CA-2024-002185 - [2025] EWCA Civ 1049

The judge identified the two versions of the PCP referred to in paragraph 28 above. He referred to the statistical analysis provided by the appellant. He summarised the submissions of the appellant and the respondent.

The judge said at paragraph 44 of his judgment that women were more likely to be placed in what he referred to as temporary accommodation (which I understand to be a reference to persons owed duties under Part VII of the 1996 Act although that is not clearly stated to be the case) for the reasons set out in paragraph 27 of Shelter’s written submissions. Those submissions noted that women were, as they described it, over-represented in temporary accommodation (which I take to mean that women are more likely to be owed duties than men) because women were more likely than men to be single parents with children which is one of the largest categories of persons having a priority need.

The material parts of the judgment are at paragraphs 44 to 48. The judge found that the database did not amount to a PCP, that if it did the statistical evidence relied upon did not establish that it put women at a particular disadvantage as compared with men, and, if it did, he was satisfied that the respondent had shown that it was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. It was not therefore in breach of section 19 of the 2010 Act. He said this:

“44.

I am not satisfied that the creation of a database in the manner described by the defendant is a PCP. I accept Ms Screeche-Powell's [counsel for the respondent’s] primary submission that the inclusion of information to manage and to organise information is not to apply a practice, provision, or criteria but is a tool that gives practical assistance to the defendant's housing officers in sifting through vast quantities of information and matching the demands on its service to supply. It is not a complete database for all the information which is available to the defendant's housing officers.

45.

If that conclusion is incorrect, then I am not satisfied that the statistical evidence which has been produced shows true comparators that demonstrate that women are at a disadvantage. The analysis of the information available, as set out in Ms Screeche-Powell's submissions, raises too many imponderables as to the categories referred to make meaningful comparison to show that women are at a disadvantage. The fact that more women as a percentage are placed in unsuitable accommodation is recognised above but I am doubtful that the statistics relied upon show discrimination. I should say that I fully accept the helpful witness evidence of Ms Pennington which explains the adverse effects of women being placed in unsuitable accommodation.

46.

Whilst I accept the generality of Ms Screeche-Powell's submissions on this issue, it seems to me that the crucial point is that in order to show that more women with children are affected by homelessness than men with children by being left in unsuitable temporary accommodation, it would be necessary to establish that the hypothetical male homeless applicant is statistically more likely to receive an offer of permanent suitable accommodation as a result of being on the database. There is no evidence that that is the case. I am also not satisfied that there is a causal link between the use of the database and the particular disadvantages identified by the claimant. As said by Ms Screeche-Powell, the database merely gathers together some of the information on tenants and acts as a “pivot tool” for the defendant's housing officers.

47.

If that conclusion is incorrect, and the PCP is discriminatory, I have concluded that the creation of the database was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. I have been referred to the decision in R (Elkundi) v Birmingham City Council [2022] QB 604 , where the Court of Appeal held that it was unlawful for a local housing authority to postpone compliance with the duty under section 193(2) of the HA 1996 by placing applicants on a waiting list. I do not accept that the database operates as a waiting list or as a means of delaying the provision of suitable accommodation to applicants, in breach of the defendant's duties under Part VII of the HA 1996 . Its purpose is the exact opposite.

48.

I accept Ms Screeche-Powell's submissions that the database is a tool that gives practical assistance to officers in sifting through vast quantities of information and matching the demands on its service to supply. It is a powerful point that it does not contain all the information before an officer, which typically includes the housing application, identification such as passports/birth certificates (eligibility), benefit entitlement documents, bank statements, affordability assessments, self-assessment medical forms, interview notes, medical records, medical reports (vulnerability) and could easily include other documents such as ECHP reports, Care Act assessments, MARAC assessments.”

The judge also found that the respondent was not in breach of its duty under section 149 of the 2010 Act.