CA-2025-000320 - [2025] EWCA Civ 1336

Lord Justice Newey:

In this case, the appellant, Mr Jerome Young, resists possession proceedings on the basis that he is owed the “main housing duty” under section 193(2) of the Housing Act 1996 (“the 1996 Act”) by the respondents, the Mayor and Burgesses of the London Borough of Wandsworth (“the Council”). For its part, the Council contends that any issue as to the existence of the main housing duty ought to have been ventilated through the review and appeal procedures for which the 1996 Act provides and that, in any event, it has long since ceased to owe Mr Young the main housing duty.

Facts

Mr Young is now in his mid-40s and single.

In a report dated 27 August 2019, Dr Sajid Suleman, a consultant psychiatrist, diagnosed Mr Young as suffering from autism spectrum disorder with traits of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. He expressed the view that Mr Young was “more vulnerable due to his mental health difficulties and requires help with his daily activities”. He also considered that Mr Young lacked capacity to conduct Court proceedings.

Following receipt of this report, on 3 September 2019 the Council granted Mr Young a non-secure tenancy of 15 Ganley Court, Winstanley Estate in Battersea pursuant to section 188(1) of the 1996 Act. Shortly afterwards, in a letter to Mr Young dated 10 October 2019, the Council accepted that it owed Mr Young the main housing duty under section 193 of the 1996 Act. The Council said in the letter that it would ensure that the accommodation which Mr Young was occupying under section 188 would continue to be available to him until its duty under section 193 was discharged. It further explained that its duty could cease if, among other things, Mr Young accepted an offer of accommodation under Part VI of the 1996 Act.

The Council made such an offer in a letter to Mr Young dated 18 March 2020. The offer related to 25 Diprose Lodge, 750 Garratt Lane in Tooting. The heading to the letter spoke of a “Final Offer of Accommodation” and the letter stated, among other things, “Please note that by accepting this offer of accommodation the council’s homelessness duty to you will be discharged”; “we will normally make applicants only one suitable offer of housing and, if you refuse an offer of suitable accommodation, your application will be cancelled”; “This is a final offer for the purposes of S 193(7) of the Housing Act 1996 (as amended)”; and “Please note that if you unreasonably refuse this offer of accommodation or fail to attend the viewing the Council’s duty to you under S.193 of the Housing Act 1996 will cease”. The letter further explained that Mr Young had the right to request a review if he felt that that offer was unsuitable or wished to refuse it and that he could both accept the offer and request a review of its suitability. The letter concluded:

“If the decision on review is that the offer is suitable, the Council will expect you to reside in the property and the Council’s duty to you under S.193 of the Housing Act 1996 will cease. If the decision on review is that the offer is unsuitable, the Council will make a further final offer of accommodation.”

On, it seems, 1 April 2020, Mr Young signed a tenancy agreement in respect of 25 Diprose Lodge. However, the commencement date had to be delayed as a result of the covid pandemic and on 4 June 2020 the Council sent Mr Young a letter proposing that the tenancy should take effect on 15 June 2020. The letter reminded Mr Young that he had “the right to request a review of the suitability of this offer irrespective of whether you wish to accept or refuse it” and ended:

“By making this final offer of accommodation available to you, the council has discharged the duty, previously accepted towards you, as an unintentionally homeless household in priority need of accommodation. If you unreasonably refuse this offer the council’s duty to you under S 193 (2) of the Housing Act 1996 may cease. In such circumstances the council will take steps to terminate your right to occupy your present temporary accommodation and will, in due course, seek possession of your temporary accommodation via the County Court.”

On 10 June 2020, Mr Young’s solicitor, Mr William Flack of Morrison Spowart, emailed the Council requesting “a review pursuant to Section 202 of the Housing Act 1996 in relation to the decision that the accommodation offered to Mr Young at 25 Diprose Lodge is suitable for him”, giving “initial reasons” under the headings “Security”, “Location”, “No Viewing” and “Communication”. As regards the last two of these, Mr Flack explained that Mr Young “objects to having been forced as he considers it to sign a tenancy agreement before viewing the property” and “considers that communication between himself and the council has been in his words ridiculous”.

The Council agreed to undertake a review under section 202 of the 1996 Act. In a further email to Mr Flack of 12 June 2020, the Council said this:

“Further to our telephone discussions of yesterday and today in which you have confirmed that Mr Young considers that he has accepted the final offer of accommodation made in discharge of the previously accepted duty, please find attached the tenancy agreement signed by Mr Young which provides a tenancy start date of 20^th April 2020. However as Mr Young was unable to move into the accommodation by that date due to the corona virus pandemic the council agreed to a delay in Mr Young taking up occupation of this accommodation and accordingly there has been no rental charge applied for that period. Mr Young has remained accommodated at his temporary accommodation address at 15 Ganley Court.

