AC-2024-LON-003241 - [2025] EWHC 3014 (Admin)
Administrative Court

AC-2024-LON-003241 - [2025] EWHC 3014 (Admin)

Fecha: 17-Nov-2025

The authorities on the treatment of causation in coroner’s inquests

The authorities on the treatment of causation in coroner’s inquests

91.

I was referred to a number of cases which had addressed decisions by coroners to leave (or not to leave) causation issues to the jury.

92.

R (Tainton) v HM Senior Coroner for Preston and West Lancashire [2016] EWHC 1396 (Admin) was an Article 2 inquest arising from a death in medical care of a serving prisoner. The coroner decided not to leave to the jury the issue of whether “admitted failings” by the prison medical services had caused or contributed to the prisoner’s death:

i)

At [41], it was noted that the issue of causation raised by the case, to which the Galbraith or Galbraith-plus test fell to be applied, was:

“whether, on the balance of probabilities, the conduct in question more than minimally, negligibly or trivially contributed to death”

(that formulation reflecting the metaphysical reality that one event or state of affairs will ordinarily have multiple causes, with different causal potency from a legal perspective).

ii)

At [42], that a coroner had a discretion, but not an obligation to leave to the jury “causes of death that are merely possible and not probable”.

iii)

The Divisional Court concluded that the coroner had been right to conclude that he was not under a duty to leave the issue of causation of the admitted failings of the prison medical authorities to the jury ([71]).

iv)

However, the Divisional Court concluded that the coroner had erred in not recording those admitted failings in the inquest record ([80]).

93.

That last topic was concerned with recording in the inquest record findings of culpable acts or omissions which been admitted, but had not met the evidential threshold for a finding of causation. I was also referred to two decisions addressing the position of coroners sitting without juries in relation to such matters, and again confirming the coroner’s entitlement to record the findings of culpable acts or omissions, even if they were not causative:

i)

In R (Worthington) v HM Senior Coroner for the County of Cumbria [2018] EWHC 3386 (Admin), [46]-[49], the Divisional Court rejected a challenge to the decision of a coroner of this kind, stating “to set out a negative conclusion in the determination of a section 5(1) matter (e.g. that something suggested as causative did not cause the death) is not proscribed by the statutory provisions; and, in the circumstances of a particular case, it may be appropriate or even obligatory to ensure the legal requirements for a such a determination are met … The question of how the deceased came by his death is clearly wider than merely finding the medical cause of death – a coroner is required to “enquire into acts and omissions which are directly responsible for the death” …We are unconvinced by Mr Thomas's submission that it is sufficient to record such findings in a ruling; and that a coroner is, in the circumstances of this case, positively prohibited from including them in the determination of the “how” question.”

ii)

In Dove v HM Assistant Coroner for Teesside and Hartlepool [2023] EWCA Civ 289, [70], the Court of Appeal stated:

“[E]xisting authority shows that it is open to a coroner to record the facts which contributed to the circumstances which may or may not in turn have led to death: the unattended open window in Longfield, the sexual assault in Worthington . These cases provide examples of the wide discretion conferred on coroners to establish the background facts, and then determine whether those facts were or were not causative of death. These are examples of coroners tailoring the scope of an inquest to the issues in the case in order to discover the 'substantial truth'.”

94.

All of these are cases in which the act or omission in question was either admitted, or supported by evidence to the requisite standard.