THE RELEVANT LEGISLATION
THE RELEVANT LEGISLATION
THE ET’s JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE THE CLAIMS
Section 2 of the ETA defines the overall jurisdiction of the ET as follows:
“Employment tribunals shall exercise the jurisdiction conferred on them by or by virtue of this Act or any other Act, whether passed before or after this Act.”
In accordance with that provision, statutes creating rights in the employment field contain provisions conferring jurisdiction to determine claims of the kind in question.
The detriment claim in this case is brought under section 47B of the ERA, which reads (so far as material) as follows:
“(1) A worker has the right not to be subjected to any detriment by any act, or any deliberate failure to act, by his employer done on the ground that the worker has made a protected disclosure.
(1A) A worker (‘W’) has the right not to be subjected to any detriment by any act, or any deliberate failure to act, done—
(a) by another worker of W’s employer in the course of that other worker’s employment, or
(b) …
on the ground that W has made a protected disclosure.
(1C)-(3) …”
It will be seen that subsection (1) provides for the liability of the employer (in this case whichever of the Abel companies turns out to have been the Claimant’s employer); and subsection (1A) provides for the liability of an individual co-worker (in this case the three individual Appellants).
Jurisdiction to determine claims under section 47B (1) and (1A) is conferred on the ET by section 48 (read in combination with section 2 of the ETA, as explained above). Subsection (1A) reads:
“A worker may present a complaint to an employment tribunal that he has been subjected to a detriment in contravention of section 47B.”
I should also note, for reasons which will appear, that section 48 (3) prescribes the limitation period for complaints under section 48 (1A). It reads:
“An employment tribunal shall not consider a complaint under this section unless it is presented [within the prescribed period]”.
The same drafting structure and language is used to confer jurisdiction to determine complaints of breaches of most of the other rights conferred by the ERA. For example, jurisdiction to determine complaints of unfair dismissal (including under section 103A) is conferred by section 111 (1), which reads:
“A complaint may be presented to an employment tribunal against an employer by any person that he was unfairly dismissed by the employer.”
Subsection (2) contains a limitation provision in the same terms as section 48 (3).
- Heading
- Sir Nicholas Underhill
- PROCEDURAL HISTORY
- THE RELEVANT LEGISLATION
- THE EARLY CONCILIATION PROVISIONS
- The Statutory Provisions
- The Early Conciliation Regulations
- The Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure
- THE EXTENT OF THE EARLY CONCILIATION OBLIGATIONS
- Langstaff P also approved observations made by HHJ Eady QC in Science Warehouse Ltd v Mills [2016] ICR 252 that, save for the obligation to provide contact information to ACAS, the early conciliation
- THE ISSUES
- THE APPEAL: JURISDICTION
- PARAS 29-30: “JURISDICTION”
- PARAS 31-32: CORE CONSTRUCTION
- PARAS. 33-34: CONSISTENCY WITH THE SCHEME OF THE RULES
- PARA. 35: LATE-DISCOVERED NON-COMPLIANCE
- PARAS. 37-38: THE AUTHORITIES
- PARAS. 39-40: DISMISSAL/STRIKING-OUT AS CASE MANAGEMENT
- CONCLUSION ON THE APPEAL
- THE CROSS-APPEAL: AMENDMENT
- THE ET’s DECISION
- THE APPELLANTS’ CHALLENGE
- Does section 18 A (1) apply to permission to amend?
- Was permission to amend wrong in principle?
- Judge Crosfill’s exercise of his discretion
- Conclusions
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