I write to confirm that as agreed during our discussion, the council will arrange for keys to 25 Diprose Lodge to be delivered to Mr Young early next week ….

Mr Young should return the keys to his temporary accommodation to the council not later than 6^th July 2020 ….”

On 1 July 2020, by which point he was no longer instructing Mr Flack, Mr Young said in an email to the Council that the placement at 25 Diprose Lodge was “going to have a significant impact on my health, future and family”. He cited “Poor health environment”, “Poor safety”, “Lack of security to freedom”, “Poor family life”, “Poor life expectancy” and the “location … between two cemeteries”. He also said:

“Wandsworth council used coercion to get me to sign the tenancy agreement during coronavirus lockdown, and then restricted me from viewing the property, which would have obviously left me outside the statutory time frame of 21 days for an appeal, so please could you inform Ms Fraser-Ellis that [there] was little or no choice but to [accept] my appeal.”

Mr Young was informed of the outcome of the review in a letter from the Council dated 20 July 2020. The first paragraph stated that the letter was written “further to [Mr Young’s] request for a suitability review”. In the course of the letter, the reviewing officer noted that Mr Young had “made allegations in relation to the tenancy offer process” but these were rejected. The reviewing officer said:

“I am satisfied that the offer process was both in accordance with the council’s usual procedure, and that you were notified of all relevant information about accepting or refusing the accommodation and the potential consequences of any refusal and your right to request a review. I am therefore satisfied that you voluntarily signed the tenancy agreement document and as a consequence of that you are now the tenant of 25 Diprose Lodge and that consequently the previously accepted duty has now been discharged.”

Having commented on location and other suitability considerations, the reviewing officer concluded as follows:

For reasons set out in this letter, I am satisfied that the accommodation at 25 Diprose Lodge is suitable accommodation for the purposes of Part VII of the Housing Act 1996 (as amended) and that in the making of this offer, which you have accepted, discharged the previously accepted duty.

The decision set out in this letter represents the Council’s decision on review and, under the 1996 Act, concludes all internal review processes.

In the undertaking of this review I can confirm that I have found no defect, omission or irrationality in the council’s decision making and offer process.”

The reviewing officer added, however, that Mr Young had the right to appeal to the County Court on a point of law relating to the decision set out in the letter.

The letter said this about 15 Ganley Court:

“You are currently provided with temporary accommodation at 15 Ganley Court, this was accommodation proved to you following the acceptance of the main housing duty, which is now discharged. Consequently you must now vacate your temporary accommodation and return the keys to the council ….”

As Mr Young did not vacate 15 Ganley Court, on 12 November 2020 the Council served on him a notice to quit requiring him to vacate the property by 14 December 2020. The present proceedings were issued on 18 May 2021. By them, the Council claimed possession of 15 Ganley Court.

The Official Solicitor was appointed as Mr Young’s litigation friend on 22 November 2021 and a defence was served on his behalf. This included the contention that the Council continued to owe Mr Young the main housing duty with the result that “an eviction from the property, without the provision of suitable alternative accommodation, would be a breach of that duty”.

The matter came before District Judge Daley, sitting in the County Court at Wandsworth, on 21 September 2023. Mr Daniel Grütters, who appeared for Mr Young at the hearing, argued that the main housing duty continued, first, because “there should have been notification to [Mr Young] pursuant to section 184 of the Housing Act, that the duty under section 193(2) was considered to have come to an end on the acceptance by him of an offer of accommodation and also, more particularly, pursuant to (5), that that notification had to include information to him as to his right to seek a review” (to quote from paragraph 25 of the District Judge’s judgment) and, secondly, because “Mr Young had not in fact accepted the offer, so that section 193(6)(c) does not apply” since he “did not have capacity” (see paragraph 34 of the judgment). However, the District Judge accepted neither contention and ordered Mr Young to give vacant possession. Among other things, the District Judge considered that the evidence of Dr Suleman was “insufficient to conclude that at the time he accepted the offer, Mr Young was incapable of doing so” (paragraph 37 of the judgment).

Mr Young appealed, but without success. The appeal was dismissed by His Honour Judge Saggerson, sitting in the County Court at Central London, on 27 January 2025.

Mr Young now challenges Judge Saggerson’s decision in this Court.