[2025] EWCA Crim 1114

The appellant is a man in his mid-50s. He was of previous positive good character, having no previous convictions of any kind. Strong personal character references were put in on his behalf. He had just one prior endorsement for exceeding the 30 mile per hour speeding limit on one occasion. Further mitigation was advanced to the effect that he had caring responsibilities for his ill wife and for one of his sons. Regrettably the pre-sentence report that was prepared identified no true remorse on the part of the appellant at that time. It was stated in the pre-sentence report that the appellant focused on the predicament in which he found himself and did not focus on the consequences of his actions. This perhaps is to be added to the fact that he had not been frank in interview and indeed had maintained a plea of not guilty up until the door of the court. However, Mr Balbir Singh, counsel on his behalf, has assured us that the appellant does indeed feel true remorse for what he has done. It may be that, as the judge said, the appellant was at that time not able to recognise the true horrors of what he had caused - we hope he does now.

Much of the debate before the judge and much of the debate before us has focused on the Sentencing Guidelines applicable to offences of causing death by dangerous driving and to offences of causing serious injury by dangerous driving. The maximum sentence for causing death by dangerous driving is, under the amended legislation, life imprisonment. The maximum sentence for causing serious injury by dangerous driving is 5 years' imprisonment. Those guidelines relate to one particular offence. The guidelines for assessing culpability are in effect the same for causing death by dangerous driving and for causing serious injury by dangerous driving. The highest category of culpability under the guidelines is culpability A. Any one of the identified factors is capable of bringing the driving into that level of culpability. A number of those factors, as set out in the guideline, demonstrably are not present in this case: for example, intoxication or evasion of the police. But some at least had prospective application. These are as follows:

Some attempt was made before the sentencing judge, and was maintained before us, to persuade the court that this was a category C case. We, as did the judge, regard that as wholly untenable. One only has to consider the circumstances of this case to assess that the appellant was at the least driving at an inappropriate speed for the conditions and further that the standard of driving was very much beyond being simply "just over" the threshold for dangerous driving. We therefore reject that particular point at the outset.

Under the guidelines the starting point for one offence of causing death by dangerous driving where category A culpability is involved is 12 years' custody, with a sentencing range of 8 to 18 years' custody. The starting point for one offence of causing death by dangerous driving where the culpability is category B is 6 years' custody, with a range of 4 to 9 years' custody. As to causing serious injury by dangerous driving where (as accepted was the case here) the harm is at the highest level, the starting point, where the culpability is category A, is 4 years' custody, with a range of 3 to 5 years; and where the culpability is category B, the starting point is 3 years custody with a range of 2 to 4 years' custody.

In the Crown Court the prosecution had submitted that this was a culpability B case. In argument, however, the judge queried that, suggesting that this might be in terms of culpability a category A case albeit at the lower end, as involving an "obviously highly dangerous manoeuvre". That was then debated before the judge. At all events that in the result was the conclusion the judge reached. He, amongst other things, said this in the course of his sentencing remarks:

Having assessed those aspects, the judge necessarily also had to take into account the fact here of two counts of causing death by dangerous driving and two counts of causing serious injury by dangerous driving, which obviously had to be reflected in the overall sentence that was to be passed. Doing that, he indicated that the total sentence, had there been a trial, would have been 15 years' imprisonment. With allowance of 10 per cent by way of credit for the late pleas that resulted in the sentence of 13½ years' imprisonment imposed, achieved by a combination of concurrent sentences on each count and with counts 1 and 2 being taken as the lead counts.