Case No. EWFC-155

 [2018] EWCA Civ 727). If I take the view that the Wife has satisfied me that there was relationship generated disadvantage, I am clear that I must comply with section 25A and see if I can reflect that disadvantage fairly within the capital division such that a clean break can still be achieved… Finally, I turn to compensation for relationship generated disadvantage. I have found quantification of this claim very difficult. First, I am satisfied that I should take the Husband's future working life at four years until he has attained twenty years in the partnership. His income is likely to fall during that period and he will have an obligation to maintain the children both as to their maintenance and their school fees for a considerable number of years thereafter…I have formed the very clear view that there should be a clean break in this case. The Wife has already benefited from the Husband's earnings since she gave up work until now, given my equal division of the assets. I am clear that, when I look at relationship generated disadvantage, it is the next four years that I have to consider…I have come to the conclusion that an appropriate sum to award for relationship generated disadvantage, over and above her half share of the assets, is the sum of £400,000. Whilst this could be portrayed as being an additional £100,000 per annum for the likely remainder of the Husband's time at the firm, it will be paid up front on the sale of the former matrimonial home…Exceptionally, in this case, I have found there to have been relationship generated disadvantage sufficient to justify an award of compensation. I continue to be of the view that such cases will be very much the exception rather than the rule. It is rare to be able to make the findings of fact that I have made in this case. Even having done so, I have been clear that the case remains a suitable one for a clean break with, by the standards of such cases, a relatively modest additional award. I have already made the point that, in many of these cases, the assets will be such that any loss is already covered by the applicant's sharing claim. In other cases, the assets/income will be insufficient to justify such a claim in the first place. It follows that litigants should think long and hard before launching a claim for relationship generated disadvantage and they should not take this judgment as any sort of "green light" to do so unless the circumstances are truly exceptional.”76.In my view the present case presents very similar facts to those in RC v JC and I have reached the conclusion that the present case is one of those rare and truly exceptional cases where a discrete compensation award is appropriate. I have no difficulty on the facts of this case in concluding that the wife has made a relationship-generated sacrifice of her high earning career in investment finance to devote herself to supporting her husband’s career choices and providing child-care for her children. I have concluded that, whilst she should be able to find reasonable work now, this is very unlikely to get her back to anything like where she would have been if she had not made that relationship-generated sacrifice. In the search for fairness, in the context of the House of Lords guidance in Miller v. Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane, my view is that this sacrifice should be reflected in the outcome of this case.77.How should this compensation claim be quantified? Like Moor J, I have found this the most difficult part of the exercise. The award must reflect the fact that the wife in this case has to a significant extent benefited through the sharing exercise from the upside of her sacrifice – the accretion of capital from the husband’s high earnings, including the fruits of the absence of income tax in the Middle East. I must take care not to fix the award in a way which amounts to a sharing award of the husband’s high income. I bear in mind that the wife made a voluntary choice to do what she did with her career. Although a compensation claim is an income-related claim I need to bear in mind the statutory steer in favour of a clean break arising from Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, section 25A – and there is enough capital in the husband’s hands to achieve this fairly. In the end I have concluded that I should broadly follow a similar route to the one adopted by Moor J in relation to the wife’s compensation claim. To achieve a fair outcome I propose to add five tranches of £100,000, a total of £500,000 to the wife’s award and to order that they be paid now as a lump sum on a clean break basis.