CA-2025-000320 - [2025] EWCA Civ 1336

Was Mr Young still owed the main housing duty?

Mr Young’s case

Mr Justin Bates KC, who appeared for Mr Young with Mr Grütters, did not suggest that District Judge Daley’s finding that Mr Young had accepted the offer of accommodation at 25 Diprose Lodge is open to challenge. His argument (like that of Mr Grütters before Judge Saggerson) was rather that the main housing duty could not have come to an end without the Council having informed Mr Young both of that (with reasons) and of his right to request a review of such a decision. While the Council told Mr Young in its review decision that the main housing duty had been discharged, it did not inform him that he had the right to request a review. It follows, Mr Bates submitted, that the main housing duty was continuing when the matter was before the District Judge (and, in fact, has still not ceased).

As Mr Bates recognised, section 193(6)(c) of the 1996 Act states in unqualified terms that a local housing authority “shall cease to be subject to the duty under this section if the applicant … accepts an offer of accommodation under Part VI”. He argued, however, that the combined effect of sections 184 and 202 is to require the applicant to be notified that the authority considers a condition specified in section 193(6) to have been satisfied (together with reasons for concluding that no duty is now owed) and that there is a right to request a review of such a decision.

Mr Bates stressed the central importance of section 202 of the 1996 Act in the statutory scheme. Section 202(3) stipulates that a request for review must be made “before the end of the period of 21 days beginning with the day on which [the applicant] is notified of the authority’s decision or such longer period as the authority may in writing allow”. The evident purpose, Mr Bates said, is to ensure that requests for reviews are made quickly and, since that depends on the applicant being “notified of the authority’s decision”, it must be incumbent on authorities to notify applicants of their decisions. Consistently with that, Mr Bates submitted, section 184 applies. That being so, as and when an authority decides that it no longer owes the main housing duty, it must “notify the applicant of their decision and … inform him of the reasons for their decision” (in compliance with section 184(3)) and “also inform the applicant of his right to request a review of the decision and of the time within which such a request must be made” (in compliance with section 184(5)).

In the present case, Mr Bates argued, there was incorporated in the letter containing the review decision a distinct decision that the main housing duty had been discharged. The letter thus needed to inform Mr Young both of his right to appeal to the County Court against the review decision (as it did) and of his right to request a review of the discharge of duty decision (which it did not). The main housing duty did not, therefore, end.

Authorities

We were referred to three main authorities in this context: Warsame v Hounslow LBC [2000] 1 WLR 696 (“Warsame”), Ravichandran v Lewisham LBC [2010] EWCA Civ 755, [2011] PTSR 117 (“Ravichandran”) and R (Bano) v Waltham Forest LBC [2025] EWCA Civ 92, [2025] 1 WLR 2557 (“Bano”).

In Warsame, an attempt to appeal pursuant to section 204 of the 1996 Act was rejected in the County Court on the basis that section 202(1)(b) “had no application to a decision under section 193(7) whether accommodation offered under Part VI of the Act was suitable accommodation”: see 704. Allowing an appeal, Chadwick LJ, with whom Rattee J agreed, commented that the Circuit Judge’s approach “fails to give due weight to the width of section 202(1)(b)”: see 704. Chadwick LJ explained that the language of section 202(1)(b) was “apt … to apply to a decision that a duty, once owed, is owed no longer” and that “it was the intention of Parliament that decisions as to matters which, if they existed, would cause a duty to cease, are decisions which can be the subject of a request for review”: see 705-706.

Mr Bates focused on the following passage from Chadwick LJ’s judgment, at 704-705, in which I have added the emphasis:

“It is plain that section 202(1)(b) is directed, at least, to the question whether a duty arises. The phrase ‘any decision as to what duty (if any) is owed’ reflects the words in section 184(1)(b). That section requires the local authority to make enquiries to satisfy themselves ‘whether any duty, and if so what duty, is owed’ under the provisions of the Act.

But, although the paragraph plainly applies in that case, the language is apt, also, to apply to a decision that a duty, once owed, is owed no longer. A decision that a duty once owed is no longer owed is, to my mind, plainly a decision as to what duty, if any, is owed at the time when the decision is taken. I can see nothing in the language which restricts decisions within paragraph (b) to decisions whether a duty arises and excludes decisions whether a duty which has arisen has ceased.”

Mr Bates argued that Chadwick LJ’s linking of section 202(1)(b) and section 184(1)(b) indicates that section 184 is applicable where section 202(1)(b) would be and, hence, that it is in point where a local housing authority decides that “a duty, once owed, is owed no longer”. However, Chadwick LJ drew the parallel with section 184(1)(b) when explaining that section 202(1)(b) applies to “the question whether a duty arises”, not as supporting his view that section 202(1)(b) extends to “decisions as to matters which, if they existed, would cause a duty to cease”. It is fair to say that, in the context of section 202(1)(b), Chadwick LJ considered that words reflective of those used in section 184(1)(b) extended to a “decision that a duty once owed is no longer owed”, but it need not follow that a similar conclusion is to be drawn in the context of section 184(1)(b): regard must be had to how section 184(1)(b) fits into section 184 and Part VII more generally.

