AC-2024-LON-0001595 - [2025] EWHC 2182 (Admin)

The relevant principles were helpfully summarised in R (Balajigari) v SSHD [2019] 1 WLR 4647 at [70]:

“70 The general principles on the Tameside duty were summarised by Haddon-Cave J in R (Plantagenet Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Justice [2015] 3All ER 261, paras 99—100. In that passage, having referred to the speech of Lord Diplock in Tameside, Haddon-Cave J summarised the relevant principles which are to be derived from authorities since Tameside itself as follows. First, the obligation on the decision-maker is only to take such steps to inform himself as are reasonable. Secondly, subject to a Wednesbury challenge (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corpn [1948] 1 KB 223), it is for the public body and not the court to decide upon the manner and intensity of inquiry to be undertaken: see R (Khatun) v Newham London Borough Council [2005] QB 37, para 35 (Laws LJ). Thirdly, the court should not intervene merely because it considers that further inquiries would have been sensible or desirable. It should intervene only if no reasonable authority could have been satisfied on the basis of the inquiries made that it possessed the information necessary for its decision. Fourthly, the court should establish what material was before the authority and should only strike down a decision not to make further inquiries if no reasonable authority possessed of that material could suppose that the inquiries they had made were sufficient. Fifthly, the principle that the decision-maker must call his own attention to considerations relevant to his decision, a duty which in practice may require him to consult outside bodies with a particular knowledge or involvement in the case, does not spring from a duty of procedural fairness to the applicant but rather from the Secretary of State’s duty so to inform himself as to arrive at a rational conclusion. Sixthly, the wider the discretion conferred on the Secretary of State, the more important it must be that he has all the relevant material to enable him properly to exercise it.”

Applying those principles to the present context, it seems to me to be quite clear that there was no failure to undertake sufficient inquiry.

Whilst the SoS could have made further inquiries as alleged, he was under no obligation, statutory or contractual, to do so. It is difficult in those circumstances to gain traction with an argument that no reasonable SoS could have proceeded without making such inquiry.

The particular area which the Claimant says ought to have been further investigated is whether Rydon had “learned lessons” and changed its practices etc. The first point of note in that regard is that although the Rydon group companies are separate corporate entities, the approach of the RAS Regulations is not to dissociate one group entity from another for the purposes of determining responsibility for the development or refurbishment of a particular building: see e.g., regs. 7(2), 13(3) and 14(2)(b) of the RAS Regulations and the definition of Designated PD in Annex 1 to the SRTs. In the case of Rydon in particular, the evidence of its Group Legal Director, Ms Ivanec as to how the various group entities interrelate is instructive:

“Each of the 3 main operating companies (Rydon Construction, Rydon Homes, Rydon Maintenance) has its own operational and management teams, its own board of directors and a managing director. Each company holds its own board meetings. The managing directors of each operating company are also members of the more senior boards of the Rydon Group. Reporting between companies in the Rydon Group occurs via monthly meetings of the Rydon Group Board.” (Emphasis added)

That evidence suggests that the group companies operated and continue to operate in an integrated way. Furthermore, the concerns raised during Phase 2 of the Inquiry were not confined to one or two rogue individuals within Rydon but appeared to be more systemic in nature. The potential existence of systemic flaws within an integrated group structure means that it is not necessarily unreasonable not to dissociate Rydon in 2023 from Rydon Maintenance in 2014-17 for the purposes of the Designation Decision. In any event, the Minister was made aware of the fact that designation would be in respect of a different corporate entity. As set out in Annex C to the First Submission:

“It was Rydon Maintenance - rather than Rydon Group - that carried out the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower. We note however that when banning Rydon Housing from Help to Buy, the Department has considered that the two entities were sufficiently closely related that it was reasonable to attribute failings by Rydon Maintenance to Rydon Group.”

The Help to Buy decision, which also conflated the two group entities, was not challenged by Rydon. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to sustain an irrationality argument against the SoS, when the group companies themselves have effectively allowed a similar failure to dissociate to go unchallenged.

In terms of whether Rydon can be said to have changed, there was no obligation to inquire further as to that either. The question under consideration was whether to designate Rydon by reason of it being “unfit” to carry out remediation works. The concept of “unfitness” is not confined to competence alone. It can include other matters relevant to the public interest including, for example, trust and confidence in that PD in relation, in particular, to matters relating to building safety, which may not be a matter that is easily re-established once lost. Such matters could, in this context, legitimately be viewed on a group basis and there is no irrationality in not seeking documentary evidence from Rydon as to possible changes. It was open to the SoS to proceed with what he had. For the same reasons, the fact that Rydon was successfully remediating other buildings is not decisive. The decision was multi-faceted and involved a lot more than mere competence in remediation.

The SoS could have obtained more information, but the fact that he did not do so does not render his decision to proceed without it irrational: see third principle in Balajigari.

The Claimant seeks to draw a comparison with the SoS’s approach to the way in which the RMCs were treated. The comparison is, in my view, wholly inapt. The RMCs were not potentially subject to designation and were in an entirely different position. What information was sought from the RMCs provides no guidance as to whether the SoS acted irrationally with regard to Rydon.

It is my view, for the reasons set out, that the SoS did not act irrationally in terms of the scope of inquiry and there was no breach of the Tameside duty. Ground 2 therefore fails and is dismissed.