Post-Judgment Interest
Post-Judgment Interest
There is also a single issue which arises in relation to post-judgment interest. The Bank invites the court to exercise its discretion under section 44A of the Administration of Justice Act 1970 (“section 44A”) to award simple interest at US Prime plus 2%. It relies on Lonestar Communications Corp LLC v Kaye [2023] EWHC 732 (Comm) in which Foxton J reviewed the authorities on pre- and post-judgment interest at [14] to [16] and explained that the default judgment interest rate for US$ awards in the Commercial Court going forward should be US Prime, irrespective of whether the claimant has a US place of operations or not, plus an appropriate uplift. I see no reason not to adopt that approach in these proceedings. It was said that the appropriate uplift is 2% which is conservative, particularly in light of the fact that the evidence shows that the borrowing costs for Ukrainian institutions have increased significantly since the start of its war with Russia.
The Individual Defendants disagreed. They invited me to follow the approach that Leggatt J adopted in Antonov when he exercised his discretion under section 44A to award post-judgment interest at the rate that would have been applied by the Latvian court, which was lower than the standard Judgments Act rate of 8% per annum. Applying that principle in the present case would mean that I would award 3% interest.
In my view the Bank is right on this point. In Antonov at [18], Leggatt J confirmed that the court should still focus on compensating a judgment creditor for being kept out of their money and therefore on making a post-judgment award by reference to market rates of interest. However, in that instance the applicable ECB rate was 0% and Leggatt J expressed concern that 2% should not undercompensate the claimant in circumstances in which it would have been entitled to a 6% rate if it had sued in Latvia, which it would have done if the defendant had not relocated to England after the claimant had collapsed. He therefore awarded 6%, which was more than the market rate would have yielded. That is the converse to the present position.
While I have regard to the position which would have pertained if the Bank had sued in Ukraine, it remains my view that it is appropriate to apply US Prime plus 2%. On the evidence, this is the best approximation of a realistic compensation for the borrowing costs which will be incurred by the Bank in consequence of the Defendants’ delay in making payment of the judgment debt. In my view, the fact that Leggatt J considered it appropriate in Antonov to award more than the market rate by reference to judgment interest applicable in Latvian proceedings is no support for the submission that I should award less than market interest by reference to the judgment interest applicable in Ukrainian proceedings.
- Heading
- This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30 on 10 November 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives
- The Judgment Sum
- Interest
- Pre-Judgment Compound Interest
- Pre-Judgment Simple Interest
- Post-Judgment Interest
- Costs
- Interim payment on account of costs
- Interest on Costs
- Permission to appeal: Mr Kolomoisky
- Permission to appeal: Mr Bogolyubov
- Stay of Execution
- Stay: the impact of sanctions
- Stay: the arguments based on stifling and the balance of justice
- The Form of the Consequentials Order
- The form of the Worldwide Freezing Order
- The form of Delivery Up and Disclosure Order
- Conclusions
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