CA-2024-002185 - [2025] EWCA Civ 1049

Part VII of the 1996 Act imposes a range of duties in respect of persons who are homeless, or threatened with homelessness, and who are eligible for assistance (that is, they are not excluded from receiving assistance because they are persons from abroad or asylum seekers or their dependants: see section 183 of the 1996 Act). The existence of the duties is dependent, in part, on the satisfaction of certain criteria such as whether a person is homeless, whether the person is intentionally homeless, and whether the person has a priority need. Each of those terms is defined in the 1996 Act. In particular section 189 provides that the following persons “have a priority need for accommodation”:

“(a)

a pregnant woman or a person with whom she resides or might reasonably be expected to reside;

(b)

a person with whom dependent children reside or might reasonably be expected to reside;

(c)

a person who is vulnerable as a result of old age, mental illness or handicap or physical disability or other special reason, or with whom such a person resides or might reasonably be expected to reside;

(d)

a person who is homeless or threatened with homelessness as a result of an emergency such as flood, fire or other disaster;

(e)

a person who is homeless as a result of that person being a victim of domestic abuse.”

Different duties are owed in different circumstances. Most of the duties are owed for a limited or defined period. There is, by way of example, an interim duty to secure accommodation where the housing authority “have reason to believe” that the applicant may be homeless and have a priority need (section 188 of the 1996 Act). That duty continues whilst the housing authority conducts inquiries and decides whether the applicant is in fact homeless and has a priority need. Section 190 of the 1996 Act imposes a duty where an applicant is homeless but became homeless intentionally. Then the duty on the housing authority is to secure that accommodation is available “for such period as they consider will give him a reasonable opportunity of securing accommodation” together with advice and assistance.

Section 193 of the 1996 Act imposes a duty owed to those who are homeless, have a priority need and are not homeless intentionally. This is often referred to as “the full duty” or the “main duty”. The duty is to secure that accommodation becomes available for occupation by the applicant. The duty comes to an end where, amongst other circumstances, an applicant accepts an offer of accommodation from the housing authority under Part VI of the 1996 Act or accepts an offer of an assured tenancy from a private landlord. This appeal concerns men and women to whom this duty is owed.

The material provisions of section 193 for present purposes are as follows:

“(1)

This section applies where the local housing authority are satisfied that an applicant is homeless, eligible for assistance, and has a priority need, and are not satisfied that he became homeless intentionally.

(2)

Unless the authority refer the application to another local housing authority (see section 198), they shall secure that accommodation is available for occupation by the applicant.

(3)

The authority are subject to the duty under this section until it ceases by virtue of any of the following provisions of this section.

…..

(5)

The local housing authority shall cease to be subject to the duty under this section if—

(a)

the applicant, having been informed by the authority of the possible consequence of refusal or acceptance and of the right to request a review of the suitability of the accommodation, refuses an offer of accommodation which the authority are satisfied is suitable for the applicant,

(b)

that offer of accommodation is not an offer of accommodation under Part 6 or a private rented sector offer, and

(c)

the authority notify the applicant that they regard themselves as ceasing to be subject to the duty under this section.

(6)

The local housing authority shall cease to be subject to the duty under this section if the applicant—

(a)

ceases to be eligible for assistance,

(b)

becomes homeless intentionally from the accommodation made available for his occupation,

(c)

accepts an offer of accommodation under Part VI (allocation of housing), or (cc) accepts an offer of an assured tenancy (other than an assured shorthold tenancy) from a private landlord,

(d)

otherwise voluntarily ceases to occupy as his only or principal home the accommodation made available for his occupation.

“(7)

The local housing authority shall also cease to be subject to the duty under this section if the applicant, having been informed of the possible consequence of refusal or acceptance and of his right to request a review of the suitability of the accommodation, refuses a final offer of accommodation under Part 6.

…..”

A housing authority may discharge its functions by (a) securing that suitable accommodation provided by the local housing authority is available, (b) securing that the person obtains suitable accommodation from some other person or (c) by giving the person such advice and assistance as will secure that suitable accommodation is available from some other person (see section 206 of the 1996 Act). An applicant has a right to request a review of a decision of a housing authority, including a decision that accommodation is suitable, under section 202 of the 1996 Act. An applicant who is dissatisfied with a decision on a review may appeal to the county court under section 204 of the 1996 Act.

Section 193(2) imposes an “immediate, non-deferrable and unqualified duty”: see R (Elkundi) Birmingham City Council [2022] EWCA Civ 601; [2022] QB at paragraph 81. The duty is a public law duty owed personally to the individual and is enforceable by way of a claim for judicial review. A court may grant a mandatory order requiring an authority to comply with its duty although it may, as a matter of discretion, decline to grant such an order if it is satisfied, on proper evidence, that it is not possible for the authority to fulfil its duty: see, generally, R (Imam) v London Borough of Croydon [2025] AC 335 at paragraphs 36 to 70.