Discussion
Discussion
It is crucial to Mr Young’s case that the Council was obliged to inform him that he had a right to request a review of the decision that the main housing duty had been discharged which, he says, was incorporated in the letter containing the review decision. It is not enough for Mr Young to show that the letter included a decision which was susceptible to a further review. For Mr Young to succeed, it must have been incumbent on the Council to tell him that he was entitled to request such a review.
As I have said, Mr Bates argued that such an obligation is to be derived from sections 184 and 202 of the 1996 Act. I have not, however, been persuaded.
Section 202(3) of the 1996 Act states that a request for review “must be made before the end of the period of 21 days beginning with the day on which [the applicant] is notified of the authority’s decision or such longer period as the authority may in writing allow”. This means that, once an applicant has been notified of a decision, he must request a review within 21 days unless the local housing authority agrees otherwise. Notification of a decision therefore plays an important role. Without it, the time limit for which section 202(3) provides will not apply. Section 202(3) does not, however, provide for an authority to be under an obligation to notify an applicant of a decision, let alone impose a requirement that an authority inform an applicant of a right to request a review. While section 202(3) refers to an applicant being “notified of the authority’s decision” (emphasis added), there is no reference to notification of a right to request a review.
Nor, in my view, does section 184 of the 1996 Act assist Mr Young. My reasons are as follows:
Section 184 applies to the inquiries which a local housing authority is required to make by subsection (1) if it has “reason to believe that an applicant may be homeless or threatened with homelessness”. It is significant that it is one of a pair of sections with the heading “Application for assistance in case of homelessness or threatened homelessness” and is itself headed “Inquiry into cases of homelessness or threatened homelessness”. The focus is on what must be done when a person first applies for accommodation or assistance, when the authority has “reason to believe that an applicant may be homeless or threatened with homelessness” but has not already so concluded;
In contrast, as the heading to the group of which it is part indicates, section 193 is concerned with duties to persons “found to be homeless or threatened with homelessness” (emphasis added) and prescribes specific requirements in respect of the various ways in which the main housing duty can cease. By subsection (5), the applicant must have been “informed by the authority of the possible consequence of refusal or acceptance and of the right to request a review of the suitability of the accommodation” and notified by the authority that it regards itself as ceasing to be subject to the duty. Subsection (7) requires an applicant to have been “informed of the possible consequences of refusal or acceptance and of his right to request a review of the suitability of the accommodation”. For subsection (7AA) to be applicable, the applicant must have been informed of “the possible consequence of refusal or acceptance of the offer” and “that the applicant has the right to request a review of the suitability of the accommodation”;
These requirements sit ill with those for which section 184 provides. For example, were Mr Bates’ submissions well-founded, an authority making an offer of accommodation under Part VI would presumably have to inform the person at the time not merely that he had a right to request a review of suitability (in accordance with section 193(7)) but that he could request a review of the authority’s decision to make the offer (to comply with section 184(5)). Further, if the offeree refused the offer, section 184 would oblige the authority to inform him both that it had decided that the main housing duty had come to an end (with reasons) and that he was entitled to request a review of that decision even though no suggestion of such requirements (even by cross-reference to section 184) is to be found in section 193. Again, it is hard to see why Parliament should have chosen to provide for an authority to “notify the applicant that they regard themselves as ceasing to be subject to the duty under this section” in section 193(5)(c) if it was anyway incumbent on it to notify the applicant of its decision (and with reasons) pursuant to section 184(3). The position would be all the odder when Parliament had elected to retain a notification requirement in section 193(5)(c) but not in relation to refusal of a Part VI offer, in respect of which section 193(7) formerly provided for notification that “the authority are satisfied that the accommodation was suitable for him and that it was reasonable for him to accept it”;
It is noteworthy, too, that the explanatory notes in respect of section 7(3) of the Homelessness Act 2002 spoke of the new section 193(7) for which it provided as “clarif[ying] the ending of the main homelessness duty where the applicant refuses an offer of suitable accommodation allocated under Part 6” while identifying an authority’s notification obligations by reference to the terms of section 193(7) without any reference to section 184;
Although Stanley Burnton LJ said in Ravichandran, in paragraph 35(6),that an applicant should be informed of the right to a review of “the decision of the authority as to the discharge of its duty under section 193(7) by virtue of section 202(1)(b)”, I do not think he is to be understood as expressing the view that there was a legal obligation on an authority to do more than section 193 prescribed. In any event, the comment was obiter and Stanley Burnton LJ did not expand on it. In Bano, I rejected a complaint that the offer letter had not informed Mrs Bano that she could request a review on a basis other than suitability in part on the grounds that “section 193(7AA) and (7AB)(b) of the 1996 Act impose a requirement to inform an applicant of the right to request a review of suitability but not on any other basis” and “nothing in section 193, section 202 or elsewhere in the 1996 Act makes the right to request a review under section 202(1)(b) conditional on the applicant having been informed of the right”: see paragraph 60;
The upshot, I think, is that section 184 has no application in relation to cessation of the main housing duty. Parliament has laid down in section 193 the requirements which are to apply in such cases. Section 184 does not do so additionally.
I would add that if, contrary to my view, a local housing authority continued to owe the main housing duty where an applicant asked for review of suitability and the review officer (a) decided that the accommodation was suitable, (b) added that the main housing duty had ceased, (c) explained that there was a right of appeal but (d) did not refer to the possibility of any further review, that could give rise to considerable difficulty. I would guess that there have been many review decisions along these lines.
In short, it seems to me that, even supposing (which is far from clear) that the letter containing the review decision incorporated a distinct decision which was susceptible to a further review, the Council was not obliged to inform Mr Young that he was entitled to request such a review. That being so, the appeal must fail.
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