CH-2025-BRS-000001 - [2025] EWHC 2373 (Ch)

Julian sensibly focused his arguments on the points raised by Michael Green J in his reasons for giving permission to appeal. In broad summary, he submitted that it was wrong to remove the appellant, because there was no benefit to the estates and trust in doing so, and in particular there was no threat to their proper administration. In fact, substantial progress had been made in the administration of the estates. In addition, there were issues still outstanding which needed to be resolved by the litigation at the four-day trial originally listed, and the appointment of an independent administrator would not advance their resolution. Moreover, the application actually made by the respondents was in substantially different terms to those set out in their witness statements.

As to the progress of the estate administrations, Julian submitted that Jean’s estate was now (at least arguably) fully administered, tax having been paid and her investment portfolio distributed in 2022. He submitted that Alexander’s estate was also fully administered, except for a flat in Courtfields Road, London SW7 (which had passed from Jean to Alexander on her death), in which Vanessa was now living. Julian had obtained planning permission to build on part of the garden of their parents’ home in Dorset (Seathrift), thus increasing the value of the estate for the beneficiaries, and then marketed and sold it to a property developer in 2021. He had realised and distributed the proceeds of Alexander’s investment portfolio in 2023. He had resolved the estate’s tax position and paid all outstanding tax by the end of 2023. He had marketed and sold Seathrift itself in 2024.

Julian submitted that what were left to be resolved were the allegations of misconduct and dishonesty against Julian made by Nick and Leessa in their counterclaim (which I have summarised at [7] above). These required a trial with oral evidence and cross-examination. This, he said, was what DJ Watson had originally envisaged in September 2019. And, he further said, it was what I envisaged when refusing a further stay of the proceedings in June 2023. (I may interpolate to say that I did not go quite as far as that. I simply refused the stay, and the existing order of 3 September 2019 would therefore come back into effect. It would have been possible to apply to vary that order if anyone had wished. But at that stage no-one did.) The directions for trial subsequently filed by the parties were approved by DJ Taylor in November 2023. Julian says that the judge below was accordingly wrong to ignore the listing directions already made.

However, in his submissions Julian also referred to a list of what he calls “Discreet [sic] triable issues”, to be found in his skeleton arguments before the judge below. These are as follows:

“i.

Nicholas’ advance inheritance - £90,000

ii.

Julian’s labour costs and out of pocket expenses.

iii.

MG/Martin Motors invoice – disputed.

iv.

Items of value removed by Leessa from Seathrift.”

But, so far as I can see, none of these is an issue on the pleadings as they stand. Nos i, iii, and iv would be claims by the estates against Nick and Leessa. No ii would be a claim by Julian against the estate. None of these claims is made as the litigation is currently constituted. So going to trial would not actually resolve any of these points. The only part of the proceedings left in existence was the counterclaim. The relief sought by that counterclaim was, as set out earlier, simply for the removal of Julian as executor and trustee and for him to account fully for his stewardship of the estates and the trust. There was no claim, for example for devastavit or breach of trust, or for the reconstitution of any estate or trust fund.