CH-2025-BRS-000001 - [2025] EWHC 2373 (Ch)
Chancery Division of the High Court

CH-2025-BRS-000001 - [2025] EWHC 2373 (Ch)

Fecha: 22-Sep-2025

Ground 2: Failure to consider that the estate was substantially administered with the beneficiaries’ agreement

Ground 2: Failure to consider that the estate was substantially administered with the beneficiaries’ agreement

102.

Julian says that the judge overlooked or failed to give adequate weight to the fact that the estate was largely administered in accordance with the agreement of the beneficiaries, and that there was no ongoing conflict or mismanagement warranting removal. As to the former point, in his judgment (at [17]), the judge clearly recognised the administration which had been carried out and that, in Julian’s view at least, only the flat at Courtfield Road remained to be dealt with. The weight that the judge gave to this was a matter for him. In doing so, he did not exceed his margin of appreciation. (I note that an argument in Long v Rodman [2019] EWHC 753 (Ch), that the administration was almost complete, and there was no need for removal, did not prevent the Chief Master doing so.) The judge also took into account (at [19](4)-(7)) possible claims by the estate against the beneficiaries (including Julian) and vice versa, which were also matters requiring administration, and the considerable length of time that administration had so far taken (at [19](8)).

103.

As to the latter point, this falls into two parts. The first is that the judge in his judgment (at [19](4)-(7)) was quite clear that Julian had various potential conflicts of interest. The second is that I have already made clear that it is not necessary to establish any mismanagement in the administration of the estates to justify the removal of a personal representative.

104.

Julian also says that removal creates disadvantages. In his judgment, the judge acknowledged this (at [19](11)). It was for him to make an evaluative judgment by weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of removal. This is what the judge did, and an appellate court will not interfere with his decision unless compelled to do so, by being satisfied that he was plainly wrong, in the sense which I have already explained. I am not so satisfied. In my judgment, this ground fails also.