AC-2024-LON-003241 - [2025] EWHC 3014 (Admin)

Fecha: 17-Nov-2025

Is there a reasonable excuse for the delay?

Is there a reasonable excuse for the delay?

69.

There are a number of periods of delay which, judged by the ordinary standards of public law proceedings, involve unreasonable delay:

First, there is a period of unexplained delay (within the three-month period, but not consistent with the obligation to act promptly) between 26 March 2024, when the family’s application to adjourn the Inquest so that a second opinion might be obtained failed, and 23 April 2024, when advice was obtained from another counsel. The court has been told relatively little about this period.

ii)

Second, there was a period of unexplained delay (albeit again within the three-month period, but not consistent with the obligation to act promptly) between the start of May (when the issue of conflict of interest is said to have arisen, albeit in unexplained circumstances) and the sending of the claim form to the ACO on 17 June 2024.

iii)

Third, there is a period of delay (largely after the three-month period had expired) between 24 June 2024, when the ACO asked for a copy of the decision being challenged, and 10 July 2024, when it was provided. Indeed it is not clear why no copy could be provided on 17 June 2024.

iv)

Against the background of the three-month time limit expiring on 24 June 2024, the delay in instructing counsel until after 16 July 2024, and then instructing counsel who was not available for a conference until 20 August 2024, involved insufficient expedition.

The time taken between that conference on 20 August 2024 and the sending of the statement of facts and grounds to the ACO on 24 September also manifested insufficient urgency, although I do take account as a factor explaining the time taken the application for legal aid. That application, however, (a) did not hold up the drafting of the statement of facts and grounds which was circulated before legal aid was granted; and (b) was processed relatively promptly, with an application made on 6 September 2024 resulting in the grant of emergency legal aid on 20 September 2024.

70.

I should refer in this regard to evidence from Mrs Rizvi, which I accept, of the devastating effect her daughter’s tragic death has had and is continuing to have on her, and the difficulties she has had in progressing this application as a lay person. I have sought to make allowances for this, albeit delay occurred at key points in the process when lawyers were involved.

71.

My overall conclusion is that there was some unreasonable delay in bringing the application, albeit not at the egregious end of the scale.