OUTCOME
78.Accordingly I propose to make the following capital orders in this case:-(i)The American property will be transferred to the wife. She will be responsible for the costs of the transfer and any tax consequences arising from it.(ii)The net proceeds of realisation of the husband’s bank stock will be divided equally between the parties as and when the entitlement to realise arises. The parties have already agreed a form of words.(iii)The joint HSBC accounts will be divided equally.(iv)The husband will pay a lump sum made up of the equalising figure of £2,092,126 plus the additional compensation award of £500,000, i.e. a total of £2,592,126. (v)There will be a pension sharing order of 39.02% on the husband’s pension.(vi)Otherwise the assets will remain where they stand on a clean break basis.79.Such a division, using my asset schedule above, should produce the following outcome:-80.I have reached the conclusion that the reasons I have set out above amount to good justification for this fairly modest departure of equality on capital.81.It remains for me to determine the unagreed child periodical payments order issues to which I drew attention above.82.As far as the quantum of child periodical payments is concerned, I propose to follow the approach of Mostyn J in CB v KB [2019] EWFC 78 to these awards where the payer’s earnings are above the CMS cap; i.e. a figure is fixed by reference to the CMS formula ignoring the cap. I am told by Counsel that it is agreed that this figure in broad terms amounts to £50,000 per annum, or £25,000 per child per annum. I propose to adopt this figure in my order. This figure will have CPI uplifts from the first anniversary and each anniversary thereafter.83.My view is that the order should follow the orthodox pattern of continuing until the children respectively cease full-time education, including tertiary education up to a first degree and including one pre-university gap year. For periods after the completion of secondary education two thirds of this sum should be paid to the respective child directly and one third should be paid to the wife as a roofing allowance.84.It is common ground that the husband will pay all future school fees for both children, but there is a difference of view about university tuition fees. The issue is complicated by the fact that there might very well be a difference of opinion as to whether the children should pursue their tertiary education in the UK or the USA. Typically, tuition fees are cheaper in the UK and there is usually a government loan available. In the USA tuition fees are typically much more expensive, but there are not infrequently scholarships available. Further, especially in B’s case, decisions about tertiary education are some years away and the respective income positions may look very different when the time comes to make those decisions. For me to make an all-encompassing order now for the husband to pay university tuition fees, whatever they may be, I fear runs the risk of pre-judging the sensible child-focused decision which should be made at that time. In the circumstances I propose to make an order which leaves open the question of how university tuition fees are funded to be decided as and when the time arrives. I trust that these two well-educated and intelligent adults, who love their children dearly, will make sure that their differences do not in due course get in the way of the children’s obvious needs to engage in suitable and good quality tertiary education. 85.This is my decision and I invite counsel to produce a draft order which matches these conclusions. I am handing this judgment down by email in the late morning of 2nd December 2022 and will reconvene the hearing at 2.00 pm, at which I trust we will be able to settle a final order.86.I have not in this judgment specifically discussed the issue of costs, but in view of FPR 2010 Rule 28 this is a case where ‘no order for costs’ is the general rule and my provisional view is that neither of the respective open offers justify any departure from this general rule. Further, my provisional view is that there are no relevant conduct issues here. I will receive any further submissions on this if either party wishes to make them.87.My provisional view is that I should publish this judgment on The National Archives in anonymised and redacted form and propose to invite Counsel to address me on this view if they wish and also to suggest what anonymisations/redactions should be executed.HHJ Edward HessCentral Family Court2nd December 20221 This figure is based on a value of $1,275,000, converting to £1,080,508 less notional sale costs and US and UK tax = £920,434 2 This figure is based on a value of $1,320,000 = £1,118,644 less notional sale costs at 3% less the outstanding mortgage of £266,875 less CGT of £238,041 = £580,169 3 This figure is based on a total of incurred fees of £419,894 less a total of fees paid of £394,366 = £25,5294 Payable in tranches over a number of years5 This figure is based on a total of incurred fees of £375,337 less a total of fees paid of £333,843 = £41,494
- INTRODUCTION
- THE MARRIAGE
- FINANCIAL REMEDIES PROCEEDINGS
- SOME CORE LAW
- Section 25 and Section 25A Matrimonial Causes Act 1973
- FIRST CONSIDERATION – THE WELFARE OF THE MINOR CHILDREN
- property and other financial resources which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future
- PENSION ASSETS
- is likely to have in the foreseeable future
- standard of living
- duration of the marriage
- INCOME AND COMPENSATION
- wife
- McFarlane
- Waggott v Waggott
- OUTCOME
