BL-2017-000665 - [2025] EWHC 2909 (Ch)

The Bank’s calculation of the principal sum for which the Individual Defendants are jointly and severally liable is US$1,761,957,792. They have both confirmed that they do not object to the Bank’s calculation. I am satisfied that this is the correct principal judgment sum and that judgment against them should be entered in that amount accordingly.

In their skeleton arguments, the Individual Defendants seek an extension of time from the standard 14 days to 28 days for payment of the judgment sum. They invited the court to exercise its jurisdiction under CPR 40.11(a). This is a separate application from their application for a stay of execution pending appeal, which Mr Bogolyubov described as the principal head of relief, but he accepted that an extension for any significant period of time was only likely to be granted in the context of a stay of execution (e.g., Gulf International v Al Ittefaq [2010] EWHC 2601 (QB) at [20] to [24]). If a stay were to be granted the time for compliance with the obligation to pay the judgment sum will be extended in accordance with the terms of the stay: CPR 40.11(c). Mr Kolomoisky simply relied on what was said by Mr Bogolyubov, although Mr Haydon added that the information available to his solicitors indicated that there are limited assets outside Ukraine that might be considered to be readily realisable.

The differences between a stay and an extension of time for payment were not further explored in the parties’ oral submissions. This is not very surprising because this is not a case in which there is any freestanding basis for an extension of time on grounds which operate independently of the stay, and the form of order circulating between the parties during the course of and since the Second Consequentials hearing does not indicate that there is. In any event, the Individual Defendants have known since July that they have been found liable for payment of a very large sum of money (albeit the precise quantum is only now being settled) and the court would expect to have received evidence if there were particular reasons as to why payment within a period greater than 14 days was likely to be achievable while payment within 14 days was not. It follows that paragraphs 2 and 3 of the CO say nothing about the time for payment with the consequence that the 14 days prescribed by CPR 40.11 will in principle apply. The impact of the Individual Defendants’ application for a stay on the time for payment of the judgment sum is a matter to which I will revert later in this judgment.

As to the Corporate Defendants, the Bank accepted that it cannot seek monetary relief against them in both tort and unjust enrichment, because that would result in double recovery. However, it submits, and I accept, that it is entitled to choose whether to receive compensation for tortious wrongdoing pursuant to Article 22 of the Civil Code or restitution for unjust enrichment under Article 1212. It has elected to receive compensation in tort, which means that each of the Corporate Defendants is liable for the amount of the Relevant Drawdowns that was used to fund the Unreturned Prepayments it received if and to the extent that they were made less than one month before the date of the associated Relevant Supply Agreement.

The Bank instructed Mr Thompson (who had given expert forensic evidence at the trial), to calculate the amount of the loss attributable to each of the Corporate Defendants having regard to the principles I explained in paragraph [1571] of the Judgment. His calculations were supported by a table which summarised a multi-page appendix demonstrating that 87 Relevant Drawdowns with a US$-equivalent value of US$301,118,989 were made less than one month before the date of the associated Relevant Supply Agreement to which one of the Corporate Defendants was a party. His evidence also established that the total value of the repayments which I concluded ought to be credited against those Relevant Drawdowns was US$25,581,653.

Although the Corporate Defendants did not appear at the Second Consequentials hearing, I am satisfied that they were well aware that a determination of the amount for which they were liable in the light of the Judgment would be made either at the time of hand down or on a later occasion. I am also satisfied that they have been informed that their solicitors have come off the record. They have chosen not to challenge Mr Thompson’s evidence, which I accept as an accurate assessment of the amount for which each of them is liable to the Bank.

The consequence of my findings and Mr Thompson’s calculations is that the aggregate of the principal amounts for which each of the Corporate Defendants is severally liable to compensate the Bank is US$275,537,335, broken down as between each of the Corporate Defendants as follows:

Each of these amounts is compensation for part of the same harm as the harm for which the Individual Defendants are jointly liable to compensate the Bank. It follows that the Individual Defendants are jointly liable to the Bank together with each Corporate Defendant in respect of each amount for which that Corporate Defendant is severally liable to the Bank.

There is one further issue which has arisen in relation to Rossyn. It was dissolved under the law of its incorporation (British Virgin Islands) on 4 July 2023 and no steps have been taken to restore it to the register in the BVI. Initially, I was concerned that this meant that there might be an impediment to the entry of judgment against it, not least because it appeared from the version of section 215 of the BVI Business Companies Act (“BCA”) in the bundles that, while a creditor was able to proceed against a company registered under the BCA after it had been struck off, that may not have been the case after it was dissolved. However, further investigation has revealed that section 215 of the BCA was amended in 2022 to provide that the fact that a company has been dissolved (and not just struck off the register) does not absolve it from any liability that arose prior to its dissolution, and does not prevent any creditor from making a claim against the company and pursuing the claim through to judgment or execution. It follows that I am satisfied that judgment may be entered against each of the Corporate Defendants in the amounts I have identified above.