[2025] EWCA Crim 1114

We turn, then, to the submissions made to this Court. On behalf of the appellant Mr Singh argues that this sentence was excessive. He has, in essentials, three grounds. First, he says that the case was wrongly categorised in terms of culpability and in consequence the judge took too high a notional figure of 9 years. Second, he says that, even if the notional figure could be justified, an increase of 6 years to allow for the other counts was simply much too much. Third, he says that the judge unreasonably downplayed the mitigation available to the appellant, in particular his previous good character. He also submits that the judge had no basis for finding, as the judge appears to have done, that the appellant knew that there was a police presence and police concern before the fatal crash occurred.

In the course of his arguments, both written and oral, Mr Singh developed the following particular points, amongst others. This was, he submits, a single momentary incident of dangerous driving, which did not last over a sustained period of time or length of road. There had been no racing and there had been no evidence of any aggressive driving beforehand. He stresses that no harm was foreseen or intended; and he says it was a hideous mischance that the victims were standing as bystanders on the pavement at that particular spot. He goes on to submit that the acceleration of the car away from the roundabout could not be considered an "obviously highly dangerous manoeuvre", albeit he necessarily accepts that it was deliberate and it was done with a view to showing off. It is also true, as he accepts, that the speed was significantly in excess of the applicable speed limit; but again he says that this was over a relatively limited period of time and distance. Moreover, the crash itself was occasioned when the appellant had tried unsuccessfully to correct the initial skid. He also adds that the appellant had previously driven a car in the preceding months without any issues or accidents.

Overall, he says, that whilst the material cause of the incident was the appellant’s loss of control occasioned by the combination of speed and acceleration, he says that, in terms of culpability, if this case was not to be put within category C then it should be put in category B and not in category A. In any event he argues, as we have said, that the uplift the judge gave for the other counts in the indictment could not be sustained, given that everything that occurred arose out of one incident.

For the prosecution Ms Heeley KC supports the judge's reasoning and the judge's conclusion: which she says were properly open to the judge. Whilst the prosecution had below suggested that this was a culpability B case, she submits that the judge was entitled to take a different view and to find that this was a category A case for the reasons he gave. She emphasises that attention must be given to the context in which the dangerous driving occurred as well as to the actual dangerous driving itself. Further, she stresses that in accelerating away from the roundabout at speed the appellant had acted deliberately and with a view to showing off. Moreover, in doing as he did and in significantly exceeding the speed limit he knew that there would be spectators and pedestrians watching nearby. Overall, she submits that the judge's approach was justified and that at all events his notional figure of 9 years could not be faulted. She further goes on to submit that an increase to 15 years before credit for plea properly reflected the fact that here there were two deaths and two seriously injured other victims. Thus, she argues, this sentence cannot properly be described as manifestly excessive.