.