BL-2017-000665 - [2025] EWHC 2909 (Ch)
Chancery Division of the High Court

BL-2017-000665 - [2025] EWHC 2909 (Ch)

Fecha: 10-Nov-2025

Stay of Execution

Stay of Execution

163.

The Individual Defendants sought a stay of execution pending appeal in relation to payment of the judgment sum including interest and any order for the payment of costs. The main basis on which they did so related to the fact that they are both subject to sanctions imposed by the President of Ukraine which are said to have a consequential impact on the ability of the Bank to return to them any recoveries it may make if the appeal is allowed. It was also said in Mr Kolomoisky’s skeleton argument that the Bank intended to pay any money it may recover from the Defendants, together with other amounts of its profits, to assist in its war with Russia, which means that they will stand little prospect of recovering it if successful in their appeal. This latter point was not developed in oral submissions and for reasons which I will come to rather faded in significance during the course of the hearing.

164.

Mr Bogolyubov also submitted that there is a risk that his appeal will be stifled if the stay is refused over the entirety of the judgment amount. The solution to this part of Mr Bogolyubov’s application is that an appropriate sum should be ring-fenced from enforcement to allow him to pay his costs of the appeal, costs relating to other English litigation and foreign proceedings in which he is currently engaged, the costs of complying with his obligations under the WFO and his living costs. Mr Morrison, who argued the stay application on behalf of Mr Bogolyubov, submitted that, if a stay based on the possible application of sanctions is granted, the second argument based on stifling is moot.

165.

Mr Kolomoisky did not advance an argument based on stifling in quite the same way. Mr Haydon’s argument relied on the risk that for one reason or another the Defendants would not get their money back from the Bank if their appeal were to succeed; a risk which outweighed any prejudice to the Bank if there were to be further delay in enforcement, more particularly because of the protection which the Bank already had from the continuation of the WFO, which the Defendants accepted should not be discharged at least until the appeal has been determined.

166.

This court has a general power pursuant to CPR r.52.16 to stay all or any part of the order it makes pending appeal. It applies the same principles as those which will be applied by the Court of Appeal. The correct approach has been summarised in Hammond Suddards v Agrichem [2001] All ER (D) 258 at [22], Leicester Circuits Ltd v Coates Brothers plc [2002] EWCA Civ 474 at [13] and DEFRA v Downs [2009] EWCA Civ 257 at [8] to [9]. I can summarise the position as follows:

i)

The default position, confirmed by the language of CPR 52.16 itself, is that an appeal does not operate as a stay.

ii)

The court has a discretion to grant a stay, but it must be satisfied that the application is based on solid grounds.

iii)

If solid grounds are established, the court will undertake a balancing exercise taking into account all the circumstances of the case and weighing the risks of injustice to each side if a stay is or is not granted.

iv)

When considering whether solid grounds have been established by the appellant, the court will normally be concerned to identify whether there is some form of “irremediable harm”, as opposed to a “temporary inconvenience” to the appellant if a stay is not granted.

v)

Examples of such harm may include the risk of the appeal being stifled and the risk that the appellant may be unable to recover any monies paid to the respondent in the event that the appeal is successful.

vi)

If such harm is established, the court must weigh in the balance the prejudice to the respondent that further delay in enforcement may entail, including issues relating to possible asset dissipation and competition with the appellant’s other creditors.

vii)

While the normal rule is for no stay to be granted, where the justice of that approach is in doubt, the answer may depend on the perceived strength of the appeal.