Case No. EWFC-155

and also any relevant case law.30.Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, Section 25 reads as follows:-(1)It shall be the duty of the court in deciding whether to exercise its powers under section 23, 24, 24A or 24B above and, if so, in what manner, to have regard to all the circumstances of the case, first consideration being given to the welfare while a minor of any child of the family who has not attained the age of eighteen.(2)As regards the exercise of the powers of the court under section 23(1)(a), (b) or (c), 24, 24A or 24Babove in relation to a party to the marriage, the court shall in particular have regard to the following matters:-(a)the income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future, including in the case of earning capacity any increase in that capacity which it would in the opinion of the court be reasonable to expect a party to the marriage to take steps to acquire;(b)the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;(c)the standard of living enjoyed by the family before the breakdown of the marriage;(d)the age of each party to the marriage and the duration of the marriage;(e)any physical or mental disability of either of the parties to the marriage;(f)the contributions which each of the parties has made or is likely in the foreseeable future to make to the welfare of the family, including any contribution by looking after the home or caring for the family;(g)the conduct of each of the parties, if that conduct is such that it would in the opinion of the court be inequitable to disregard it;(h)in the case of proceedings for divorce or nullity of marriage, the value to each of the parties to the marriage of any benefit which, by reason of the dissolution or annulment of the marriage, that party will lose the chance of acquiring.31.Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, Section 25A reads as follows:-(1)Where on or after the grant of a decree of divorce or nullity of marriage the court decides to exercise its powers under section 23(1)(a), (b) or (c), 24 or 24A or 24B above in favour of a party to the marriage, it shall be the duty of the court to consider whether it would be appropriate so to exercise those powers that the financial obligations of each party towards the other will be terminated as soon after the grant of the decree as the court considers just and reasonable.(2)Where the court decides in such a case to make a periodical payments or secured periodical payments order in favour of a party to the marriage, the court shall in particular consider whether it would be appropriate to require those payments to be made or secured only for such term as would in the opinion of the court be sufficient to enable the party in whose favour the order is made to adjust without undue hardship to the termination of his or her financial dependence on the other party.32.The interpretation of these statutory provisions has to be considered against the background of the relevant case law, and the present case calls me to have to give some thought to how the leading House of Lords authority of Miller v. Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24, in particular the speeches of Lord Nicholls and Baroness Hale, should be followed to achieve a fair outcome. Extracts from these speeches appear below.33.Per Lord Nicholls:-“.” 34.Per Baroness Hale:-“35.In the years since 2006 the courts have become very used to applying the needs and sharing principles and it is not necessary for me to say very much about them at this stage, save to say that Lord Nicholls’ words (“When their partnership ends each is entitled to an equal share of the assets of the partnership, unless there is a good reason to the contrary”) have become widely applicable in relation to matrimonial property. For example, in the words of Mostyn J in JL v SL [2015] EWHC 360:-“Matrimonial property is the property which the parties have built up by their joint (but inevitably different) efforts during the span of their partnership. It should be divided equally. This principle is reflected in statutory systems in other jurisdictions. It resonates with moral and philosophical values. It promotes equality and banishes discrimination.”36.The present case is perhaps unusual because it engages, at least potentially, the compensation principle. I shall return to this issue, and the various authorities on it, below.