In Ravichandran, applicants refused an offer of accommodation under Part VI of the 1996 Act, but, following a review, the local housing authority confirmed that it considered the property suitable. A few months later, the authority informed the applicants that it was “ending its duty to assist you with housing under section 193(7)”, adding that the applicants could request a review of the decision within 21 days. The applicants duly asked for such a review, but the authority’s position remained the same: it restated that it no longer owed a duty under section 193. The applicants appealed to the County Court without success, but the Court of Appeal decided in their favour, holding that the second review had been defective.

At the time (though not now), section 193(7F) provided:

“The local housing authority shall not—

make a final offer of accommodation under Part 6 for the purposes of subsection (7);

(ab) approve a private accommodation offer; or

approve an offer of an assured shorthold tenancy for the purposes of subsection (7B),

unless they are satisfied that the accommodation is suitable for the applicant and that it is reasonable for him to accept the offer.”

Giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Stanley Burnton LJ explained in paragraph 35(5) that an applicant was “entitled to a review of the suitability requirement in section 193(7F) by virtue of section 202(1)(f) and of the reasonableness requirement in section 193(7F) by virtue of section 202(1)(b)”, observing that it was “both possible and desirable for both requirements to be reviewed at the same time”. Stanley Burnton LJ continued:

The applicant is also entitled to a review of the decision of the authority as to the discharge of its duty under section 193(7) by virtue of section 202(1)(b). If the review takes place before refusal of the final offer of accommodation, it will strictly be a review of the intention that the offer will, on refusal, result in cessation of the authority’s duty. If the review takes place after the refusal of accommodation, it will be a review of the authority’s confirmation that its duty has ceased by virtue of satisfaction of the statutory preconditions for such cessation. The applicant should be informed of the right to such review.

It is desirable that such a review of the decision of the authority as to the discharge of its duty under section 193(7) takes place at the same time as the review of the suitability requirement and the reasonableness requirement in section 193(7F). If it is intended that it will take place at the same time, the applicant should be so informed.”

Earlier in the judgment, in paragraph 31, Stanley Burnton LJ had said:

“In the present case it is clear from the correspondence … that Lewisham came to a decision in January 2009 about whether or not its duty had ceased under section 193(7). The effect of Warsame’s case is that its decision taken then, even if only confirmatory of a prior automatic discharge, was reviewable under section 202(1)(b).”

Stanley Burnton LJ thus considered that decisions which are merely confirmatory can potentially be subject to review. It is also to be noted that he said that an applicant should be informed of the right to a review of “the decision of the authority as to the discharge of its duty under section 193(7) by virtue of section 202(1)(b)”.

In Bano, the applicant, Mrs Bano, had refused a “private rented sector offer”, but she maintained that the offer letter had been defective and so that she was still owed the main housing duty. She sought judicial review in respect of the local housing authority’s refusal to accept that the duty continued, but this Court dismissed the claim on the basis that she had had available to her, but had failed to invoke, the procedure (viz. review and appeal) which was meant to apply in relation to decisions as to whether a duty under section 193 of the 1996 Act was owed. In the Court’s view, Mrs Bano could have requested a review both in relation to the offer letter and in respect of the authority’s later conclusion that its duty to the applicant had ceased.

In the course of my judgment (with which Peter Jackson and Warby LJJ agreed), I expressed the view that refusal of a private rented sector offer of itself brings the main housing duty to an end. I said in paragraph 55:

“It is doubtless the case that, as Ms Davies [i.e. counsel for Mrs Bano] said, local housing authorities commonly tell applicants who have refused offers that they consider their duties to have come to an end. No doubt, authorities also sometimes (though I would guess less often) inform applicants who have accepted private rented sector offers that the authorities’ duties have ceased. However, the legislation does not specify that an applicant must be told that the authority’s duty has terminated, and I do not think that the decided cases establish that an authority is under an obligation to inform an applicant that it considers its duty to have ceased or even to make a decision to that effect. To the contrary, Ravichandran seems to me to lend support to the proposition that, as section 193(7) of the 1996 Act is now framed, there is ‘automatic discharge’ where an offer of accommodation under Part VI is refused and, if that is right, there must similarly be ‘automatic discharge’ under section 193 (7AA) where a private rented sector offer is refused or accepted provided that the applicant has been informed of the matters mentioned in section 193 (7AB).”

Later in my judgment, when explaining why I considered that Mrs Bano had been entitled to request a review under section 202(1)(b) of the 1996 Act when she received the offer letter, I said this in paragraph 60:

“Ms Davies submitted that, while the offer letter of 11 June 2020 specifically informed Mrs Bano that she had a right to request a review of the suitability of the accommodation, it did not tell her that she could request a review on any other basis. However, (a) section 193(7AA) and (7AB)(b) of the 1996 Act impose a requirement to inform an applicant of the right to request a review of suitability but not on any other basis, (b) the offer letter included a reference to a right of review under section 202 which did not mention suitability … and (c) in any event, nothing in section 193, section 202 or elsewhere in the 1996 Act makes the right to request a review under section 202(1)(b) conditional on the applicant having been informed of the right.”

I thus noted that “section 193(7AA) and (7AB)(b) of the 1996 Act impose a requirement to inform an applicant of the right to request a review of suitability but not on any other basis”. However, Mr Bates observed that (a) no one appears to have referred to section 184 in Bano, (b) Bano concerned the provisions relating to private rented sector offers, which, he said, constitute a self-contained scheme and (c) Bano is under appeal to the Supreme Court (although Mr Bates recognised that as matters stand this Court is bound by its decision in Bano).