[2025] EWCA Crim 1114

We turn to our decision on the matter. As we have already indicated, we put to one side the suggestion that this was in terms of culpability to be assessed as a category C case. Further, as to mitigation the judge did have regard to the appellant's previous good character and caring responsibilities. But he was, in the circumstances of this case, in our judgment, entitled to give relatively limited weight to such factors. We also do not regard the judge's finding that the appellant was aware of police presence prior to the crash to be of significance. What was of significance was that the appellant clearly knew what a "meet" involved and knew that at the time he was deliberately showing off in accelerating as he did.

We can accept that whilst the circumstances here present in various respects come close to constituting various of the factors set out in culpability A none squarely or obviously does so. In particular, as to the judge's finding that this was an "obviously highly dangerous manoeuvre" we accept that that can indeed be queried. It is to be noted that, under the factor set out in the guideline, the manoeuvre required for the purposes of the guideline is heavily qualified. It not only has to be highly dangerous but also has to be obviously so. That raises the bar high. But all that said, we do not consider that that vitiates the judge's ultimate conclusion that a notional figure of 9 years was appropriate. Not only was what the appellant did, on any view, very dangerous, in circumstances of him knowing that there were spectators and pedestrians around, but he also was significantly in excess of the speed limit and was, even if not racing, showing off. Further, he was not in a modern high-performance car engineered and designed to accommodate high-speed acceleration but, as he knew, was in an older model which had been heavily adapted and converted; and which, as illustrated by the previous incident that had been witnessed by Mr Hale, at least had a tendency to swing or swerve if driven inappropriately.

We consider that the combination of all the circumstances in this case at the very least took this case to the cusp of culpability between category A and category B. As the bottom of the range for category A is 8 years and as the top of the range for category B is 9 years, we see no error in the end result in the judge selecting a figure of 9 years as he did - the more so, when, whilst allowing for mitigation, there were additional aggravating factors involved.

As to the judge's increase of 6 years from that starting figure to reflect the totality of the offending and the totality of the counts on the indictment, we can see no error in that either. Not one young person was killed but two. Not one young person was gravely injured but two. That necessitated a very significant uplift in this particular case; and we conclude that an increase of 6 years was one properly open to the sentencing judge.

In conclusion, of course it is to be accepted that the appellant did not intend to cause this harm; but he cannot escape the catastrophic consequences of his wilfully reckless driving in circumstances such as these. A sentence overall of 13½ years' imprisonment no doubt was on the severe side and certainly cannot be described as a "lenient" sentence. But there was no particular reason why the sentence should be lenient, given the circumstances of this case. In any event, that is not the question for this court. The question for this court is whether such a sentence was manifestly excessive. This court is of the opinion that it was not. Accordingly, we uphold the sentence and we dismiss the appeal.