CA-2025-001079 & CA-2025-002078 - [2025] EWCA Civ 1262
Court of Appeal (Civil Division)

CA-2025-001079 & CA-2025-002078 - [2025] EWCA Civ 1262

Fecha: 07-Oct-2025

The Factual Background

The Factual Background

3.

Mr Robertson had a contract with Google LLC (“Google”), a company based in the USA, pursuant to which he provided YouTube videos. That contract was terminated on 22 February 2021 in consequence of Google’s “hate speech” policies.

4.

Mr Robertson issued a claim form against Google on 7 October 2021. This asserted claims that Google “demonetised” and “shadow banned” Mr Robertson’s channel prior to its termination. He alleged that those actions, and the termination itself, amounted to unlawful discrimination on account of his philosophical beliefs or race, contrary to s.29 of the Equality Act 2010. In the alternative, Mr Robertson alleged that the termination was a breach of contract. The claim form had to be served on Google in the USA within 6 months, namely by 7 April 2022.

5.

Mr Robertson did not act promptly. It was not until 5 April 2022 that the claim form was delivered to Google’s headquarters. However, the mandatory form N510 (explained in greater detail below) was not filed with the court or provided with the claim form. On 19 April 2022, Google pointed out that omission and said that, in consequence, proper service had not been effected. As a result of the letter from Google, Mr Robertson filed the N510 with the court on 22 April 2022 together with an application for relief from sanctions.

6.

In this way, valid service of the claim form had not taken place within the statutory 6 months. Unless a subsequent order rectifying that position was made in Mr Robertson’s favour, that was likely to mean that some of his claims, including the claim under the Equality Act, were statute-barred (Footnote: 1). But it would appear that other claims, based on the same or similar facts and matters, could be made even now in fresh proceedings, and still be within time. For example, the ordinary limitation period for claims for breach of contract is 6 years from the date of the alleged breach, so such claims may not expire in this case until 22 February 2027. In this way, the ultimate purpose of the procedural jousting at the heart of this appeal remains a little opaque.